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Book Reviews


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ARTICLES

MAO DUN AND NIETZSCHE: FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END (1917-1979)*

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The aim of this study is to point out the history of Mao Dun’s relation to Nietzsche on the basis of his essays, translations and other foreign and Chinese intellectuals, from the beginning of his critical career as a young Chinese man of letters during World War I up to the end of 1970s, two years before his death.

Hier sass ich, wartend, wartend – doch auf Nichts,
Jenseits von Gut und Böse, bald des Lichts
Geniessend, bald des Schattens, ganz nur Spiel,
Ganz See, ganz Mittag, ganz ohne Ziel.

Dann plötzlich, Freundin! wurde Eins zu Zwei –
- Und Zarathustra ging an mir vor vorbei...
(Nietzsche: Sils-Maria)

My article on Nietzsche’s reception and survival in China in the years 1918-1925 appeared in 1971.1 Before and after its publication some hundred works were written in the Chinese world (mostly in Taiwan and in the last twenty years in the PRC) and abroad on different aspects of Nietzsche’s life and his work.2 As far as modern Chinese intellectual history is concerned, most attention was paid to Lu Xun [1] (1881-1936) and to Li Shicen [2] (1892-1935). My contribution will follow, at least partly, my studies in modern Chinese intellectual histo-

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ry, use the methodology of the systemo-structural approach and try to supplement my former research. As indicated in the title of this paper, it will be related to Mao Dun [3] (1896-1981), my steady life companion.

Mao Dun’s not very well-known article, and up to now more or less concealed work, Nicai xueshuo [4] Nietzsche’s Teaching)³ begins with the words which did not attract the attention of the readers or researchers up to now: “The end of the 19th century produced three great personalities: Nietzsche, Ibsen and Maeterlinck. Where their outward appearance is concerned, they are completely different. Their view of life follows three different ways, but in one aspect there are united: their life observations show that the human life is striving for a bright future (guangming) [6].”⁴ This was formerly not his own opinion, but it was taken from one of his favourite authors Archibald Henderson, at that time a popular scholar on mostly European contemporary drama. Mao Dun then proceeds immediately with three examples: Stockmann from Ibsen’s drama An Enemy of the People, Monna Vanna from Maeterlinck’s drama of the same name, and Zarathustra from Nietzsche’s most well-known “novel” (according to Mao Dun) Also sprach Zarathustra.⁵

Stockmann was known to a few Chinese readers from 1908 from the long treatise by Lu Xun entitled Muolo shili shuo [7] On the Satanic Power of Poetry.⁶ Lu Xun wrote that Dr. Stockmann, the central character of the drama “stubbornly defended truth against the fools and was constantly accused of being an enemy of the people... Towards the end, he exclaimed: “I have discovered truth – the strongest man is the man who stands alone.”⁷ Ten years later, Hu Shi [9] (1892-1961) published a long article Yibushengzhuyi [10] Ibsenism, to which many young Chinese readers had access, and where Dr. Stockmann and similar idealists were highlighted. Ibsen’s wholesome individualism was slightly corrected and the socio-political importance of the “minority” vs. “majority” redefined. According to Hu Shi: “It is generally held that what the majority thinks, must be correct. Ibsen absolutely rejects this superstition. The majority is always wrong, the minority is always correct.”⁸ Together with this article a part of

³ Xuesheng zazhi [5] Students Magazine, 7, 1-4, pp. 1-12, 13-24, 25-34 and 35-48. Nietzsche’s Teaching will henceforth be pointed to as NT.
⁴ Ibid., p. 1.
⁷ Ibid., p. 212. The quotation is from Ibsen’s op. cit., Act V.
the Chinese translation of *An Enemy of the People* appeared in the same issue of the journal.\(^9\) Mao Dun although he held Ibsen in high esteem, he mentioned him occasionally, but he did not write about him, since he was quite well known in China after 1918. In 1919 Mao Dun did not include into his *Jindai xijujia zhuan* [15] *Biographies of Modern Dramatists*, for the same reason, the biographies of four of them: Ibsen, Shaw, Leo Tolstoy and Oscar Wilde.\(^10\)

Monna Vanna, both as a whole play and a main character, was known to Mao Dun at least by 1919, in English translation or in critical evaluation, as a hypostasis of female “Superman”, and he even specified it just in this way. During my visit to the Mao Dun Museum in Peking on July 17, 1996 I found among Mao Dun’s books from his Commercial Press period (1916-1932) a volume of essays by Frank Wadleigh Chandler *The Contemporary Drama of France*. Mao Dun certainly read one devoted to Maeterlinck and even underscored the last part of it. In *Monna Vanna* Maurice Maeterlinck “paints a firmly outlined picture of sharp contrasts and true perspectives also, involving, the consideration of two ethical dilemmas. The first concerns the duty of a woman to yield her honor in order that a starving city may be saved. The second concerns her separation from her husband when he fails to recognize the nobility of her motive. Pisa, besieged by the Florentines, can be relieved from famine only if Vanna will consent to the nefarious terms proposed by Prinzivalle, chief of the enemy host. Against her husband’s protest, but with the approval of his father, a Platonist idealist, Vanna visits the tent of Prinzivalle prepared to sacrifice herself. But Prinzivalle spares her. He is a chivalrous lover who long has cherished his youthful dream of Vanna. When he is threatened by Florentine treachery, she leads him for refuge to Pisa, but is received by her husband as a modern Judith luring her betrayer in order to slay him. In vain she endeavours to convince Guido (her husband, M.G.) of the truth, and, when only her false accusation of Prinzivalle can save him, she is ready to assert his guilt, to claim him as her prisoner, and to prepare to flee with him as her prisoner, at the first opportunity.”\(^11\)

In the article mostly adapted on the basis of a study by Barrett Harper Clark from *Continental Drama of Today*, and entitled *Meidelinke pingzhuan* [16] *Maurice Maeterlinck’s Life and Work*,\(^12\) from the year 1921, just after quoting Maeterlinck’s letter to Clark concerned with his “dynamic” and “static” plays, and their “human”, or better to say “superhuman” characteristics, Mao Dun

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10 See *Students Magazine*, 6, July 1919, 7, p. 56. This article was published in 6 installments between July and December of this year. I have seen only those published between July and November, pp. 53-98.
wrote the following: “In Maeterlinck’s view, ‘Superman’ is most necessary. Apart from Monna Vanna his other plays have a ‘Superman’ flavour.” It seems that he regarded Pelléas et Mélisande as such, having the force of Ibsen’s dramas. One year later, Mao Dun translated Anton Hellmann’s essay Hauptmann and the Nietzschean Philosophy where the impact of Nietzsche on Maeterlinck is stressed: “The ideas that originated in Nietzsche’s ‘Human all too Human’, and in ‘The Dawn of the Day’ were certainly not lost upon him,” although he was able to blend Nietzsche’s ideas with his own, or those of Henri Bergson or William James. 

In agreement with A. Hellmann and certainly many other literary critics and historians of his days, Mao Dun characterized Ibsen as a pioneer of modern realist drama. According to the first: “A turning-point in the history of the drama occurred when the writings of Henrik Ibsen appeared. The evolution of the social-drama of his middle-period marks the place where modern drama began... Philosophically, however, he seemed to be ever striving toward something behind his reach; something which Nietzsche presented, considerably involved, in ‘Thus spake Zarathustra’...” And then followed others: George Bernard Shaw, who presented his own image of “superman” in his play Man and Superman, and in some of his essays. After him Hermann Sudermann’s first play Honor was named, written allegedly under the spell of the The Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil, Auguste Strindberg whom Nietzsche mentioned in Ecce Homo as “the first to incorporate the Nietzschean philosophy into his plays.” And Gabriele d’Annunzio, José Echegaray, Eugène Brieux and Arthur Schnitzler. Mao Dun translated act three of Shaw’s play Man and Superman, Strindberg’s short stories Compulsory Marriage and Half a Sheet of

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13 On Modern Playwrights, p. 44.
14 Loc. cit.
20 Translated under the pseudonym of Xi Zhen in the Students Magazine, 6, 1919, 2. Its Chinese title was Diyou zhonzhi duitan [29] Don Juan in Hell, and it was the third act of Shaw’s play.
He translated also *La Mort de Tintagiles* and *L'Intérieur* two “plays for Marionettes”, both about death, by Maeterlinck, and wrote, although always through a mediary, about Echegaray, Brieux, Sudermann and D’Annunzio.

Death and unhappy marriage were often the topic of the plays (or parts of them), or short stories, Mao Dun translated between the years 1919 and 1922. Here we may mention Leo Tolstoy’s *The Living Corpse*, Rabindranath Tagore’s *The Skeleton*, or *The Newly-Married Couple* by Björnsterne Björnson and *The Temptations of Rabbi Akiba* by David Pinski. Mao Dun’s tendency to render gloomy pictures of everyday life in different parts of the world were the outcome of the Zeitgeist typical for the end of the World War I and for his own condition humaine: he had a compulsory marriage with a completely

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23 Adopted translation appeared as *Renjianshi lishizhiyipian* [32], *The Short Story Monthly*, 12, April 10, 1921, 4, pp. 28-29. According to Susan Wilf Chen (p. 381), and also Mao Dun’s acknowledgement, the text used for it was “Easter” and *Stories from the Swedish of August Strindberg*, trans. by Velma Swanston Howard, Cincinnati, Stewart and Kidd 1912, pp. 183-189.

24 Translated as *Dingtaiqi de si* [33], *Jiefangyu gaizao* [34] *Emancipation and Reconstruction*, 1, October 15, 1919, pp. 49-74.

25 Translated as *Shinei* [35], *Students Magazine*, 7, August 5, 1920, 8, pp. 1-12.

26 Translated as *Huoshi* [37] *The Living Corpse*, *Students Magazine*, 7, January-June 1920, 1-6, pp. 1-55. Both according to Mao Dun and Susan Wilf Chen (p. 379), it was rendered on the basis of *The Man Who Was Dead*, ed. by Hagberg Wright, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co. 1912, pp. 11-155.

27 Translated as *Dulou* [38] *The Skull*, *The Eastern Miscellany*, 17, January 25, 1920, 2, pp. 93-100. According to Susan Will Chen (p. 379), it was done on the basis of *Mashi and Other Stories*, New York, Macmillan 1918, pp. 31-45.

28 Translated as *Xinjiehun de yidai* [39], *The Short Story Monthly*, 12, January and March 10, 1 and 3, 1921, pp. 34-49 and 14-28. According to Susan Wilf Chen (p. 381) “Mao Tun worked from three English translations, one of which was S. and E. Hjerleid, trans.: *The Newly-Married Couple*, London, Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1870.”

29 Translated as *Labi Aqiba de xiuhuo* [40], *The Short Story Magazine*, 13, January 10, 1922, 1, pp. 26-32. According to Susan Wilf Chen (p. 384) it has been done on the basis of Isaac Goldberg’s rendition *Temptations. A Book of Short Stories by David Pinski*, London, George Allen and Unwin 1919, pp. 83-111.
illiterate girl. The newly married people have no other way to do: only to follow the husband and wife from the Björnson play and try to overbridge the contradictions between their abilities and characters. As far as is known, it was not a bad marriage, with the exception between the years 1927-1930.

Mao Dun’s first literary and critical essay from the year 1919 was called *Xiao Bona* [41] *George Bernard Shaw.* A relatively long article in two installments published in February and March, just before the May Fourth Movement, consisted of the contents of Shaw’s plays in the first and longer part, and of his philosophical and socio-political views in the second part. In the last two pages, most of his attention is devoted to Superman. On the last two pages of this essay is the word Superman is mentioned nine times: “He (Shaw, M.G.) stresses the necessity of change of thought (*sixiang*) [42]. He insists society’s need for the Superman. Superman may realize all its ideals.” And then on the same page he only slightly changes the wording of the first assertion: “He (Shaw, M.G.) insists that society needs Superman. Superman may realize all its ideals.” On the next page Mao Dun says that according to Shaw married couples have a higher aim than earlier: “to produce Superman. Therefore Shaw underlines the necessity to create Superman.” And: “Mr. Shaw resolutely insists on the creation of Superman. He says that if we want to have progress, we need Superman.” Shaw’s eyes are turned toward future. Two conditions are necessary in order to achieve a bright future: art (including literature), and Superman. Only thus may mankind “reach the way to the Heavenly Kingdom (*Tianguo*) [43].”

Mao Dun’s enneadic call for Superman had its predecessors in modern Chinese intellectual history. One of them, Lu Xun was mentioned already. He confessed Nietzschean “aristocratic radicalism” for some time in the years 1907-1908 [35], and later in 1919, he wrote about Nietzsche’s Superman with deeper

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30 *Students Monthly*, 6, February 5 and March 5, 1919, 2 and 3, pp. 9-19 and 15-21.
31 Ibid., p. 20.
32 Ibid., p. 21.
33 Loc. cit.
34 Loc. cit.
understanding than Mao Dun: "The Nietzschean Superman, although very indefinite (miaomang) [44], yet when looked upon from the reality of people living in the contemporary world, gives grounds for the belief that a nobler and more perfect humanity may appear in the future."36 Another great personality, who influenced Mao Dun much more around 1920 than Lu Xun, was Chen Duxiu [46] (1879-1942). Slightly older than Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu had incomparably greater impact on Chinese youth between 1915 and 1927. Cheung Chiu-yee remarked that “Chen Duxiu referred to Nietzsche in many essays”. This time we may, by pure chance, also speak about enneadic references, since they are manifested in nine different articles or letters by Chen.37

In Jinggao qingnian [47] Call to Youth, published in the first issue of the famous journal Qingnian zazhi [48] La Jeunesse in 1915, we may find under the first slogan: Be independent, not servile, Nietzsche’s thesis about two moralities: guizu daode [49] Morality of Noble and nulli daode [50] Morality of Slave.38 This Morality of the Noble or of Slave is an awkward English rendition of Nietzsche’s Herren-Moral and Sklaven-Moral, or Master Morality or Slave Morality, as used in the books Nietzsche. His Life and Works by Anthony M. Ludovici39 and Friedrich Nietzsche. His Life and Work by M. A. Mügge,40 both of them were known and used in China in 1919-1920.41 Mao Dun in his first social and critical article entitled Xuesheng yu shehui [53] Students and Society from 1917 took over completely Chen’s message and even its wording, and as was often the case, without acknowledgement of the debt. If “morality of the noble” is characterized by Chen Duxiu, whom Mao Zedong, his pupil and later arch-enemy called “supreme commander” of the May Fourth Movement,42 as that of “human beings of free spirit and with courage” (you duli xin and yong-gangzhe) [54], and the “morality of the slave” as those who are “humble and serve obediently” (qiansun er fucongzhe) [55],43 Mao Dun follows him up to the last comma, but without using the English terms.

In reality Chen’s understanding of the concept of “morality of the noble” and “morality of the slave” was his own, democratically oriented,44 dissimilar to

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43 Cf. Chen Duxiu: Call to Youth, p. 2 and Mao Dun: Students and Society, Students Magazine, 4, December 5, 1917, 12, p. 133.
44 Loc. cit.
the specifically aristocratic concept of Nietzsche. Two years later, Mao Dun, especially due to this Nietzschean understanding, was very much disappointed when reading *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and the scholarly or popular works on Nietzsche.

It is possible to say that the Superman in Mao Dun’s cognition and imagination was a mirage, and the future utopia of the Heavenly Kingdom from the article on George Bernard Shaw was a fata morgana. The atmosphere in modern China between the end of the World War I up to about the middle of 1920, and even later was full of the Superman and the most popular slogan taken over from Nietzsche of “transvaluation of all values” (*Umwertung aller Werte*), or as the first Nietzsche’s apostle in China Anthony M. Ludovici, underlined, the “creation of new values, new principles, new standards”. I doubt that any among the Chinese of that time, *exceptis excipiendis*, and most of them were young people, ever read Nietzsche’s original works, or scholarly treatises about him. The second slogan, connected with the one just mentioned, was: “Destroy idols!” which was a contemporary Chinese variety of the death of God, or of gods. The overwhelming majority of Chinese did not believe in God, but they believed in gods, or spirits, therefore they could, in their own way, understand Nietzsche’s “call to arms”: “Dead are all Gods!’ now we will that Superman live!” The Chinese traditional values they wanted to transvaluate and the idols they needed to destroy, were analysed many times in modern Chinese intellectual history by Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Lu Xun, Wu Yu [56] (1872-1949), Guo Moruo [1892-1978], Fu Sinian [57] (1896-1950) and others. In an essay *Yi duan fenghua* [58] *Some Crazy Words*, published in April 1919 and written by Fu Sinian, the “marshal” of the May Fourth demonstration, the young Chinese enthusiasts could read the following sentences, emotional and provocative:

“Christ was mad, Socrates was mad, Trotzsky and Nietzsche are (were?, M.G.) mad. How could their contemporaries not think of them as madmen? But, after a while, didn’t thousands of sane people follow in the footsteps of these madmen... China is nearly dead today precisely because we have too few madmen... Madmen are most lovable, most cherished people. Apart from madmen, only children are worthy of love... We should therefore follow madmen and love children: the madmen will be our teachers, the children our friends.”

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45 Cf. especially Chapter Nine of *Beyond Good and Evil*.
46 Ludovici, p. 4.
47 Ludovici, p. 63.
49 Chow Tse-tsun: op. cit., p. 110.

This call was too noisy and too strong. Mao Dun before and during the hightide of the May Fourth Movement was industriously working on his extensive article Tuoersitai yu jinrizhi Eluosi [62] Tolstoy and Contemporary Russia\footnote{Students Magazine, 6, April 5- June 5, 1919, 4-6, pp. 23-32, 33-41 and 43-52.} and writing his fairy tales for Chinese children.\footnote{Published in small booklets in the years 1917-1919. Now they are accessible in Mao Dun quanj [63] The Complete Works of Mao Dun. Vol. 10. Peking, People’s Publishing House 1985, pp. 153-291. Henceforth only MDOJ.} If the Chinese students in March 1919 were presented with a vision of the Shaw-Nietzschean image of the Superman as the hope of mankind, in April 1919 this vision changed to a great extent. According to Mao Dun: “The 19th century is a period of unexpected fertility of thought of the Russian people and it is also their great age. It will undoubtedly also influence several decades of the 20th century and these decades will be governed by this great age. Modern Russian Bolshevism has conquered Eastern Europe and it will flood Western Europe, too. The world stream of thought rushes forward and no one knows where it will end. And Tolstoy is its very initiator.”\footnote{Mao Dun: Tolstoy and Contemporary Russia, pp. 25-26.} These words were written and published before the Xin qingnian [64] La Jeunesse magazine, VI, (May 1919), 5, devoted mostly to the problems of propagating Marxism in China, appeared. It is possible that the cited words were written under the spell of Li Dazhao’s [65] (1888-1927) enthusiastic essay Bolshevism de shengli [66] The Victory of Bolshevism.\footnote{I read this essay in Li Dazhao wenji [67] The Collected Works of Li Dazhao. Vol. 1. Peking, People’s Publishing House 1984, pp. 597-603.} Its eulogy was derived from the book by Leon Trotsky Bolsheviki and World Peace.\footnote{Ibid., p. 601.}

In the next months after the May Fourth Movement Mao Dun did not search for or preach the Superman. He tried to study Nietzsche’s work more carefully. It is very probably that Thus Spake Zarathustra was the first book he read from Nietzsche. And once again very probably in the translation by Thomas Common
and authorized by Oscar Levy, since this edition was quoted by him later. In
November and December 1919 Mao Dun translated the eleventh and twelfth
chapters of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, which were the first translations from Ni­
etzsche into Chinese in the history of introduction of his works into China. Both
appeared in the journal *Emancipation and Reconstruction*. In the second half of
1919 Mao Dun helped to found in his native town of Wuzhen [68] a mimeo­
graphed journal entitled *Xin xiangren* [69] *New Landsmen*, where he published
the essay *Qiao’ao* [70] *Conceit*. In it he reminded a few readers of a fable
from *Qiu shui* [75] *Autumn Floods* of the book *Zhuangzi* [76] and compared it
to one aphorism, or to the whole chapter from *Zarathustra*, exactly to *Of the
Flies of the Market-place*. He probably studied it just at that time.

In the *Autumn Floods* we read:

“When Hui Tzu was prime minister of Liang, Chuang Tzu set off to visit
him. Someone said to Hui Tzu, “Chuang Tzu is coming because he wants to re­
place you as prime minister!” With this Hui Tzu was filled with alarm and
searched for three days and three nights trying to find Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu
then came to see him and said, “In the south there is a bird called the Yüan-chu
— I wonder if you ever heard of it? The Yüan-chu rises up from the South Sea and
flies to the North Sea, and it will rest on nothing but a Wu-t'ung tree, eat noth­
ing but the fruit of the Lien, and drink only from springs of sweet water. Once
there was an owl who had gotten hold of a half-rotten old rat, and as the Yüan-
ch'u passed by, it raised its head, looked up at the Yüan-ch'u, and said, ‘Shoo!’
Now that you have this Liang state of yours, are you trying to shoo me?’”

Here is not possible, and certainly not necessary, to quote the whole chapter
from *Zarathustra*. The next few aphorisms will be enough to remind the hearers
or readers of its most important content:

“All great things occur away from glory and the market-place: the inventors
of new values have always lived away from glory and the market-place.
Flee, my friend, into your solitude: I see you stung by poisonous flies. Flee
to where the raw, rough breeze blows!
Flee into your solitude! You have lived too near the small and the pitiable
men. Flee from their hidden vengeance! Towards you they are nothing but ven­
geance...
They buzz around you even with their praise: and their praise is importunity.
They want to be near your skin and your blood.”

Experts on Mao Dun know that he was very fond of Zhuangzi as a high
school student. He also had a personal experience with this story. A short time

58 Cf. LUDOVICI, p. 102 and MÜGGE, p. 436.
nianpu* [73] *Mao Dun's Chronological Biography*. Vol. 1. Taiyuan, Shanxi gaoxiao lianhe
chubanshe [74] United Publishers of the Universities of the Shanxi Province 1996, p. 73.
60 See Zhuangzi yinde [77] A Concordance to Chuang Tzu. Peking, Harvard-Yenching Insti­
tute Sinological Index Series 1947, p. 45 and *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*. Trans. by B.
after the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, he sent to the hated educator of his
secondary school in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, a neatly prepared small red pa-
per containing a carcass of a rat with a dedication written on the basis of the
text quoted above. He was requested to leave this school “for good”. It seems
that up to his 13th year, Mao Dun read only Mengzi [78] among the famous an-
cient Chinese philosophers. Later he become acquainted with others, too, but
his philosophical and literary love was and remained for some next years just
Zhuangzi and nobody else.

From Zarathustra besides Of the Flies of the Market-place, Mao Dun trans-
lated (as mentioned above) another chapter Of the New Idol. Here are a few of
its aphorisms:

“The state? What is that? Well then!...
The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie
creeps from its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.”
It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and love over
them; thus they served life.
It is destroyers who set snares for many and call it state...”

The chapter ends with these words:

“Only there, where state ceases, does the man who is not superfluous begin:
does the song of the necessary man, the unique and irreplaceable melody, begin.
There, where the state ceases look there, my brothers. Do you not see it: the
rainbow and the bridges to Superman?”

Even more than the previous one, this chapter was reminiscent to Mao Dun
of the Autumn Floods, or of the chapter Ma ti [79] Horses’ Hoofs from Zhuang-
zi. According to Mao Dun opinion published later, Zhuangzi’s “basic thought
was anarchism”, and his proof, just as that of Bertrand Russell, read and trans-
lated just at that time, is precisely a story about Bo Lo [82] and his handling
horses in an unnatural way, and about the “same fault committed by the men
who handle the affairs of the world”, i.e. politicians, philosophers and those
who codify the ethical and moral principles or social behaviour.

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Ltd. 1961, pp. 79-80. All other citations from this chef d’oeuvre by Nietzsche, if not men-
tioned otherwise, will be from Ludovici’s book.
63 Ibid., p. 71.
64 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 75.
65 Shen Dehong [80] (Mao Dun’s official name): Xuyan [81] Preface. In: Zhuangzi. Shanghai,
104 and Bertrand Russell: Proposed Roads to Freedom. Socialism, Anarchism and Syndical-
ism. New York, Blue Ribbon Books, n.y., p. 34. It is very probable that this last was published
in 1919, just as another edition in London at George Allen and Unwin Ltd. It seems that Mao
Dun and his friends had better access to American than to English books. See Mao Dun: Wo
I would dare to say that in the moments of writing the *Conceit*, Mao Dun saw in Zhuangzi an ancient predecessor of Nietzsche, in the fabulous bird Yuanzhu a hazy symbol of the Superman, and in the owl consuming the rotten rat, either the “superfluous people” worshipping the state, or the “poisonous flies” of the market-place.

In the same issue of the journal *New Landsmen* as the essay *Conceit*, Mao Dun published another one entitled *Women weishenmo du shu* [84] *Why We Do Read Books?* Here Nietzsche is not mentioned, but his vision concerning the coming age of Superman is present. He answers the question in the following way: “We read books while we need knowledge. We need knowledge in order to become ‘perfect’ human beings who can strive for the common happiness of the mankind... Just look! A bright future is before us, let us run forward!”

Is it not the same feeling, the same conviction as in the opening passage, manifested at the beginning of this contribution?

The year 1919 was one of the most productive in Mao Dun’s life. The inner feeling of necessity to become a ‘perfect’ human being who would be able to scheme for the benefit of mankind exaggerated his energy, and he worked like crazy, writing, translating and publishing in the field of education, womens’ problems, philosophy and politics. To the translations we mentioned in the first part of this contribution we should add the works by M.Y. Saltykov-Schechedrin, A.P. Chekhov, M. Gorky, Guy de Maupassant, Stefan Żeromski and Bertrand Russell.

During 1919 a new situation evolved in the Chinese intellectual world. A few days before the start of the May Fourth Movement (exactly on March 30, 1919) John Dewey reached Shanghai. The sixty years old “Yankee Confucius” received a “thunderous welcome”. On October 20 that year his birthday was commemorated together with 2470th birthday of the Chinese sage. His greatest triumph during his two years stay in China was achieved forty one days later, when after the special issue dedicated mostly to Marxism and Li Dazhao’s confession *Wo de Makesizhuyiguan* [85] *My Marxist Views* published in *La Jeunesse*, this journal in its December issue carried a manifesto allegedly “drafted by Chen Duxiu and approved by other editors”, where it was stated:

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68 Mao Dun’s Chronological Biography, pp. 68-79.
69 Loc. cit.
71 Loc. cit.
“In order to seek social progress, it is necessary to break up the prejudices that are upheld as ‘unalterable principles’ (tianjing diyi) [86] or as ‘established from old’ (zigu rusi) [87].

We believe that politics, ethics, science, the arts, religion and education should all meet practical needs in the achievement of progress for present and future social life.

We have to give up the useless and irrelevant elements of the traditional literature and ethics because we want to create those needed for the progress of the new era and new society.

We believe that it is a requisite for the progress to uphold natural science and pragmatic philosophy (shiyanzhexue) [88] and to abolish superstition and fantasy...”74

Here we have pure Dewey's instrumentalism and when, earlier or later, Mao Dun found that the popular book by Frank Thilly A History of Philosophy, pointed to the connection of Nietzsche's philosophy to pragmatism,75 his doubts about the existence of absolute truths, his struggle against the old customs and beliefs, he began with reading the books on Nietzsche and even his own works. Raoul Findeisen was right when he corrected my assertion about Thus Spake Zarathustra as the only book by Nietzsche he read.76 On the other hand it is not true that Mao Dun read all Nietzsche's books mentioned in his study Nietzsche's Doctrine. This last is the opinion of Shao Bozhou [89], one of the oldest researchers on Mao Dun's life and work. He hardly read carefully Mao Dun's study and probably never had Ludovici's book on Nietzsche in his hands.77

I suppose that Mao Dun began to write Nietzsche's Doctrine immediately after the appearance of the manifesto on pragmatism and the situation in contemporary Chinese intellectual history. Otherwise the pragmatic aspects of the study of “politics, ethics, science, the arts, religion, and education”78 would probably not be stressed so vehemently in this longest among his articles. We know that in 1920 Chen Duxiu shifted away from this position, rejected the Deweyan experimentalism and cultural reform for political revolution. Mao Dun met him at the beginning of this year79 in the International French Settle-

73 This is the opinion of CHOW TSE-TSUNG: op. cit. p. 422. According to J.B. GRIEDEER, Hu Shi and the Chinese Renaissance. Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press 1970. p. 183, this manifesto “was, rather, an expression of Hu Shi’s opinions, embodying only minimal concessions on his part”.
74 Quoted according to CHOW TSE-TSUNG: op. cit., pp. 174-175.
78 Cf. text to Note 74.
ment in Shanghai and became his faithful aide de camp in the literary and cultural realm. Both have very similar ideas concerning democracy and different kinds of socialism and therefore Chen’s invitation addressed to Mao Dun to visit him and join his circle, was nothing embarrassing. They were kindred spirits. Beginning at that time (at least from February 1920), the circle around Chen Duxiu was committing itself to Marxism, although in December 1919, he “expressed for a short time his interest for John Dewey’s guild socialism” and democratic spirit. Mao Dun’s concern for Kropotkin’s and Bakunin’s anarchism, American syndicalist organization Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W), B. Russell’s book Proposed Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism, and even his critical attitude to the “orthodox” or Marxist “State socialism”, must be very sympathetic to Chen Duxiu in the second half of 1919 and in the first one or two months of 1920.85

Reading and partly translating, adjusting or commenting the above-mentioned booklet by A. M. Ludovici, he discovered already at the beginning, that some of the philosophers declared him “to be a mere anarchist”. Mao Dun gave this pronouncement a different interpretation. He put it into the context of “transvaluation of all values” and wrote the following thesis: “This is the most prominent (zhujue) [93] demand of his thought, therefore some people assert that he is an anarchist among the philosophers.” This is, of course, something different, and by the way, according to Ludovici some even “denied his right to the title ‘philosopher’, and for the “tough” English Nietzschean, even the comparison of Nietzsche with their anarchists, was a blasphemy. For Mao Dun, who had a deep sympathy for anarchistic teachings, Ludovici’s words carried a completely different message.

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80 Lee Feigon: op. cit., p. 144.
81 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
82 NT, p. 30 and Mao Dun’s translation of Chapter Two Bakunin and Anarchism from Russell’s Proposed Roads to Freedom, pp. 32-55 in The Eastern Miscellany, 17, January 10 and 25, 1920, I and 2, pp. 57-64 and 60-67. Cf. also Mao Dun: “Bakuning he wuqiangquanzhuyi” [92] Translator’s Remark to “Bakunin and Anarchism”. In: MDQJ, Vol. 14, pp. 102-103. Although Mao Dun especially stresses that the aim of his translation is not propagation of Anarchism in China, he could choose Chapter One of this Russell’s book Marx and Socialist Doctrine, but he decided not to do it, although at that time Anarchism, especially of Kropotkin’s kind, was better known in China than Marxist teaching. More information about it, see the monograph by R.J. Scalapino and George T.Yu: The Chinese Anarchist Movement. California University Press 1961.
83 See text to Note 149.
84 NT, p. 37.
85 Lee Feigon: op. cit., pp. 144-156.
86 Ludovici, p. 2.
87 NT, p. 2.
88 Ludovici, p. 2.
It seemed, at least at the first deeper contact with Nietzsche, although more mediated than direct, that Mao Dun’s conviction was that he is really the philosopher of bright future and of his most excellent product – Superman. Armed with his sympathy to anarchism and the methodological instructions of instrumentalism, he began to write down his impressions having before him some English translations of Nietzsche’s works all edited by Oscar Levy, Ludovici’s monograph and three other scholarly or popular books: Modern Philosophers by Harald Höfßding, A History of Philosophy by Frank Thilly, A Student’s History of Philosophy by A.K. Rogers and the book on modern dramatists by A. Henderson, mentioned at the beginning of this paper. He also read the recently published article on the decline of interest in Nietzsche in Germany and the increase of concern for Karl Marx there after the World War I, and he began to be quite cautious. Inspite of his sympathy for the Superman, he started a careful examination of the master morality and slave morality (including, of course, Superman, too). He proclaimed that, “if we are speaking in general”, they are really “ju ejing” excellent and seminal. This, on the other hand did not mean, that they are really such. From reading of Höfßding, he comprehended that in the teaching of Nietzsche there are many mutually contradictory assertions, but he did not understand how the author of the essay on state and the market-flies, could pronounce the theses about war being better than peace or about the need for the “expansion of power” (kuozhang quanli).

I do not believe that the driving motive for writing this article was the situation in the intellectual world condemning Nietzsche and his philosophy as the ideological fountainhead of World War I. It was mostly his “inner demands” that compelled him to do so, and his curiosity to know Nietzsche more deeply after so many rendez-vous with him especially in the world of theatre, fiction and essays. He did not forget to stress the need for a careful and crucial examination of the questions involved, including the teachings of the great men of bygone ages: “Only if we do not regard the great man Nietzsche as idol, and the words of authorities as ‘unalterable principles’, doubt and criticize them, can their books be worthy of reading, and their teachings worthy of study.”

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91 New Age, September 4, 1919. I have not had the opportunity to read this essay.
92 NT, p. 3.
93 Höfßding, H.: op. cit., p. 158.
94 NT, p. 1.
96 NT, p. 3.
There were no problems in writing the first part of the study concerned with Nietzsche’s life and his works. Mao Dun followed honestly the facts presented by Ludovici, leaving aside only some unimportant details and adding often, not always, the German names of Nietzsche’s works which are not in Ludovici’s book.

The difficulties became evident in the next part, otherwise Chapter II in Ludovici and called Nietzsche the Amoralist entitled by Mao Dun simply as Nicai daodelun shang [96] Nietzsche’s Theory of Morality. First Part. The terms feidaode de [97], likewise feiwudaode de [98], or wulinli de xingzhi [99] could be misleading for the readers of the journal. Amoral is not equivalent to immoral; it means to be moral outside of the framework of the norms of moral conduct. Later in the text, Mao Dun translates amoralist as chaodaodedia [100] which implies the meaning supermoralist in the context of the study, and it is therefore probably not appropriate. Mao Dun expressed his satisfaction with Nietzsche’s idea of moral slave revolt (Sklavenaufstand in der Moral), he read partly in Ludovici, [100] but in a more detailed way in Höf­ding’s book. [101] He manifested his welcome to the idea as such, for example, to the ancient revolt of Theognis, but not to its aristocratic character, and this applies to all he knew in history: Buddhism, Socratism, early Christianity, the Reformation, Freigeisterei, Revolution, Democracy and the natural sciences. Nietzsche was a believer, according to Mao Dun and both Höf­ding and Ludovici, in aristocratic morality and he hated both Democracy and Socialism. And these two forms of socio-political organization Mao Dun preferred. Social dualism and master morality was not acceptable either for Höf­ding or Mao Dun; on the other hand, they were in programme of Nietzsche and of his tough disciple. Mao Dun, when reading material about the moral slave revolt and social dualism, held the opinion that this teaching of Nietzsche concerned with the historical attitude to the moral is, on side wonderful, and similar to historical materialism of Karl Marx, [102] but on the other side, because of its highlighting of the noble, powerful, war, those “modes of conduct” that lead through “the incessant struggle for power” to a “desirable type of man”, [103] i.e. to a Superman, it is cuola [101],

97 Ludwig, pp. 24-40.
99 NT, pp. 15-17.
100 Ludwig, pp. 29 ff.
102 NT, p. 17. Mao Dun certainly read Russell’s evaluation of “materialistic interpretation of history”, see Proposed Roads to Freedom, pp. 7-8 and very probably also Li Dazhao’s My Marxist Views, pp. 51-60.
103 NT, p. 18 and Ludwig, op. cit., p. 34.
wrong, just like Marx’s economic fatalism.\textsuperscript{104} This opinion of Mao Dun was probably the most important cause for not including \textit{Nietzsche’s Teaching} in \textit{The Complete Works of Mao Dun}. \textit{Jingjide dingyunlun} \textsuperscript{102} economic fatalism is regarded as a blasphemy by orthodox Marxists against their highest authority. As far as I was informed by Raoul D. Findeisen, this Mao Tun’s article was reprinted outside of \textit{The Complete Works of Mao Dun}, in Cheng Fang \textsuperscript{140}: \textit{Nicai zai Zhongguo} \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Nietzsche in China}, Nanking, Nanking Publishing House 1993.

Not so much Höfdding as Ludovici was interested in the question of Nietzsche and Christianity. According to the last “Nietzsche unfortunately stormed the most formidable strongholds of modern society – Christianity and Democracy; and perhaps this accounts for the fact that his fight was so uneven and so hopeless.”\textsuperscript{105} Mao Dun followed Ludovici’s assertion that Nietzsche’s philosophy “is essentially and through and through religious”\textsuperscript{106} (or as Mao Dun wrote, Nietzsche was a “very religious man”),\textsuperscript{107} and he took over all Ludovici’s arguments concerning the Christianity after David Strauss had published his \textit{Life of Jesus} in 1863. Nietzsche did not fight against Christianity as against religion \textit{per se}, but against its moral principles, since they and Christian morality “could not develop toward the higher mankind”,\textsuperscript{108} toward Superman. Mao Dun’s part on Nietzsche as a “supermoralist”, ended just like that of Ludovici on Nietzsche as amoralist with the quotation from \textit{Zarathustra’s Prologue}, its third part:

“Verily a muddy stream is man. One must be at least a sea to be able to absorb a muddy stream without becoming unclean.

Behold, I teach you Superman: he is that sea; in him your great contempt can sink.”\textsuperscript{109}

If the part concerned with Nietzsche’s amorality (“supermorality’) presented some difficulties for Mao Dun, his task was even more precarious when he pondered over the Chapter III in Ludovici’s book entitled \textit{Nietzsche the Moralist} rendered by Mao Dun as \textit{Nicaide dao delun xia} \textsuperscript{103} \textit{Nietzsche’s Theory of Morality. Second Part}. Here the most important problem was the master morality and slave morality. I wonder why Mao Dun did not pay enough attention to Höfdding who, when analysing the philosophical basis of social dualism, mentioned that Nietzsche often called himself an immoralist and declared that his

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{NT}, p. 17. Russell in op. cit., pp. 19-23, quotes the stories from Marx’s \textit{Capital}, that are “brought up to illustrate some fatalistic theory which Marx professes to have proved by exact reasoning, cannot but stir into fury any passionate working-class reader, and into unbearable shame any possessor of capital in whom generosity and justice are not wholly extinct” (p. 23).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{LUDOVICI}, pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{106} ibid., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{NT}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{108} Loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Thus Spake Zarathustra}, p. 8, \textit{LUDOVICI}, p. 40 and \textit{NT}, p. 19.
aim was to *aufheben* all morality.\(^{110}\) *Aufheben* here means simultaneously the Hegelian to preserve, to cancel and to lift up.\(^{111}\) The term "immoralist" would probably better characterize Nietzsche in Mao Dun’s final apprehension.

At the beginning of this chapter Mao Dun in his own way renders the meaning of Ludovici’s words.

According to Ludovici: “Conceiving all forms of morality to be but weapons in the struggle for power, Nietzsche concluded that every species of man must at some time or other taken to moralising, and must have called that “good” which its instincts approved, and that “bad” which its enemies’ instincts approved. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, however, he tells us that after making a careful examination “of the finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on earth”, he found certain traits recurring so regularly together, and so closely connected with one another, that, finally, two primary types of morality revealed themselves to him. That is to say, after passing the known moralities of the world in review, he was able to classify them broadly into two types.”\(^{112}\)

According to Mao Dun: “Nietzsche considered all kinds of moralities only as the means of acquiring the power. His conclusion then was: Good and bad are ‘one’ thing, ‘one’ deed. For example, one deed is regarded as good by some people and as bad by others. The first call it good, the second call it bad. Where moralities are concerned, the difference is only in their kinds, not in their qualities. Nietzsche said that he carefully examined the finer and coarser moralities which have prevailed and still prevail in the world, and found that they followed each other and are closely connected with one another. He discovered that two basic types could be pointed out which represent all other moralities.”\(^{113}\)

For Mao Dun who was a short time before very much enthralled by Nietzsche as one of the greatest personalities of the *fin de siècle*, by his philosophy of Superman, his ideas about the state or the flies on market-place, was astonished by Ludovici’s exposition about the implacable and perennial wars “between the powerful and the impotent, the strong and the weak, the givers and the takers, the healthy and the sick, the happy and the wretched”.\(^{114}\) The ensuing broad generalization concerned with master and slave morality, which he learned about from the book by Höfding, was also a strong and almost unbelievable argument for him. When Ludovici “forgot” to quote two maxims and two other passages about these two basic and contradictory moralities, Mao Dun started to search for them in Nietzsche’s writings: in *Beyond Good and Evil* and in *Genealogy of Moral*.

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\(^{112}\) LUDOVICI, p. 41.

\(^{113}\) *NT*, p. 20.

\(^{114}\) LUDOVICI, p. 42 and *NT*, p. 20.
Mao Dun not only read these two books, at least some parts of them, he also tried to check, without any more exact success, three passages overlooked by Ludovici. One was concerned with the two following maxims: "I must reach the sun and spread broad branches in so doing; this I call 'good' and the herd that I shelter may also call it good." This one is related to the representatives of the master morality. Another is characteristic for slave morality. Here the shrub (which Mao Dun translates as xiao cao [104] small grass)\textsuperscript{115} answers to the oak: "I also want to reach the sun, these broad branches of the oak, however, keep the sun from me, therefore the oak's instincts are 'bad.'"\textsuperscript{116} The two remaining passages specified by Ludovici were followed by Mao Dun, although the latter slightly modified their wording:

According to Ludovici: "The creator of the master morality was he who, out of the very fulness of his soul, transfigured all he saw and heard, and declared it better, greater, more beautiful than it appeared to the creator of the slave morality. Great artists, great legislators, and great warriors belong to the class that created master morality."\textsuperscript{117} According to Mao Dun: "...the creator of the master morality worked out of the fulness of his soul, and all he saw and heard, he transformed out of this fulness. He felt that this has to be better, greater and more beautiful that it appeared to the creator of the slave morality. Great artists, great legislators, and great warriors belong to the class that created master morality."\textsuperscript{118}

And then:

According to Ludovici: "The creator of slave morality was one who, out of the poverty of his soul, transfigured all he saw and heard and declared it smaller, meaner, and less beautiful than it appeared to the creator of the master values. Great misanthropists, pessimists, demagogues, tasteless artists, nihilists, spiteful authors and dramatists, and resentful saints belong to the class that created slave morality."\textsuperscript{119}

According to Mao Dun:

"...the creator of the slave morality has a poor soul. That which he saw and heard was transformed out of this poor spirit. Therefore it is smaller, meaner and less beautiful than it should appear to the creator of the master morality. Great conspirators (yinmoujia) [105], pessimistic suicides, demagogues, tasteless artists, nihilists, spiteful authors and dramatists and resentful saints belong to the class that created slave morality."\textsuperscript{120} We may observe here that Mao Dun changed the beginning and the end of the last important message: instead of

\textsuperscript{115} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{116} According to Mao Dun, this quotation is from Beyond Good and Evil, Aphor. 260-262. I did not find it there.
\textsuperscript{117} LUDOVICI, A.M.: op. cit., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{118} NT, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{119} LUDOVICI, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{120} NT, pp. 21-22.
misanthropists we have here conspirators and instead of the saints, not important for the Chinese tradition, Mao Dun opted for the sages who were more common there.

Master morality, according to Ludovici, leads to the "desirable type of man"\textsuperscript{121} and to the Superman, according to Mao Dun’s interpretation. What Nietzsche calls “Superman” is a progressive kind of man, but Mao Dun also does not forget to make one important remark: “If we more carefully study his programme, we see that Nietzsche worships power, the cruel and inhuman way! Therefore we have to regard him with caution: we should select only his good points and put aside his bad ones.”\textsuperscript{122}

Eleven days before this second installment of Mao Dun’s study on Nietzsche a short essay by Mao Dun \textit{Peifu yu zongbai} \textsuperscript{[106]} \textit{To Admire or to Worship} appeared in the column \textit{Xuedeng} \textsuperscript{[107]} \textit{Lantern of Study of the Shishi xinbao} \textsuperscript{[108]} \textit{Shanghai Newspaper} on January 25, 1920.\textsuperscript{123} Here Mao Dun presented an idea that one should be very careful where idol worship is concerned and in this way he joined Zhu Zhixin \textsuperscript{[109]} (1884-1920), one of the first introducers of socialist theories into China, according to whom, nobody and nothing should develop into an idol, since all values have only their relative validity within the historical relations.\textsuperscript{124} Mao Dun in his essay declared that there is a difference between admiring and worshipping. The first is possible after rational reasoning, the second because of its psychological disposition inclines to blind imitation of the worshipped objects. He mentioned Nietzsche’s master morality, which is possible to admire, but not worship. In spite of its inadequacies, it could be used in China as the appropriate means in the creation of new values. It is essential for Chinese youth is inevitable to forget some words from their old vocabulary and “to worship” is one of them.\textsuperscript{125} Here we see Mao Dun’s different attitude to the Superman than in the years 1917 and 1919.

Mao Dun’s attitude to Nietzsche and to his Superman changed even more during February and March 1920 when he was working on Nietzsche’s concepts of the theory of evolution and sociology.

At the beginning of the third installment Mao Dun took up the threads of the essay just analyzed, and followed Ludovici and repeated Nietzsche’s thesis about the necessity of transvaluating all values. Mao Dun led by Ludovici considered the impact of Stendhal, Arthur Schopenhauer on Nietzsche, he approved the first and disapproved the second.

\textsuperscript{121} \textsc{Ludovici}, p. 34 and \textsc{NT}, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{122} \textsc{NT}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{123} \textsc{MDQJ}, Vol. 14, pp. 104-106.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Zhu Zhixin: Shensheng bukeqin yu ouxiang dapo} \textsuperscript{[110]} \textit{Invulnerable Sanctity and Iconoclasm. Jianshe} \textsuperscript{[11]} \textit{The Construction}, 1, August 1, 1919, 1, pp. 169-172.
\textsuperscript{125} \textsc{Mao Tun: To Admire or to Worship}, p. 106.
When pondering over Schopenhauer, Ludovici and after him also Mao Dun mentioned Godlessness as one of the intellectual features of the age, and both of them quote the well-known maxim of Nietzsche: “Dead are all Gods! now we will the Superman live.” Ludovici’s musings end here, but Mao Dun comments: “Supermanism could be regarded as Nietzsche’s evolutionary theory.” Then followed the reflections on Nietzsche’s evolutionism, where, as in nearly the whole study, Ludovici was a leading guide.

Apart from Nietzsche’s two predecessors we mentioned, two English authors exercised the most weighty influence on Nietzsche: his contemporaries Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. We may see that in Nietzsche’s concept of life. Spencer’s famous definition from the Principles of Biology: “Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,” was one of the criticized premises. Later Spencer also discussed the problem concerned with the “dynamic element in life”. Ludovici presented the second as: “Life is activity”, and Mao Dun followed him. Spencer’s explanation of the substance of life was criticized from many sides, and Nietzsche was not an exception. He defined life differently, as “appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation, and, at least, putting it mildest, exploitation.” Mao Dun does not stress that Nietzsche defined life “practically, uprightly, and bravely”, as Ludovici does, but he admires (seriously, or perhaps with a slight irony) Nietzsche’s self-confidence.

Mao Dun just as Ludovici agrees with Nietzsche’s criticism of Spencer’s conception of life as activity, with Darwin’s idea the “struggle for existence”, or Malthus’ general principle according to which population is tending to outrun the nature’s means of subsistence, but he is likewise critical of Nietzsche’s most basic philosophical premise: Will to Power (Wille zur Macht):

“Wherever I found living matter, I found will to power, and even in the servant I found yearning to be master.

Only where there is life, there is will: though not will to live, but thus I teach thee – Will to Power.”

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126 Ludovici, p. 63 and NT, p. 27.
127 NT, p. 27.
129 This has been done in later editions of Principles of Biology.
130 Ludovici, p. 64 and NT, p. 27.
131 Ludovici, p. 65. This is a citation from Beyond Good and Evil, p. 226 according to Helen Zimmern’s translation.
132 Ludovici, p. 65.
133 NT, p. 28.
134 Ludovici, pp. 64-69 and NT, pp. 27-29.
135 Ludovici, p. 67 and NT, p. 29. Originally in Zarathustra, pp. 136-137.
From that what was just quoted, Mao Dun deduces, that Nietzsche here “excessively praising the power, regards the power as the step on the way of human evolution, is necessarily mistaken,” although he agrees that in his “towards power” tendency is something meaningful. Mao Dun also admitted that he cannot be a judge in the matter of psychological arguments for or against the Will to Power, and after repeating Ludovici’s arguments, he wrote the following words:

“... I think that Nietzsche’s words are, of course, not correct. Those who regard men as just seeking for life (wei qiu sheng) [112] are also not entirely right. If preservation of life were the only aim, contemporary civilization would be superfluous, if people only used power, they would eat each other. Therefore the teachings of both schools are wrong. In my opinion Kropotkin’s words are correct. On the basis of his study of biology, Kropotkin has shown that human life is a form of mutual assistance, evolution is possible only in virtue of mutual assistance, and the evolution theory in Kropotkin’s works is the most satisfactory of all evolution theories.”

This Mao Dun’s contemporary credo is, of course, of great importance, although it was probably not quite justified to classify Spencerian teaching as that of “seeking for life” only and in this way compare it, even if indirectly, to the ancient Chinese Taoists.

Mao Dun much more stressed the impact of Darwin than Nietzsche admitted or Ludovici wrote. If we read in Ludovici about wide difference between the Darwinian school and Nietzsche, but also that “Nietzsche nevertheless believed their hypothesis (about two factors of evolutorial variability concerned with the nature of organism, and the nature of conditions, M.G.) to be sound”, Mao Dun renders it much more positively as: “Nietzsche very much agrees with this assertion.” I am sure, even nearly three decades after I wrote it for the first time, Mao Dun “even more than Ludovici, was influenced by the Darwinist apprehension of the Superman”. It was certainly caused, among others, by the great impact of social Darwinism on Chinese intellectuals after the translations and writings by Yan Fu (1853-1921). The Darwinist and later Fascist understanding of Nietzsche was quite common in China especially after the Chinese translation of the chapter on Nietzsche in Will Durant’s *Story of Philosophy* in

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136 NT, p. 29.
137 Ibid., p. 30.
139 Ludovici, pp. 70-71.
140 NT, p. 31.
141 Galić, M.: *Nietzsche in China (1918-1925)*, p. 16.
1929 and reprinted or retranslated quite a few times later.\textsuperscript{143} Durant’s opening sentence in his treatise: “Nietzsche was the child of Darwin and the brother of Bismarck,”\textsuperscript{144} might have a tremendous impact on Chinese readers.

Most critical was Mao Dun’s attitude to Nietzsche in the last chapter of the study entitled \textit{Nietzsche the Sociologist}. Here Mao Dun puts aside his Nietzscheanist mentor and begins with its own explanation of the basic concepts of Nietzsche’s social teachings. He comes back to Höfding’s social dualism and regrets its, as he says, “most contradictory part”, most often cursed by other people. If we regard Nietzsche’s doctrines from this point of view, then, “Nietzsche is really the bad devil (\textit{emo}) \textsuperscript{113} of mankind and the most to be feared (\textit{kongbu}) \textsuperscript{114} among men”.\textsuperscript{145} Nietzsche’s thought is still estimated highly because of its iconoclastic spirit, but not his sociological views; these are “conservative (\textit{baocun}) \textsuperscript{115} and groundless (\textit{debukan}) \textsuperscript{116}”.

Here for the first time Mao Dun used the term “class” and “classes”, we do not find in Ludovici, or in Höfding. “Masters” in Nietzsche’s apprehension became now “ruling class” and “slaves” were by Mao Dun designated as “ruled class”.\textsuperscript{147} After reading and translating Russell’s \textit{Proposed Roads to Freedom} and ruminating over its contents, it is possible that Mao Dun willy-nilly admitted that anarchism, in spite of his sympathies for its theoretical reflections has deficiencies which “make it probable that within any reasonable period of time, it could not last long even if it were established”.\textsuperscript{148}

It seems that in March 1920 when working on the fourth installment of \textit{Nietzsche’s Teaching}, Mao Dun either bade farewell to Kropotkin’s evolutionism, or lost his enthusiasm for it. At that time, he was among others, under the impact of the philosopher and editor Zhang Dongsun \textsuperscript{117} (1886-1973). Zhang Dongsun, who, following the idea of John Dewey, proposed to change Chinese professional guilds into political organizations, lent Mao Dun a book \textit{The I. W. W. - A Study of American Syndicalism}, Mao Dun wrote and published a lengthy review of it.\textsuperscript{149} This organization called Industrial Workers of the World preferred economic (not political) struggle, it was very resolute and radical, and its aim was a “complete surrender of all control of industry to the organized work-


\textsuperscript{145} \textit{NT}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{146} Loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{147} Loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{148} RUSSELL, B.; op. cit., p. 211.

ers". The times changed in China also otherwise. In early 1920 Comintern agent Gregory Voitinsky came to China and in April the whole text of the *Communist Manifesto* in the translation by Mao Dun's friend Chen Wangdao [119] (1890-1977) appeared in Shanghai. Using the new terminology Mao Dun makes out of the Advocates of Higher Men in Ludovici's interpretation, the representatives of the ruling class, or from the Advocates of the Greatest Number speakers of Democracy or of Socialism. He also points out that Nietzsche admired the German monarchical form of government. Here he even partly distorts the message of Nietzsche's words:

According to Nietzsche: “There is no sorer misfortune in all human destiny, than when the powerful of the earth are not at the same time the first men. Then everything becometh false and warped and monstrous.”

And:

“For, my brethren, the best shall rule: the best will rule! And where the teaching is different, there the best is lacking.”

According to Mao Dun: “There is no more tragic event than if the powerful on the earth are not at the same time the first men. Then everything becomes false, not true and all is terrible in the manner of 'oxen devils and serpent monsters' (niugui sheshen) [120].”

And:

“My brothers, the best shall rule, the best will rule! And if it will not be done, then the best man (men?, M.G.) will not appear.”

After translating these sentences, Mao Dun added this remark: “Look! These Nietzsche's words are really *non plus ultra* strong words and forced arguments (qiangci duoliyijila) [121].”

As to the first citation is concerned Mao Dun probably did not check its origin. The quoted words do not come from the mouth of Zarathustra but from one of the two kings from the chapter called *Conversation with the Kings*. Zarathustra seems to be very satisfied with their message. The use of the phrase "oxen devils and serpent monsters" was probably adequate from the stylistic point of view, but the irony of Mao Dun's fate and of millions of his Chinese compatriots, is that forty six years after writing this "verdict", he was one of the high victims of Maoist persecution of the similar devils and monsters during the "Cultural Revolution".

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151 Chow Tse-tsung: op. cit., pp. 243-244, 246 and 248.
152 Zarathustra, p. 299.
153 Ibid., pp. 256-257.
154 NT, p. 37.
155 Loc. cit.
156 Loc. cit.
The second quotation is from the chapter Of Old and New Law-tables and it is not so much about the Superman, but about the creation of new values.

When writing this Mao Dun somehow forgot those representatives of higher men Nietzsche might have in mind and mentioned verbatim in Ludovici only one page before these citations:

"The Divine Manu, Laotse, Confucius, Muhammad, Jesus Christ - all these men, who in their sublime arrogance actually converted man into a mirror in which they saw themselves and their doctrines reflected, and who in thus converting man into a mirror really made him feel happy in the function of reflecting alone: - these leaders are the types Nietzsche refers to when he speaks of higher men."\(^{158}\)

After repeating Ludovici’s assertions that Democracy and Socialism meant the “annihilation of all higher values and hopes”,\(^{159}\) and the second was nothing else than the Christian (or Biblical) principle of all men being alike before God,\(^{160}\) Mao Dun states that these words are not even worthy to argue with. But he immediately admits that a “pure (tunzü) [124] or narrow (jiayi) [125] Democracy has many shortcomings and limits, orthodox or State (guanhua) [126] Socialism owes much to despotism,”\(^{161}\) but in spite of this he thinks that Nietzsche’s attacks are “useless and harmful arbitrary judgements”\(^{162}\).

The most important postulate that produced the greatest impression on the Chinese intellectuals during the May Fourth and pre- or post-May Fourth era, from Nietzsche’s entire work, was that of transvaluation of all values. Ludovici presented a few sentences from Nietzsche’s Antichrist to the reader at the end of the last chapter of his book. He abstained from commenting on them and only stated that they represent “the moral code wherewith he would transvaluate our present values”\(^ {163}\).

They are the following sentences:

“What is good? - All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself in man.

What is bad? - All that proceeds from weakness.

What is happiness? - the feeling that power increases, that resistance is overcome.


\(^{158}\) LUDOVICI, p. 78.

\(^{159}\) LUDOVICI, p. 80 and NT, p. 37.

\(^{160}\) Both LUDOVICI and NT, loc. cit.

\(^{161}\) NT, loc. cit.

\(^{162}\) Loc. cit.

\(^{163}\) LUDOVICI, p. 86.
Not contentedness, but more power: not peace at any price, but warfare: not virtue, but capacity ("virtu in the Renaissance style, virtue free from any moral acid")."\textsuperscript{164}

Whereas Ludovici does not add a word to these maxims, Mao Dun's comment could be regarded as a very resolute condemnation:

"On seeing the sentences just quoted, we know Nietzsche over (not beyond, M.G.) good and evil. His transvaluation of values is just this. His worship of power is such that no ordinary person could think of it."\textsuperscript{165}

In the epilogue to \textit{Nietzsche's Teaching} Mao Dun mentioned that his concept of Superman has a particle of truth in it, but like the other parts of Nietzsche's teaching, it is problematic. Nietzsche is a great philosopher, often full of contradictions,\textsuperscript{166} but we may appreciate him because of his free-spiritedness, intellectual bravery, the ability to stand alone without fear and the courage in searching for truth.\textsuperscript{167} Here Mao Dun agrees with his Nietzschean teacher.\textsuperscript{168} In Nietzsche's philosophy, as in other teaching he tried to find the means to attain two goals: changes in the life of the society, the cognition of truth.\textsuperscript{169} At the end of the writing of this article, Mao Dun was certainly to a great extent disappointed with his former idol some months or two years before.

By analysing \textit{Nietzsche's Teaching} we have seen the vehement changes of attitude to one and the same problem from extremely warm to relatively or very critical. During these four months, we may also observe this metamorphosis in other Mao Dun essays or articles. We have already mentioned two of them.

Parallel to the first installment of this study, one short but unusually concise article by Mao Dun \textit{Xianzai wenxuejia de ziren shi shenme} [127] \textit{What Are the Duties of Contemporary Men of Letters}? Here in the very beginning we find the following statement:

"Always when a new type of philosophical thought arises, writers form its vanguard, and with the help of literary descriptive means and of critical methods, awaken the broad masses by intelligible words. Therefore the 18th century individualism has its roots in two novels by Jean-Jacques Rousseau \textit{Nouvelle Héloïse} and \textit{Emile}. The new wave of 19th century individualism grows out of Henrik Ibsen's drama \textit{A Doll's House}. Nietzsche's philosophy of Superman is succinctly crystallized in the novel \textit{Thus Spake Zarathustra}. Russian youth has a Stronghold in Herzen's Society. Herzen is author of the novel \textit{Whose Crime}?

\textsuperscript{164} The Antichrist. Trans. by Th. Common, Aphorism 2.
\textsuperscript{165} NT, pp. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{168} Ludovici, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{169} NT, pp. 47-48.
Leo Tolstoy is a great writer and father of humanism and proletarianism, the writer Romain Rolland a father of heroism. George Bernard Shaw and Gerhart Hauptmann are writers who propagate Socialism.170

In the last month of 1921 another relatively long article by Mao Dun appeared *A Systematic Study of Modern Chinese Literature*. Here we find another very similar statement, as far as I know, never translated into any European language, where Nietzsche is also an important representative:

“If we speak about the origins of modern literature, we have to know the most weighty features of the metamorphosis of modern thought. There is not one established literature without a solid philosophical frame. In the opposite direction it is possible to say that all new trends of thought, need the power of literature for their propaganda. We May see the principles of natural education in Rousseau’s *Emile*, Gustave Flaubert’s nihilism in his novel *Madame Bovary*, Nietzsche’s philosophy of Superman in his *chef d’oeuvre* - the poetic novel *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (in the last time some people translate this book as *On Superman* which seems to be not quite appropriate). For others, as G.B. Shaw, M. Maeterlineck, Romain Rolland, H. Barbusse, P. Loti, L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoyevsky, L. Andreyev and W.B. Yeats, literature is new thought and new thought is literature, they are inseparable.”171

Comparing these two passages with the one from the beginning of this contribution, we see that *Thus Spake Zarathustra* was always there, although in the last one it was characterized in a slightly different way. I think that *A Systematic Study of Literature* was written in the first half of 1920 during the time of Mao Dun’s enthrallment with Symbolism, and published later. Certainly Mao Dun would not put *Thus Spake Zarathustra* upon such a high pedestal in later months and years.

In one place we may see Nietzsche’s name venerated in 1922. But at that time, when writing about Gerhart Hauptmann, Mao Dun was only translating Anton Hellmann’s article about Nietzsche, not expressing his own opinion.

In 1920 and 1921 Mao Dun exposed his attitude to Nietzsche a few times. After translating a chapter from Lester F. Ward’s *Pure Sociology* where the author treats the problem of feminine biological and social insufficiency in relation to men, Mao Dun pointed to Nietzsche’s contemptuous views concerning women from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* allegedly from the Book One, Chapter 14:

“Woman is not yet capable of friendship: women are still cats and birds. Or, at best cows.”

And then:

“For the woman, the man is a means: the end is always the child. But what is the woman for the man?...”


Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.”¹⁷²

The first quotation is really from the Chapter 14, the second one from the Chapter 18.

On July 3, 1921 Zhang Wentian [129] (1900-1976), a good friend of Mao Dun and of his family, published an article Wudikangzhuyi de wojian [130] My Views on Non-resistance to Evil,¹⁷³ later reviewed and criticized by Mao Dun and Chen Wangdao. It was at the time when the first Chinese Communist group (or as some say the Chinese Communist Party) had been founded. Mao Dun in his essay¹⁷⁴ mentioned and criticized the teaching of Jesus Christ concerning his maxim: “Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you,”¹⁷⁵ and L. Tolstoy’s views of non-resistance. When on July 15, Zhang Wentian published a rejoinder entitled Rengedi zhongyao [134] The Importance of Human Character, Mao Dun some days later wrote his re-rejoinder “Renge” zagan [135] Miscellaneous Feelings on “Character”. Here Mao Dun compared a follower of non-resistance to evil to Superman and mentioned Beyond Good and Evil. “Love is life”, confessed by these followers, could not be a credo of Nietzschean Supermen, because these do not profess philanthropy (boai) [136] or non-resistance.¹⁷⁶ In his answer, Zhang Wentian, as younger friend, promised to study more Jesus and Tolstoy. As to the first, he fulfilled his promise and on January 25, 1922 he bought the 1920 edition of the Bible. Old and New Testaments, in its Mandarin Union Version. Somehow he forgot later this copy in Mao Dun’s library.¹⁷⁷

In this essay Mao Dun repeated his demand from the beginning of Nietzsche’s Teaching: “I think that by the study of all -isms - scientific, artistic... the most important aim should be their tendency to a bright future.” He immediately added something new: “I likewise think that all -isms... should show pity towards the pitiable members of our contemporary society, towards the sufferings of the fourth estate...”¹⁷⁸

It seems that after July 1921, Mao Dun completely neglected Nietzsche.

¹⁷² The translation finished on November 16, 1919, was published in Ladies Journal, 6, January 5, 1920, 1, pp. 1-9. Translator’s remark was reprinted in MDQI, vol. 14, pp. 100-101. The first quotation from Zarathustra is on p. 100, the second one on pp. 100-101. Both English translations of quoted passages are from Hollingdale: op. cit., pp. 84 and 91.


¹⁷⁵ St. Luke, 6, 27.

¹⁷⁶ This essay was also published in Awakening, July 24, 1921 and reprinted in MDQI, vol. 14, pp. 223-226. On philanthropy, non-resistance and Nietzsche, see pp. 224-225. Zhang Wentian’s essay is also reprinted here, pp. 227-229.

¹⁷⁷ The copy is accessible in the Mao Dun Museum, Peking.

Mao Dun’s case with Nietzsche is typical among the young Chinese intellectuals around Chen Duxiu from 1917 to 1921. This man whose thought developed very fast and who changed his opinions in relation to the new conditions, whether political, social, cultural and ideological, had great impact among Chinese youth. When he decided to take Mao Dun among his most intimate collaborators, he certainly knew what he was doing. Mao Dun in the years 1919 to around 1923 was following and concretely elaborating Chen Duxiu’s literary policy.\footnote{As far as I know, there is no special study of this kind, but this can be seen from comparing Chen Duxiu’s and Mao Dun’s literary essays. Cf. entries concerned with Chen in Gálík, M.: *Mao Tun and Modern Chinese Literary Criticism*, pp. 17, 20, 27-30 and Mao Dun’s literary and critical ideas from this period.}

Mao Dun’s *Nietzsche’s Doctrine* is a bit peculiar, but at the same time it is also representative of the attitude of Chinese intellectuals to foreign philosophical and literary legacies. Both its peculiarity and its typicalness lie in the very fast development of the Chinese receivers of foreign legacies which is performed within the frame of one study (peculiarity), but also within a short period of time (typicalness). As to the first, I know at least one similar example by Wang Guowei [137] (1877-1927) who in his famous article *Hongloumeng pinglun* [138] *Contribution to a Discussion on the Dream of the Red Chamber*, accepted the philosophical and aesthetic ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer in the first three chapters, but in the fourth he ceased to trust in his teachings.\footnote{Gálík, M.: *On the Influence of Foreign Ideas on Chinese Literary Criticism. Asian and African Studies* (Bratislava), 2, 1966, pp. 42-47, or his *Milestones in Sino-Western Literary Confrontation* (1898-1979), Bratislava-Wiesbaden, Veda-Otto Harrassowitz 1986, pp. 13-17.} Mao Dun, as shown above, already began to be quite critical of Nietzsche in the third installment of his study. As to the second, the examples for the changes of this kind of an appreciation, evaluation, criticism or even complete distrust or condemnation, abound in the time around the May Fourth Movement.

As far as I know, Mao Dun mentioned Nietzsche only once in his writings after 1922. In February 1979, something more than two years before his death on March 27, 1981, Mao Dun published the second installment\footnote{Xin wenxue shih liao [139] *Materials to Modern Chinese Literature*, 2, 1979, pp. 43-54.} of his later book *Roads I Have Travelled On*, where we find his certainly last attitude to Nietzsche. Here he quotes his own words from *Nietzsche’s Teachings* that “Nietzsche is really the bad devil of mankind and the most to be feared among men”, but also that his teaching is a wonderful means “for new criticism and transvaluation of all philosophical doctrines, social beliefs and all moralities within different views of life”.\footnote{MAO DUN: *The Roads I Have Travelled On*, Vol.1, p. 133.} He wrote this study, he confessed at the end of his life, not only because of the intellectual and moral situation in China, but
also because of Nietzsche’s attacks on “bourgeois philosophy”. This time he did not mention Nietzsche’s criticism of the ideas of Socialism, Mao Dun just started vehemently to propagate.

Mao Dun took Nietzsche’s writings literally and did not mind their symbolic significance. Much of his misunderstanding and misapprehensions originated here. I tried to show this part of his treatment of Nietzsche’s legacy in my study from 1971. I shall not repeat that criticism here.

1. 魯迅 2. 李石岑 3. 茅盾 4. 尼采的學說 5. 學生雜誌
6. 光明 7. 摩羅詩力說 8. 魯迅全集 9. 胡適 10. 易卜生
主義 11. 新青年 12. 胡適文存 13. 亞東圖書館 14. 陶孟和
15. 近代戲劇家傳 16. 梅特林克評傳 17. 近代戲劇家論
18. 東方文庫 19. 希貞 20. 小說月報 21. 謝普德曼與尼采
圖書集成公司 29. 地獄中之對話 30. 強迫的婚姻 31. 婦女
雜誌 32. 人間世歷史之一片 33. 丁泰琪的死 34. 解放與改造
35. 室內 36. 意大利現代第一文學家奮南達 37. 活尸 38. 逃亡
39. 新結婚的一對 40. 拉比阿契巴的秀域 41. 肖伯納 42.
思想 43. 天國 44. 悠茫 45. 隨感錄四十一 46. 陳獨秀
47. 敬告青年 48. 青年雜誌 49. 貴族道德 50. 奴隸道德
51. 墨尚思 52. 中國現代思想史資料簡編 53. 學生與社會
54. 有獨立心而勇敢者 55. 謹遵而受封者 56. 吳虞 57. 傳斯年
58. 一段風話 59. 新潮 60. 任人日記 61. 樂黛雲 62. 托而斯太
與今日之俄羅斯 63. 茅盾全集 64. 新青年 65. 李大釗
66. Bolshevism 的勝利 67. 李大釗全集 68. 布鎮 69. 新鄉人

183 Ibid., p. 134.
70. 陈赓 71. 唐金海 72. 刘长凖 73. 王鹏年著 74. 太原
山西高校联合出版社 75. 秋水 76. 范子 77. 范子引得 78. 孟子
79. 马蹄 80. 沈德鸿 81. 辜言 82. 伯乐 83. 云走过的道路
84. 我們為什麼讀書 85. 我的馬克思主義觀 86. 天經地義
87. 自古如斯 88. 實驗哲學 89. 郭伯周 90. 略論矛盾早期
對待西方文化思潮的基本態度 91. 矛盾與中外文化 92. "巴枯寧
和無強權主義"譯者按 93. 显绝 94. 絕精的 95. 擴張權力
96. 尼采的道德論上 97. 非道德的 98. 非道德的 99. 無倫理的
性質 100. 超道德家 101. 錯了 102. 經濟定理論 103. 尼采
道德論下 104. 小草 105. 陰謀家 106. 佩服與崇拜 107. 學燈
108. 時事新報 109. 朱執信 110. 神圣不可侵與偶像打破
111. 建設 112. 為求生 113. 惡魔 114. 恐怖 115. 保存
116. 得不堪 117. 張東陳 118. I W W的研究 119. 陳望道
120. 牛鬼蛇神 121. 強詞奪理已極了 122. 范子銘 123. 參回星移
矛盾晚年生活見聞 124. 鈍卒 125. 狂論 126. 女化 127. 現在
文學家的責任是什麼 128. 防衛 129. 張聞天 130. 無抵抗主義底
我見 131. 覺悟 132. 民國日報 133. 無抵抗主義與"愛" 134.
紅樓夢評論 139. 新文學史料 140. 成方 141. 尼采在中國
142. 東方雜誌
LANGUAGE COMMAND, LINGUISTICS AND PHILOLOGY

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Stimulated by recent publications this short article proposes to strengthen the awareness and criticize disregard of the fact that language command, however perfect and although an important cognitive factor in studying ideological systems, is a useful, but not a sufficient prerequisite for adequate analyses of ideological concepts. Moreover, its scholarly usefulness is only given, if the speaker of a particular language speaks it consciously and if command of a language is combined with linguistic and philological competence. Attempts by an author whose mother tongue is Tahitian, to analyse a number of key Tahitian religious terms, are dealt with in a critical and ironic way. It is shown that the attempts blatantly fail to fulfil the required linguistic and philological competence. They are only caricatures of scholarly analyses. This kind of would-be scholarship only results in would-be results which never enlighten anyone but dim the light which might have dawned on one or another here and there. Hoc erat demonstrandum.

Things do not necessarily become easier if several persons form a team in order to write a single book or article. On the contrary, from a formal point of view it can be more complicated to communicate experiences or episodes concerning only one member of the team. And so, before getting down to business, I, Horst, would like to make reference to one of the most wholesome experiences in my scholarly life.

In late 1962, on the threshold of what turned out to be my academic “career”, I had just enrolled myself in my very first seminar on Spanish literature. Its subject was one of the “autos sacramentales” or allegorical plays by the Spanish author of the 17th century, Don Pedro Calderón de la Barca, titled “Los Encantos de la Culpa”, i.e. “the enchantment of guilt”. One of my classmates-to-be whom I met by chance asked me whether I had already read the play and understood it. It was then ten years since I had started studying Spanish all by myself; I had practiced it day and night, as it were, with Latin American students, newspapermen, globetrotters and business and political visitors to the East Berlin of the late 1950s; finally, I had regularly attended an eight-month course at the university of Madrid from 1960 to 1961. On top of all this, I had just returned from five months of literary leave on the beaches of the Canary
Islands where I had been deepening my knowledge of Spanish in a leisurely way by reading all the Spanish books that I was able to lay my hands on. Even though I had not read anything written by Calderón de la Barca and no idea of what an "auto sacramental" was supposed to be, I answered that, indeed, I had read the text in question, and, fully aware of my excellent command of the beautiful mother-tongue of Don Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, I selfconfidently added that I had understood everything. My opposite number expressed his admiration and admitted that he himself had found it a rather problematical piece of literature.

Later, at the beginning of the first session of the seminar, our professor, one of the most renowned German Hispanists and Lusitanists at the time, asked the participants who had read and understood the play. Strangely enough, I was the only one who answered in the affirmative. The professor congratulated me — confessing, at the same time, that he himself had encountered certain difficulties and found himself unable to join me in my claim.

I had a hunch that something was awkward and felt ashamed as if having been caught boasting. On the other hand, my Spanish was really good. I spoke it without any foreign accent and was rather well-versed in several dialects and sociolects. What I was not aware of was the fact that the Spanish language had quite a long and complex history and that Spanish philology had a long tradition and a very high standard. No doubt, of all the participants of the seminar I could claim to be the one with the best command of Spanish, but it was also clear that this was neither the all-decisive nor an indispensable requirement for participation in the seminar. Most of the other students were much better linguists and philologists, whereas I had no idea of either linguistics or philology, neither Spanish nor general.

I am telling all this here, because something similar appears to be going on in the field of Polynesian language studies. There are plenty of native speakers of Polynesian languages, but in this respect only very few of them, if any, could rightfully claim to be experts on their respective mother-tongues, to say nothing of Polynesian linguistics or philology in a scholarly sense. On the other hand, there are many trained linguists who are not native speakers and lack knowledge of any of the Polynesian languages. They also lack an adequate insight into and a sound judgement about the peculiarities of Polynesian languages in general. Finally, there are many anthropologists, exclusively foreigners, who do not even seem to realize that Polynesians speak their own particular languages and who, at any rate, have no propensity whatsoever to get involved with one of them. All in all, it is safe to say that, in comparison with say European languages, those of Polynesia have been pretty inadequately studied so far. Anthropologists seem to perceive and treat them quite generally as something negligable, as a burden rather than a useful or even indispensable means of understanding what it is all about to feel, to think, to be Polynesian. Such scholars cannot help being lost when it comes to judging the competence with which their informants speak about the anthropology, religion, literature and philosophy of the culture into which they have been born. In this situation any native speaker of a Polynesian
language – and we are not referring here to the charlatans who deliberately lead strangers up the garden path and who also exist – would be admissible as an expert, no matter how much or how little he or she knows. The danger of being uncritical or not critical enough with regard to one’s own possibilities in doing field-work and, on account of this, committing errors is especially great if a native speaker and a trained linguist coincide in one and the same individual. A recent example of this kind induces us to voice our reserves against the assertions resulting from the cooperation of the two.

The text which bothers us is by Louise Peltzer and has been published in the *Bulletin de la Société des Études Océaniennes*. As far as we are aware, the author is a native speaker of Tahitian and a French-trained linguist. Although we do not know the subject of her doctoral thesis, we assume that it was not a Polynesian one or, if it was, her supervisors would not seem to have been too well acquainted with what rightfully might be called Polynesian linguistics or philology. Judging from her linguistic publications, we do not doubt for a second that Mrs. Peltzer speaks Tahitian and we have no misgivings either about assuming that she is a well-trained French linguist. On the other hand, in view of her poor performance as an analyst of Tahitian religious terms, we have also no reason to think that she is an expert in Tahitian, let alone Polynesian linguistics. In order to do justice to our colleague, we propose to present and discuss her evidence and results here, leaving it to the readers to decide for themselves what they want to make of it. We do not intend to comment on every single point Mrs. Peltzer tries to make but only on those which, as far as we are concerned, are definitely incorrect or unconvincing and which we feel in a position to straighten out at this point in time. In doing so, we have no compunctions about correcting Mrs. Peltzer’s and other authors’ spellings of Polynesian words by adding the diacritics to the best of our knowledge and technical possibility using the circumflex accent instead of the macron as length marker. The italics with Polynesian and other foreign words and syllables are always ours.

The article of Mrs. Peltzer’s which we propose to look into and discuss here, is titled: “La mort dans la tradition polynésienne”1. It aroused our keen interest, since it deals with much the same phenomena as our own recently published volume titled: “Religion and Language of Easter Island”. It is a pity that we were not aware of the article while we were still working at our own analysis, although it would not have influenced our conclusions. After having got a copy from a friend in France, the article kept us in suspense but reading it was an anticlimax.

According to Mrs. Peltzer “the Polynesian is dual”2 which is doubtlessly supposed to mean that the living Polynesian individual was believed by the Polynesians to be composed of two integral parts. To a Polynesian, then, the Polynesian was what may be termed a dichotomy. According to Mrs. Peltzer, its

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1 Peltzer 1995: 15-29.
2 ibid.: 16. Cf. the French original: “le polynésien est duel”.

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constituents are “a material and visible principle (tino) and a spiritual and hidden principle (vārua)”\(^3\). With all due respect, we doubt the correctness of this statement.

The late Miss Vonnick Bodin, also a native speaker of Tahitian, is more precise and convincing when she writes: “While a person is alive, he (she) possesses, at least, two things in his (her) own right: his (her) tino: his (her) body and his (her) iho which corresponds exactly to the self of the philosophers ... If this person dies, his (her) tino becomes the tūpāpa’u and his (her) iho the vārua.”\(^4\) Mrs Peltzer herself defines iho as “the vital principle, the essence” and adds that it “is limited to humans and gods. An animal has no iho. It is the individual substance, the personality of the individual”.\(^5\) Apart from the fact that she does not tell what relationship is supposed to exist between her “vital”, “material” and “spiritual” principles, she seems to concur with her late compatriot. But again, when she explains what death traditionally means to the Tahitians, she does not say what becomes of the iho of the dying person. She declares: “To us, then, death is never the end nor the annihilation of the human personality. There is disappearance of the carnal envelop (tino which becomes tūpāpa’u) and liberation ... of the soul of the deceased.”\(^6\) This is to say that, according to Bodin and Peltzer, tino was believed to become tūpāpa’u, a metamorphosis which Mrs. Peltzer equates with disappearance. According to Miss Bodin, iho was supposed to become vārua, whereas Mrs. Peltzer does not even mention iho in this connection but speaks of the liberation of the “soul” which, according to her own dichotomy of a living person, cannot be anything else but the vārua.

Two observations should be noted here. First, Vonnick Bodin claims that the Tahitians’ dichotomous concept of a living human being differs from that of a dead person. In the former case the components are tino and iho, whereas in the latter, there are tūpāpa’u and vārua. Louise Peltzer differentiates between the living and the dead only with regard to what she terms the material principle, tino and tūpāpa’u, but takes vārua for the so-called spiritual principle both of the living and the dead. Her iho — the vital principle, the essence, the individual substance, the personality of the individual — which appears to be identifiable with that of Miss Bodin, plays no part in the transition from life to death.

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\(^3\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “un principe matériel et visible (tino) et un principe spirituel et caché (vārua)”.

\(^4\) Bodin, personal letter of May 13th 1977. Cf. the French original: “Lorsqu’une personne est vivante, elle possède au moins deux choses en propre: son tino: son corps et son iho: qui correspond exactement au moi des philosophes ... Quand cette personne décède, son tino devient le tūpāpa’u et son iho le vārua”.

\(^5\) Peltzer 1995: 17. Cf. the French original: “le principe vital, l’essence” ... “IHO est réservé aux humains et aux dieux. Un animal n’a pas de iho, c’est la substance individuelle, la personnalité de l’individu.” Note also her “ihō-tumu (identité d’un individu), ihō-ari’i (essence royale), ihō-atua (essence divine)”.

\(^6\) ibid.: 16. Cf. the French original: “La mort pour nous n’est donc jamais une fin ni un anéantissement de la personnalité humaine. Il y a disparition de l’enveloppe charnelle (tino qui deviendra tūpāpa’u) et libération ... de l’âme du défunt.”
The second observation concerns the valuation of the two components, the so-called material and the so-called spiritual. Whereas Vonnick Bodin abstains from valuing, Louise Peltzer values them in a typically Christianocentric way, when she speaks negatively of disappearance, in the case of the conversion of tino into tūpāpa’u, and positively of the liberation of the “soul”. The depreciation of the human body and the concept of the “soul” as a captive or prisoner of the body are typical from Plato to the European Romantics “... ‘The soul flies away into the pure blue heaven of truth and innocence like a bird that has been set free, to hover in the clear light ...’”.  

Mrs. Peltzer analyses the terms she chose, whatever the cost, on a purely first glance and present-day Tahitian basis. Since she knows or claims to know the meaning of every single Tahitian word and syllable, all terms seem quite clear to her. She does not feel that it would perhaps be necessary or, at least, worthwhile to recur to a historically earlier ready to hand language stratum, to the proto-Polynesian (PPN), proto-Oceanic (POC), proto-Austronesian (PAN) reconstructions or, at least, to other empirical Polynesian languages, which might afford explanations of what otherwise would be difficult to explain or simply remain unexplained. She seems to be convinced that a good, let alone excellent command of a language in its present shape – in her case present-day Tahitian – enables one to explain what there is to be explained. We are sorry for having to mix our colleague’s wine with quite a good deal of water.

It is common knowledge that any word and any syllable in any language has a phonological, morphological, semantic and etymological history; and in many cases it is a complex one. A term might contain morphemes, for example, which are no longer productive and whose meanings might have been long forgotten. Its simple phonetic identity, real or apparent – for the most common and lamentable omission of the Polynesian diacritics creates countless ambiguities – does not provide a reliable basis for any serious analysis of any Polynesian word or syllable. Accordingly, there are terms which resist being etymologized or otherwise analysed. There are also terms which may only be conjectured upon for the time being. As far as we are concerned, this is the case with some of the terms for which Mrs. Peltzer offers definite though absurdly recondite semasiological explanations. We are convinced, on the contrary, that most of her analyses are not tenable, because they are exclusively based on Tahitian lexicographical data and on what semantic connotations the author associates with these data. As her procedure is superficial, her explanations are odd in that they suggest an oversophisticated, abstruse reasoning on the part of the ancient Tahitians. We propose to substantiate this criticism subsequently.

The first term to be considered is tūpāpa’u or its variant ti‘apāpa’u. According to Mrs. Peltzer, tūpāpa’u denotes “cadavre” (corpse), and she adds that

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corpse was its ancient meaning, whereas the modern one is “revenant”. She di-
vides the word into two components, tū “maintain oneself standing, be equal,
situation, stability, representation, consistence”,8 and pāpaʻu “shallow”.9
Tūpāpaʻu, then, is declared to mean “little consistence”.10 The other compound,
tiʻapāpaʻu, is said to denote “to maintain oneself standing in the shallow, with
little consistence”.11

These fantastic interpretations which do not make much sense, call urgently
for a commentary. First of all, it should be noted that the author does not deign
to say a word about the reason why there are two forms of the word and the pos-
sible, probable or actual implications of this. It is true that there is a verb tū
meaning “to stand upright”, but the question is, whether we are dealing here
with that verb or with a verb at all and if so, whether “to stand upright” is the
only meaning of it or, at least, the one to the point here. We do not believe this
to be the case.

According to what we have been able to find out, the relevant tū- in our con-
text is not a verb but a prefix whose function, though not very clear nowadays,
appears to have been that of reenforcing or intensifying the meaning conveyed
by the attached base. It was replaced on account of the piʻi custom which
caused words and syllables to be tapu and banned from the everyday use for be-
ing names or parts of names of important ariʻi (chiefs) or important ancestors
of such chiefs’ descent groups. The piʻi, which Mrs. Peltzer mentions without
characterizing it, was put into effect when the phonetics of a word or syllable
coincided with that of a name or part of the name of a person of rank. Ralph
Gardner White describes the Tahitian piʻi without naming it as follows: “The
ariʻi’s name was usually made up of a word or words taken from the common
colloquial vocabulary. This meant that the ariʻi’s subjects could no longer use
those words or the sound sequences in them except as the name of the ariʻi. For
instance one ariʻi had the name of /tūl ( = Tū-nui-e-ʻaʻa-i-te-atua) which had
been a very common word meaning ‘to stand, to stay habitually in a place, to
have a family likeness to (someone) and was also a very common prefix as in
tū-rama ‘to illuminate (as with a torch) from rama ‘torch’. All these usages
were forbidden and the sound sequence could only be used as the name of the
ariʻi. ... Much of the tabooing which had a more or less permanent effect on
Tahitian comes from the various names of Pōmare I, who was born in the mid-
dle of the 18th century and died in 1803. His names were long and he changed
them often. His son, Pōmare II, was highly instrumental in setting up the stan-

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8 Peltzer 1995: 18. Cf. the French original: “se tenir debout, être à égalité, situation, sta-
bilité, représentation, consistence”.
9 ibid. Cf. the French for pāpaʻu = “peu profond”.
10 ibid. Cf. the French: “peu de consistance”.
11 ibid. Cf. the French original: “se tenir debout dans peu de profondeur, avec peu de
consistance”.

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standard literary language, thus promoting the use of the new vocabulary officially and in writing."

The reason why *tū-* had to be replaced was not its semantics but the coincidence of its phonetics or "sound sequence" with the shortened name of *Tū*, the usurper of the political power in the Tahitian-speaking area of Tuamotuan descent. When he changed names from *Tū* to *Pōmare* on account of his little son's nocturnal coughs, this lead to other *pi'i* replacements of *pō* with the Tuamotuan *ru'i* for "night" and *mare* with *hotā* for "cough". The reason why *ti'a-* and no other "sound sequence" was chosen to substitute *tū-* was this time that *tū* and *ti'a* were felt to be verbs meaning "to stand upright" which must already have been their most current signification for those Tahitians who placed the *tapu* upon *tū-* and who were just as good diachronic linguists then as Mrs. Peltzer is today. The difference is, however, that the Tahitians of the olden days neither were nor pretended to be scholars. They were untrained and proceeded neither systematically nor methodically but mechanically and by instinct. However, to be aware of the *pi'i* and to fully understand its mechanism is crucial for anyone who wishes to study Tahitian and Polynesian semantics and etymology.

In reality *tū-* appears to have been the prefix mentioned by Gardner White, which also occurs in the following compounds randomly taken from Lemaitre: *tūfā* (*ti'ařā*), *tūhā* (*ti'ahā*) "être à découvert" said of the reef at low tide, *tūoro* (*ti'ororo*) "appeler, invoquer, faire appel à", *tūpana* (*ti'apanaha*) "empan", *tūrama* (*ti'aramaha*) "guider avec une torche ou une lampe, éclairer". In this case *tūpāpa'ū* (*ti'apāpa'ū*) would simply be one more in that number. The other possibility which, as far as we are concerned, is a probability, would mean that *tū-* is the prefix listed by the Andrewses and said to be "frequently intensive in sense of word *tū*, to stand firm" but "much more often worn down to a mere stem variant" or again: "often with significance, 'stand', but usually practically meaningless".

Though there is no need to derive this prefix from the verb meaning "to stand", it is clear that it is the result of a historical process which was already at its end when it became necessary to substitute it in the 18th century. Now, bearing this in mind, we turn to the explanation of *pāpa'ū*. As Mrs. Peltzer correctly states, *pāpa'ū* means "shallow", but formally it is also a partial reduplication of *pa'ū* or *paku* which means everywhere in Polynesia and beyond "dry", "(be) dried" and "desiccated". Complete or partial reduplication has variously a frequentative function or it intensifies, weakens or pluralizes the action or condition referred to by any simple base. *Pāpa'ū*, then, may originally

12 Gardner White 1968: 64.
14 Andrews 1944: XI.
15 ibid.: 174.
also have meant “very, utterly, completely, extremely dry, dried up, desiccated”. In the present context, this meaning proves to be the most plausible one as pāpaku means actually “corpse” on Rapa Nui, and this again is absolutely in keeping with the mortuary customs of the Polynesians and their Oceanic brethren. These customs were designed to preserve the corpses through scraping off and removing the corruptible parts and systematically desiccating the remains by draining them and exposing them extensively to the sun. The consequence of such treatment was the reduction of corpses so that they were of little consistence, as Mrs. Peltzer says, or actually emaciated and even skeletons. The prefix ā- added to the base pāpau forming āpāpau could either further emphasize the condition designated by the base or simply be redundant. Indeed, on the basis of this descriptive meaning, āpāpau denoted “corpse” before it was used to designate also “ghost”. At the time when ā- became tāpu the original superlative meaning “completely desiccated” of āpāpau was already obsolete and no longer understood by the Tahitians. To them āpāpau simply meant “corpse” and, most probably, even already “ghost”, as in modern Tahitian.

Notwithstanding our preference for the translation and interpretation just explained as the original one, there is still another possibility. After having glossed pāpau as meaning originally “dry”, “dried”, “desiccated”, and hence “corpse”, ā meaning “to stand up”, “to arise”, “to rise” may again be taken into consideration. Stimson and Marshall, after glossing the Raivavaean āpāpau “ghost, apparition, spirit of the dead” and equating it with the Tuamotuan āpāpaku, declare that the term refers literally to “a corpse arisen-, returned- from the grave”.

This interpretative translation is virtually correct, because it corresponds to the spirit of Polynesian religiosity. At any rate, the idea of revenants as physically resuscitated dead is reflected in the morphology of their generic name as well.

In analysing what appear to be five different terms for “soul” or “spirit”, Mrs. Peltzer gives striking examples of folk etymology and its ludicrous results. The five terms which we propose to deal with in her own order are vairua, vaerua, vārua, vaiite and vāite.

According to Mrs. Peltzer, vairua is a compound of vai “existence” and rua “deux” (two), which, however, is not supposed to signify “deux existences” (two existences) but “double or second existence”. Given the fact that the Tahitians

17 ibid.: 38.

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conceived of the human individual as a dichotomy of body and “soul” or “spirit” and under the assumptions, first that this conception is expressed in the term vairua, second that vairua is a compound of vai and rua, and third that rua is actually the ancient Tahitian word for “two”, Mrs. Peltzer’s interpretation is a possible and even suggestive one. We ourselves adhered to it for a while before we found a more plausible and, as far as we are concerned, the original Polynesian one.

But on the basis of the above assumptions, there is still another interpretation which we do not want to omit here. Hans Kähler explains wairua (vairua) on the basis of PAN reconstructions conjecturing that wai (vai) was the Polynesian reflex of PAN *bali ‘to accompany’ and rua (lua) of PAN *dua “two” so that wairua (vairua) would have come to mean “spirit, companion two” – that is, “second companion”.24

Another of Mrs. Peltzer’s interpretations of the same compound suggests that vai, as contained in the question ‘o vai ‘oe? “Who are you? (Your identity?)”,25 means “identity”. In this case, vairua is said to denote “the double or second identity”.26

As a circumspect scholar, Mrs. Peltzer does not miss a thing and provides yet another explanation of vairua suggesting this time that vai also denotes “the water, symbol of life”27 and rua “the source, the opening, the hole”.28 Though we are not told what vairua in this case is supposed to mean, it could not be anything but “spring water” whose association with the human “soul” or “spirit” is not only quite natural but also obvious to everybody.

The next term for “soul” Mrs. Peltzer deals with in the same superficial manner is vaerua. As its morphology shows, it is also a compound and, from the phonetic point of view, very similar to vairua. According to the author vae signifies “divide or part into two equal parts”29 and “marcher” (to march). Insinuating that rua stands again for “two” and without any further commentary, she offers two interpretations for vaerua, “divide into two but remaining united”30 or “march in twos, together”.31

Mrs. Peltzer’s third choice is the already mentioned varua which according to her is both a person’s “soul” and “ghost” but which according to Vonick Bod-

26 ibid. Cf. the French original: “l’identité double ou deuxième identité”.
28 ibid. Cf. the French original: “la source, l’ouverture, le trou”.
29 ibid. Cf. the French original: “diviser ou partager en deux parties égales”.
30 ibid. Cf. the French original: “diviser en deux mais en restant liés”.
31 ibid.: 19. Cf. the French original: “marcher à deux, ensemble”.

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in is only the “ghost” of a human being. Mrs. Peltzer tries to be more explicit as to its semantics and says that *vā* denotes either a “very narrow space between two rain drops or between two layers of pandanus leaves on a roof”\(^{32}\) or a “very light noise, very light draft, noise produced when the air escapes through an opening or when a dumb person tries to speak”.\(^{33}\) *Vārua*, then, is said to mean “double or second draught which escapes from an opening, from a source”.\(^{34}\) Thus, we are left to believe in the Tahitians’ concept of an extremely subtle, airy phenomenon called *vārua* and corresponding to “soul”. The author tacitly abandons the alleged signification of *vā*, i.e. “narrow space”, in favour of that of “draught” – that is, the air which passes through the narrow space producing an equally subtle noise. All this is absolutely unconvincing both because of the inadequate method of the analyst and the lack of plausibility of her assertions. We propose to discuss this very briefly, after having dealt with Mrs. Peltzer’s last two terms in this series.

The term *vaite* is said to denote “âme, esprit” (“soul”, “spirit”) and to be little used. According to the author, its second component, *ite*, means “two” in one of the Tuamotuan languages, and she states further that *vaite* signifies like *vārua* “double or second existence”.\(^{35}\) Without distinguishing between words, she also declares *ite*, the correct spelling of which would be *īte*, to denote “to see, to know, spirit, intelligence, knowledge, visible”\(^{36}\) and goes on rendering *vaite* as “existence of the intelligence, of the knowledge” and “visible manifestation of the intelligence, of the knowledge”.\(^{37}\)

Going by the author’s own order, the final term for “soul” or “spirit” to be treated here ought to be *vāite*, a compound of *vā* and *ite*, which would be perfectly justified and could be correct, but inadvertently, in a conditioned reflex as it were, Mrs. Peltzer readapts it to *vaite* interpreting it slightly differently from the latter as meaning “visible manifestation of the spirit, of the intelligence”.\(^{38}\)

Now, all these analyses which are really pseudoanalyses yield results which make no sense. Mrs. Peltzer’s would-be explanations are folk etymologies based on the author’s command of modern every-day Tahitian and on what she was able to find in the Tahitian dictionaries. Her method consists in mixing the available lexicographical items together with their renderings and squeezing

\(^{32}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “espace très étroit, entre deux gouttes de pluie ou entre deux rangées de feuilles de pandanus dans la toiture”.

\(^{33}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “bruit très léger, souffle très léger, bruit fait quand l’air sort par une ouverture ou quand un muet essaie de parler”.

\(^{34}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “souffle double ou souffle deuxième, qui sort d’une ouverture, d’une source”.

\(^{35}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “existence double ou deuxième existence”.

\(^{36}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “voir, savoir, esprit, intelligence, connaissance, visible”.

\(^{37}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “existence de l’intelligence, du savoir” and “manifestation visible de l’intelligence, de la connaissance”.

\(^{38}\) ibid. Cf. the French original: “manifestation visible de l’esprit, de l’intelligence”.

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them into her would-be translations of the compound terms, which are in reality interpretations that insinuate a recondite abstract thinking by the ancient Tahitians. In trying to straighten things out, we propose to proceed step by step.

First of all, it is worth asking why Mrs. Peltzer fails to discuss the two remaining terms for “soul” or “spirit”, verua and virua, which are also to be found in the dictionaries of Davies, Jaussen and Andrews. If there had been a special reason not to include them in the discussion, it would have been interesting, at least, to know.

It is misleading and confusing to present and handle the evidence as if there were five distinct Tahitian terms for one and the same concept – that is, the human “soul” or “spirit”. If we add the two extra terms just mentioned, there would then be seven. The correctness of this should by no means be taken for granted.

At first glance, it is clear that the number of terms must be drastically reduced. If we assume for a while that rua is the second component of three or five of these terms and actually means “two”, vairua and vaiite, on the one hand, and vârua and vâite, on the other, are semantically identical and interchangeable. The difference between these two pairs is that the word for “two” was changed from the ancient Tahitian rua to the Tuamotuan ite. Asking why this substitution has taken place, we are again referred to the word tabooing habit called pi'i. Though to the best of our knowledge it is nowhere documented, it is quite obvious that rua must have become tapu and been replaced with ite because of the rise to power of Pômare I, the usurper and founder of the Tahitian dynasty of Tuamotuan descent. Obviously, this was neither the only nor the last effect of the pi'i on the numeral two, since the modern Tahitian word for “two” is neither rua nor ite but piti whose origin we unfortunately do not know.

At any rate, it is unacceptable to confuse ite “two” and ‘ite (kite) “knowledge, understanding, perception”, “to know, understand, perceive”, and “to know, see, find” – about which Mrs. Peltzer has no misgivings. However, this lapse induces her to render her “spiritual principle” vârua inconsistently visible again, after she had first declared it to be hidden in contrast to her “material principle” tino, said to be visible.

There are two probable reasons why vaerua “partager en deux” (divide into two),41 which is semantically identical and phonetically cognate with the Samoan vaelua, has erroneously been thought to be another term for “soul” or “spirit”. The simplest but obvious one is its close phonetic resemblance to vairua which is not easy to be distinguished from vaerua, especially not in an ordinary, quick conversation. The other one lies in its semantics which seemingly refers to the supposedly dichotomic nature of the human individual, designating his or her component other than tino. We shall explain shortly why this is an error.

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Regarding verua and virua, which we ourselves have introduced here, we may say that not a single Tahitian of all those whom we have asked as to their meanings was even aware of their existence. The fact that they are, nevertheless, in the dictionaries is most probably due to the problems of early visitors to Tahiti— to a large extent English-speaking missionaries— with the perception and pronunciation of Tahitian vowels and diphthongs. Early Polynesian writings, for example, are so distorted that they can only be read with great difficulty.

Now, both vairua and vaerua, if correctly pronounced according to the Tahitian rules of phonology, could easily be misspelled by English-speaking people as virua; and this again, if more or less correctly pronounced according to the same Tahitian rules of phonology, could under the same circumstances also be mistaken for verua. The very process of compiling word lists and, perhaps, dictating the dictionary entries to another person might well have occasioned errors through mispronouncing, for example, vārua as both verua and vaerua, or virua as vairua and vaerua again. The standardization of Tahitian and its having been committed to writing was doubtless helpful in overcoming the insecurities in the handling of Tahitian phonetics, but words which had crept into the card files with different spellings were not easily discovered and removed again. We really think this is why so many variants of the term here in question linger in Tahitian dictionaries— which, by the way, have not been revised since they were first published. Mrs. Peltzer, who knows Tahitian as her compatriots do, intuitively and rightfully dismisses verua and virua from her consideration. As far as we are concerned, however, vaerua, which owes its being listed as a variant of the term for “soul” or “spirit” to its apparent phonetic cognation and the false assumption of its similar semantics, is equally to be eliminated. This, however, requires further explanation.

As may be seen, Mrs. Peltzer breaks up the words here under consideration after the first syllable; i.e., vai-rua, vae-rua, vā-rua, vai-ite, vā-ite, and, no doubt, would have broken up verua and virua in the same manner had she only deemed them worth being taken into account. This procedure provides her in each case with a first interpretable component and a second one meaning “two”. Even though we recognize that this is tempting because it is suggestive of the Tahitians’ dichotomic concept of the human individual, which, as a consequence of the experience of death appears to be realistic, from a morphological and semasiological point of view we do not think this is the right track.

It is interesting to note that in reducing the number of variants of the “soul” or “spirit” terms, only two out of seven remain, vārua and vairua. In the dictionaries six of them are related to the seventh, i.e. vārua, whereas the only one vārua is related to is vairua. Even though the latter variant is no longer used in Tahitian nowadays, it appears to have been more common in the past. Davies states: “The old Tahitian word seems to have been vairua, which is still retained in some islands.”42 The fact that vairua was used in some of the islands in the

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42 Davies 1851: 311.
middle of last century does not necessarily mean that it represents an older or the oldest form of the word and we do not share Davies’ opinion but feel rather that its diffusion on some of the Society Islands as well as its Maori form wairua and the Hawai’ian wailua speak in favour of a dialectal variation of vårua. This, of course, is only a conjecture like the remark by Davies just quoted. In order to render it more plausible, however, the heavy Tahitian influence on both the Maori and Hawai’ian cultures could at least be mentioned. Emory, for example, has no misgivings in saying straightforwardly: “Unless or until evidence to the contrary is brought forth it seems reasonable to adopt the view that the Necker culture is a pure sample of the culture prevailing in Hawai’i before the thirteenth century, and that prehistoric as well as the historic Hawai’ian culture may be considered Tahitian in origin.” And the same is true of the New Zealand Maori culture.

Our own impression is that vårua is actually the primary Tahitian term, whereas all other variants are secondary. This is perfectly in keeping with the overall practice in Tahiti where only vårua is used, whereas the other six, which occur in the dictionaries, are hardly ever heard, if at all. It should also be noted that vårua always designates the “ghost” but never the “soul” or “spirit” of a living person. This is to say, that Miss Bodin’s above definition of vårua as a person’s “ghost” would appear to be more correct than the idea of Mrs. Peltzer’s, according to which it is applicable both to the “soul” and the “ghost” of a person.

Morphologically, vårua is not a compound of va or vâ plus rua but rather made up of varu “to scrape, grate, rasp, rub” and the suffix -a which in ancient Tahitian used to form the past participle, i.e. “scraped, grated, rasped, rubbed”, as it still does in other Polynesian languages. Another effect of the suffixing of -a was its repercussion on the length of the stem vowel of varu so that vårua is to be macronized. The original significance of te vårua, then, would have been “the scraped, grated, rasped, rubbed (one)” – that is, the corpse or dead having been stripped of all corruptible substance. This makes sense, because it is not only in perfect keeping with the mortuary customs practiced throughout Polynesia but also corroborated by the semantics of other Tahitian and eastern Polynesian “ghost” terms like the above dealt with tüpäpa (u tüpäpaku), orovarú4 and akuaku45. In order to render this explanation fully plausible, it should be noted that oro and aku and their cognates are verbal bases meaning everywhere in Polynesia and far beyond more or less the same as varu. The Tahitian oro “grate”, “ rasp” is a reflex of PPN *olo “rub”, *holo “grate, grind” or *solo “wipe, rub”46 and the Tahitian reflex of PPN *aku “scrape out with hands” is

43 Emory 1928: 12; cf. 1933: 45 ff.
44 Bierbach & Cain 1996: 10 ff.
45 ibid.: 2 ff.
a 'u “to scrape together or heap up rubbish”.

Orovaru, then, appears to be what we have termed a “semantical reduplication” in contrast to akuaku, which is a “phonetical reduplication” meaning “thin, slender” in the Marquesas and Mangareva and designating skeletal “ghosts” on Rapa Nui. Our conclusion, then, is that orovaru, akuaku and vārua denoting “ghost” have basically the same meaning – that is, the scraped, grated, rasped, rubbed one. If this were so, and we do not doubt it, we should, perhaps, no longer speak of the “spirits” of the dead or “ghosts” as being the Tahitians’ and Polynesians’ objects of religious attention but simply of the dead or ancestors themselves.

At the end of this brief critical article remains only to mention that Mrs. Peltzer also tried her hand at two more “soul” or “spirit” terms, meho‘i and mauri, which we have deliberately not commented on. Our abstention does not mean, however, that we agree with the author’s opinion about these terms but that both are complex and better to be dealt with separately. Mrs. Peltzer’s meho‘i which, as far as we are concerned, should be spelled mehoi has been extensively treated in an article of ours as well as in a paragraph of our recent volume on “Religion and Language of Easter Island”.

The term mauri is a widespread and complex one which can by no means be analysed and explained on the basis of the knowledge of everyday Tahitian and Tahitian lexicographical evidence alone. The outcome of such an ambitious but regrettable for senseless effort may be admired in its ludicrous superficiality at the end of a promising but disappointing and superfluous article by Louise Peltzer.

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Walsh, David & Bruce Biggs
"KLEINE AUGEN" AUF GROSSE FAHRT
Zur Sternnavigation in Rongorongo
(Teil III.)

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"Little Eyes" – on a Big Trip
Star Navigation as Rongorongo Inscriptions

An attempt is made here to prove that rongorongo does not reproduce coherent texts, creation chants, rituals, etc., as has been conjectured so far. All signs are symbols of stars and planets, quarters, winds, the moon, the guiding stars, etc.

The new endeavour to analyse the rongorongo signs is based on the accessible astronomical knowledge of Micronesia and Polynesia. The body of rongorongo signs consists of tropical descriptions of single stars, planets, zodiacal signs and other constellations. What has been registered are particular nights and, on the smaller tablets, general data on astronomical itineraries. The all in all about 12,000 rongorongo signs convey exclusively instructions for sidereal navigation within the Pacific.

This article deals with the signs which are supposed to represent the Pleiades (matariki) in rongorongo. More than half of all signs can only be understood through the astronomical knowledge of the New Zealand Maori. The present approach, then, provides the possibility to explain nearly all existing rongorongo signs, which hitherto was held to be an illusion.

This is the last part of the study.

Ein populistischer Name für die Milchstraße – überall in Polynesien – war Ika, d.h. Fisch. Der Fischleib, auf dem Sirius steht, ist in diesem Fall die Milchstraße. Sirius kann ober- und unterhalb der Milchstraße stehen, rechts oder links von ihr, je nach Jahreszeit und Beobachtungsort. Im April ist Sirius von nördlichen Breiten aus am Südhimmel letztmalig zu sehen, die Milchstraße steht dann über dem Stern, was über dieses Zeichen verstanden werden kann:

Der Kartenausschnitt zeigt das:


Die geheimnisvolle Zeugungsmythologie der Sonne, die von einem Fisch geboren wurde, den ein Vogel schwängerte, sieht am Himmel in der Nacht so aus:
Das Sterndreieck besteht also aus Aldebaran – Beteigeuze – (Milchstraße) Sirius. Aber woher sollen wir wissen, daß diese drei Zeichen auch so zu verstehen sind? Die Sternkonstellation macht einen Sinn, wenn man dafür das Zeichen einbezieht, das vor dem Vogel-Zeichen steht. Es ist dieses:


Bei dieser Zeichenfolge macht die Milchstraße einen Sinn, denn die drei zu einem Sterndreieck verbundenen Sterne Rigel – Beteigeuze – Aldebaran stehen links von der Milchstraße. Sirius hat in dieser Konstellation nichts zu suchen.
Die Karte zeigt, daß es sich um ein Dreieck handelt, das gut im Sichtfeld der Navigatoren stand, ohne daß sie „Kopfakrobatik“ betreiben mußten.

Damit ist Fischer widerlegt, denn seine Behauptung, daß der Code in Rongorongo „Creation Chants“ meint, geht doch davon aus, daß der Vogel ein Vogel ist, der Penis ein Penis, der Fisch ein Fisch und Sirius die Sonne sein soll.

Meine erste Arbeit über das neue Verständnis von Rongorongo wird vielleicht enttäuschend sein, denn wir werden wohl nichts erfahren, was wir nicht längst wissen und auch besser wissen.


Das hatte in Polynesien unter den Intellektuellen eine große Verärgerung ausgelöst, denn sie wußten, daß ihre Ahnen keine verantwortungslosen Ha-
zadeure waren, die mit ihrer Familie auf gut Glück in das Boot stiegen mit der Maßgabe, kein Ziel vor Augen zu haben. Es war eine unerhörte Beleidigung der Ahnen aller Polynesier. Das war auch der Antrieb von Johnson und Mahelona, erneut das Sternwissen aus alter Zeit zu durchforsten und mit neuesten Erkenntnissen zu versehen.

In dem Vorwort zu ihrer ausgezeichneten Forschungsarbeit: 

NA INOA HOKU
A Catalogue of Hawaiian and Pacific Star Names
Rubellite Kawena Johnson and John Kaipo Mahelona

ohne die eine Entzifferung von Rongorongo niemals möglich wäre, findet sich ein Text, der mich persönlich berührte.

„Perhaps we should reexamine our own expectations of what the truth might have been. We trust the airline pilot’s navigation just as the boatload from Tahiti trusted theirs in 500 A.D. on the long way to Hawaii. We can imagine what a group of passengers would think of their pilot if he told them he didn’t know where any new land might be but he would take them to some distant place without being sure about how to go there. It is doubtful if anyone would want to go anywhere under those conditions, yet that is the hypothetical situation that has been recreated by scholars who believe that Polynesian navigation was anything but touch and go. Would men go to sea treating it casually, without purpose, direction, or sure knowledge of what they were doing? We would like to meet the navigator today who courts danger lightly, knowing death is imminent if he lost his way through carelessness“.

Bis 1975 wäre Rongorongo nicht als Sternnavigation erkannt worden, weil die Angabe in keiner Literatur stand über die Guiding Stars. Rongorongo wäre wieder das hilflose Opfer derer geworden, die es schaffen, aus Sternmythen und sachlich korrekten astronomischen Notationen den Umkehrschluß zur Schleimspur des Mystizismus zu finden.

In diesem Text von Johnson/Mahelona liegt der Schlüssel zum Verständnis von Rongorongo:

„Ka-piko-o-Wakea (Himmelsäquator d.V.) was drawn midway between the black shining roads of Kane and Kanaloa. These lines were called the „roads of the navigation stars“, Na-alanui-o-na-hoku-ho-okele, and the stars which proceeded along these directed paths east to west, Na hoku ‘ai’aina, stars which „ate“, i.e. „ruled the land“ (in ancient Hawaii, the chiefs who ruled the land were called Ali‘i‘ai-moku, chief eating land).

Kai heißt übersetzt „essen“. Auch dieses Zeichen bestimmte Barthel (1954) vollkommen richtig. Es ist eine zum Kopf, also zum Mund geführte Hand, die stets nach innen zeigt. Sie wird niemals als Einzelzeichen geschrieben sondern immer nur an die Sterne und Sternkonstellationen angebunden, die darüber als Guiding Stars zu identifizieren sind.

Daß Sirius als ein wichtiger Guiding Star galt zwischen Tahiti und Hawaii, habe ich vorgetragen. In Rongorongo zeigt er sich in diesem Zeichen:
Auch Beteigeuze galt als Guiding Star, wie sein Zeichen zeigt:

Es war nicht erforderlich, das komplette Zeichen als „pillar to sit by“ zu ker-
ben und dann das Kai-Zeichen anzubinden. Die grafische Ökonomie in Rongo-
rongo habe ich bereits erklärt. Deshalb gibt es auch kein einziges Vorkommen
einer solchen Zeichenverbindung:

Der Begriff Guiding Star ist in Rongorongo nicht wörtlich anzuwenden als
ein einziger Stern. Auch Sternkonstellationen sind mit dem Kai-Zeichen verse-
hen. Beteigeuze und Sirius zusammen bilden in dem nachfolgenden Zeichen die
Navigationsangabe:

Entsprechend der Konzeption steht Sirius unterhalb von Beteigeuze. Das ist
der Fall von nördlichen Breiten aus an den Südhimmel gesehen. Bei dem näch-
sten Zeichen stimmt das bereits nicht mehr:

Der Drachenschwanz mit fünf Winkeln für das große Kanu in Ursa Maior
kommt von unten nach oben weisend – rechts von Beteigeuze und Sirius ste-
hend – dazu. Das kann aber nur der Blick von südlichen Breiten aus nach Nor-
den sein, wie die Sternkarte zeigt (S. 170).

Das Zeichen ist zwar nicht ganz korrekt, weil Sirius selbstverständlich ober-
halb von Beteigeuze steht, aber das war nicht anders zu machen. Es gibt diesbe-
züglich einige Ausnahmen in Rongo-rongo, bei denen die grafischen Möglich-
keiten keine andere Wahl zulassen. Verständlich ist die Zeichenkombination al-
lemal.

In dieser Arbeit sind die wichtigsten Solo-Zeichen für die Plejaden bespro-
chen worden. Matariki ist aber auch Bestandteil von mehreren Sternkonstella-
tionen, die sich über andere Zeichen zu erkennen geben. Aus den drei Solo-Zei-
chen lassen sich viele Zeichenkombinationen zusammenstellen. Möglicherweise sind die sechs Namen für sechs Sterne in den Plejaden in diesen Zeichen verborgen:

![Zeichenkombinationen](image)


Nach meinen Untersuchungen sind das die ersten zehn Zeichen, die in einem deutschsprachigen Buch publiziert wurden:


Ich bezweifle die Echtheit der Abbildung, denn das erste Zeichen ist „the bird with a long neck“, das auf keinem Dokument in dieser Form zu erkennen ist.

Bis heute sind das beste Arbeitsmaterial immer noch die Abzeichnungen der Objekte, die Barthel 1958 vorlegte. In vielen seiner 20 Rongorongo-Veröffentlichungen gab er Zeichenkorrekturen an. Ich bat Professor Barthel darum, seine Autorität einzusetzen, um besseres Arbeitsmaterial zu bekommen. Leider verweigerte er sich, meiner Bitte nachzukommen. Also bemühte ich mich persönlich darum.

Entsprechend internationalen Gepflogenheiten schrieb ich alle Museen und andere Institute in englischer Sprache an, die über die Originale verfügen. So ist z.B. bis heute noch keine Abschrift eines skurilen Objektes erschienen, das sich im Besitz des Musée de l’Homme, Paris, befindet:

Berlintafel mit ursprünglich 14 Zeilen zeigt heute noch etwa 30 Zeichen. Von dem sogenannten Chauvet-Fragment, einer Tafel von 12 cm mal 8 cm mit ursprünglich über 100 Zeichen, ist bisher nur eine Seite von Barthel (1958) publiziert worden mit ca. 20 Zeichen. Die Pariser Tabakdose ist zwar ein entstelltes Fragment, aber sie zeigt vermehrt ansonsten eher seltene Zeichen.


Öffentliche Büchereien und Universitätsbibliotheken sind andere Quellen, wenn sie verfügbar wären.

Das Ergebnis aller meiner Bemühungen in Europa und überall in der Welt ist so negativ, daß man Scham empfinden könnte darüber. Offenbar reagieren Museen, Universitäten und andere Institute nur noch auf solche Schreiben, die eine erheblich Spende in Aussicht stellen.

Es ist für mich kein Trost, zu wissen, daß auch Wissenschaftler sich darüber beklagen, daß die bisher gültige Kultur des Antwort schreibens außer Kraft gesetzt wurde. So hat es mich auch nicht verwundert, zu erfahren, daß mein Stichwort „Rongorongo“ gleichgesetzt wird mit „Spinner, Scharlatan, Wichtigtuer und – last but not least – Irrer!“

Die Rongorongo-Forschung ist nicht durch echte Spinner und Scharlatane so extrem in Verruf gekommen, weil solche Leute auf Anhieb zu erkennen sind. Ich muß davon ausgehen, daß es die von Wissenschaftlern publizierten Arbeiten sind, die alleine dafür verantwortlich zu machen sind.

Es ist heute unmöglich, mit Ozeanisten über Rongorongo zu sprechen, ohne daß man sofort heftig attackiert wird. Die unbewiesene Behauptung, daß Rongorongo unentzifferbar sei, genügt bereits, als Beweis angeführt werden zu können. Es gibt keinen einzigen Aufsatz eines amerikanischen Forschers, der mir bekannt ist, in dem einmal nicht das statement der „undeciphered script“ steht im Zusammenhang mit „forever“.
Eine prinzipiell einfache Problemlösung kann unter Forschung so verschüttet werden, daß das Problem selbst nicht mehr im Mittelpunkt steht, sondern nur die Fantasien, die eine Lösung verhindern.

Abschrift der Tafel Keiti, die Barthel anfertigen ließ:

Er 1

Er 2

Er 3

Er 4

Er 5

Er 6

Der Santiagostab hat im Original eine Länge von 125 cm. Meine zeilenge-rechte Vorlage mißt immer noch ca. 95 cm. Das ist zwar ziemlich umständlich in der Handhabung, aber so lassen sich die Zeilen sehr viel besser bearbeiten. Das beste Arbeitsmaterial wären natürlich Duplikate, die von Museumsfachleuten heute in einer Qualität hergestellt werden können, die das Original absolut erreichen. In Tübingen wird ein solches Duplikat vom Santiagostab aufbewahrt, das in Santiago angefertigt wurde. Das Stück ist wertlos, weil man die Kunst, einen runden Stab abzuformen, dort noch nicht beherrscht. Die Originale sind in der ganzen Welt verstreut. Es wird deshalb niemals möglich sein, von allen Objekten für Forschungen geeignetes Material zu bekommen.

**Tafel „Keiti“ (Abb. S. 177 und 178)**


Die Anordnung der Zeilen nennt man bustrophedon, das heißt übersetzt: wie der Ochse pflügt.

Schon wieder eine der Ungereimtheiten in der Rongorongo-Forschung. Weder der Ochse noch der Pflug war in Ozeanien bekannt, bevor die ersten Siedler aus Europa beides mitbrachten. Hierin kann aber unmöglich das Vorbild gesehen werden für die Zeilenanordnung.
Ungeklärt ist auch noch, wie der Anschluß von einer Zeile zur nächsten tatsäch- 
lich stattfindet. Hierzu gibt es so viele Spekulationen wie Möglichkeiten. 
Daß man in der Forschung davon ausgeht, daß am Ende der ersten Zeile die Ta-
fel gekippt wird, sodaß die zweite Zeile wieder aufrecht vor den Augen des Le-
sers steht, geht auf die Osterinsulaner zurück, die vorgaben, Schriftgelehrte zu 
sein.

Welche Glaubwürdigkeit wollen wir einem Analphabeten einräumen, wenn 
er sagen sollte, wo der Anfang eines Buches ist? Er hat nur wenige Möglichkei-
ten. Zuerst müßte er raten, wo bei unserer Schrift oben ist. Dann müßte er raten, 
ob der Buchdeckel nach links oder nach rechts aufgeklappt wird. Nehmen wir 
an, er macht alles richtig, so ist das doch noch längst kein Beweis dafür, daß er 
die Buchstaben versteht und den Text vorlesen kann.

Es gab im ausgehenden 19 Jahrhundert einige Experimente mit angeblich 
schriftkundigen Osterinsulanern, die allesamt nur den Beweis erbrachten, daß 
niemand von ihnen wußte, was auf den Tafeln verzeichnet ist und wie sie abzu-
lesen sind. Das also sind die Zeugen, die dafür benannt wurden, daß der An-
schluß von der ersten zur zweiten Zeile so geschieht, wie ich es beschrieben 
habe. Aber bisher fehlt der Beweis, daß das auch in der Weise richtig ist.

Der Beweis war erst zu erbringen durch die von mir entdeckte Segmentation 
der Zeichenfolgen.

Zum Glück sind genug Objekte an den Rändern der Tafel unbeschädigt, so-
daß die letzten Zeichen einer Zeile und die ersten der nächsten erkennbar sind.

Betrachtet man die Kleine Wientafel, wird deutlich, was gemeint ist, denn 
auf diesem Objekt sind alle Randzeichen zerstört.
Die Kleine Wientafel gehörte zur Sammlung des k. u. k. Vizekonsuls Heinrich Freiherr von Westenholz. Im Jahr 1886 schenkte er seine Sammlung mit 196 Stücken aus Polynesien dem Völkerkunde Museum in Wien. Die Tafel mißt ca. 26 cm in der Länge und ca. 5 cm in der Höhe. Ungefähr 220 Zeichen sind gut zu erkennen.

Für jede Geheimschrift gilt, daß eine erkennbare Ordnung oder Systematik, Regeln, Wiederholungen, identische Zeichenfolgen u.v.m. die Schwachstellen sind, die leicht erkennbar, zwangsläufig über Analysen zum Code führen. Einzig das Chaos – wie in Rongorongo – verhindert den schnellen Zugriff auf das geheime Wissen. Nehmen wir an, daß in Rongorongo die einzelnen Nächte fein säuberlich nur über das Stabzeichen für Osten segmentiert wären, hätte man nicht 130 Jahre gebraucht, um den Code zu finden, dafür wären 130 Tage ausreichend. Um das zu verhindern, kannten die Meister verschiedene Möglichkeiten, die regelmäßigen und gleichförmigen Bilder am Nachthimmel so chaotisch zu notieren, daß die Verschlüsselung immerhin so lange hielt.

Die Absicht der Meister ist leicht nachzu vollziehen, denn sie konnten davon ausgehen, daß es bei Weitem nicht genügt, einzelne oder alle Zeichen in ihrer Bedeutung zu kennen. Rongorongo ist erst dann vollständig in die Knie gezwungen, wenn die notierten Sternkurse verstanden sind.
Von den verschiedenen Möglichkeiten, die einzelnen Nächte zu segmentieren, ist das Stabzeichen nur eine. Aber das Zeichen genügt bereits, herauszufinden, ob der Anschluß am rechten Ende einer Zeile in der nächsten zu finden ist. Wenn das der Fall ist, muß Tu – also Osten – unter den letzten Zeichen einer Zeile zu finden sein und dann erst wieder unter den ersten Zeichen auf der nächsten Zeile. Das ist der Fall, wie ich nun an einigen Beispielen aufzeige.


Ungerade Zeilen enden stets am rechten Tafelrand, gerade am linken. Barthel führte die Bezeichnungen recto und verso ein. In den Fällen, bei denen er nicht sicher war, welche Tafelseite den Anfang markiert, bezeichnete er die Tafelseiten mit den Kleinbuchstaben a und b.

Auf der Tafel Tahua findet man auf der sechsten Zeile (Belegstelle Ab 6) ziemlich am Ende das Zeichen für Osten. Die sechste Zeile steht auf dem Kopf für den Betrachter der Tafel, die siebente natürlich aufrecht. Ich habe alle Zeichen für Tu schwarz unterlegt, weil dadurch der Leser schneller erkennt, wie der Zeilenumbruch zu verstehen ist.

Am linken Tafelrand der Tahua sind die Sterne dieser Nacht auf der sechsten und siebenten Zeile notiert. Der Umbruch entsteht also nur über das Format der Tafel. Ich habe bei allen Belegen die Zeichen für die einzelne Nacht zusammengezeichnet.

Diese Konstruktion gelang nur, weil die Randzeichen nicht beschädigt oder gänzlich zerstört sind. Zum Glück gibt es noch weitere solcher Befunde.

Auf der Tafel Aruku Kurenga ist der Übergang von der dritten zur vierten Zeile erkennbar:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ab 7</th>
<th>Ab 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ab 6/7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diese Konstruktion gelang nur, weil die Randzeichen nicht beschädigt oder gänzlich zerstört sind. Zum Glück gibt es noch weitere solcher Befunde.
Ein weiterer Beleg zeigt sich von der siebenten zur achten Zeile:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Br 8} \\
\text{Br 7} \\
\text{Br 7/8}
\end{array}
\]

Auf der Tafel Mamari ist der Übergang von der vierten zur fünften Zeile zu finden. Auf der fünften Zeile schießen sich weitere Nächte an, die ich mit dem schwarzen Stabzeichen gekennzeichnet habe

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Ca 5} \\
\text{Ca 4} \\
\text{Ca 4/5}
\end{array}
\]

Auf der anderen Seite der Tafel ist ebenfalls über Tu erkennbar, daß man von der einen in die nächste Zeile übergehen muß.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Cb 4} \\
\text{Cb 3} \\
\text{Cb 3/4}
\end{array}
\]

In dieser Nacht fällt sofort auf, daß das Zeichen „the pillar to sit by“, das für den Stern Beteigeuze in Orion steht, mit vier Vorkommen vertreten ist. Wie ist das zu erklären?

Um eine ausführliche Antwort darauf zu geben, brauche ich etwa 50 Seiten, um auf allen Objekten dieser Kernfrage nachzugehen. Grundsätzlich eignet sich jedes Zeichen in Rongorongo zur sinnvollen Segmentation der Zeichenfolge. Tu bedeutet außerdem nicht ausschließlich Osten, denn mit Ku (bedeutungsgleich mit Tu) bezeichnete man in Mikronesien (Mortlocks) die Verbindung der Sterne Alpha und Beta Arietis, möglicherweise das ganze Sternbild Aries.

(Johnson/Mahelona: 1975)
Eine vergleichbare Situation finden wir auf der Großen Santiagotafel.


Auf der Großen St. Petersburgtafel ist ein Tup-Übergang zu finden von der ersten zur zweiten Zeile.

Etwa in der Mitte der Zeichen ist Osten mit einem Steinbeil verbunden. Dabei handelt es sich um das Orion-Beil und nicht um Wega, weil das Zeichen der drei Gürtelsterne davor steht.

Auf der gleichen Tafel führt ein Übergang von der sechsten in die siebente Zeile.
Die Tafel Atua Mata-riri zeigt einen interessanten Befund für Tu.

Es gibt einige wenige Vorkommen für Osten, bei denen an dem Stabzeichen rechts und links feine Kerblinien angebracht sind.


Es gibt zahlreiche Zeichen in Rongorongo, die mit feinen Kerblinien versehen wurden. Noch heute benutzt man solche grafischen Urformen, um z.B. anzudeuten, daß eine Birne leuchten muß.

Einige der „Lichtzeichen“ zeigen sich in dieser Form:

Die Tafel Tahua zeigt meisterhafte Zeichen. Sie ist ein vollkommenes Objekt. Es fällt mir schwer, mit Bleistift auf Papier die Zeichen zu fixieren, die der Meister mit einem Messer in hartes Holz kerbte. Seinen Namen kennen wir nicht, aber er bezeugt: *Vita brevis ars longa!*

**Große St. Petersburgtafel**


**Tafel Aruku-kurenga**
Alle Tafelnamen sind Fantasienamen, die lediglich auf Spekulationen beruhen. Das ist unbedeutend für die Rongorongo-Forschung. Die Tafel mißt ca. 43 cm in der Länge und ca. 16 cm in der größten Höhe. Die Tafel gehörte zu den fünf Objekten, die Pater Roussel 1868 nach Tahiti zu Bischof Jaussen schickte. Ungefähr 1.500 Zeichen sind zu erkennen. Heute wird das Stück verwahrt von der Congregazione dei S.S. Cuori, Rom.


**Londoner Tafel**

Die Abbildung habe ich aus dem Buch der Engländerin Lady Scoresby-Routledge entnommen, daß zwar undatiert ist, aber wahrscheinlich 1919 erschien: *The Mystery of Easter Island*. Die Tafel mißt ca. 21 cm in der Länge und ist ca. 7,5 cm hoch. Ursprünglich waren ca. 300 Zeichen gekerbt, von denen nur noch die Hälfte zu erkennen ist. Auf jedem Objekt gibt es ein – oder sogar mehrere – Zeichen, die sich nur auf dieser Tafel befinden und auf keiner anderen. Auf der Londoner Tafel ist diese Zeichenkombination einmalig:

![Zeichenkombination](image)

**Tafel Mamari**

Das Exemplar gehörte zu den Objekten, die Pater Roussel nach Tahiti schickte. Sie ist ca. 23 cm lang und 21 cm hoch. Über 1.000 Zeichen sind gut zu erkennen. Auf der Mamari sind überproportional viele Mondzeichen gekerbt. Barthel (1958) zählte so lange hin und her, bis er den alten Mondkalender der Osterinsulaner auf dieser Tafel nachzuweisen glaubte. Das ist falsch und bedarf keiner weiteren Erklärungen, denn Barthel zählte natürlich nur die Mondzeichen, die in seine Theorie paßten.

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VERBAL MARKERS OF TENSE IN MARQUESAN

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This paper is an attempt at a preliminary survey of Marquesan verbal particles that mark tense and aspect. They are discussed upon the background of analogous particles in closely related Polynesian languages.

We may assume that within the framework of so called common sense (or better within the naive linguistic picture of the world) we are capable of noticing that various actions referred to in the speech stream may vary in their duration as well as in their placement along the time axis. In other words, some actions take place earlier than others or may be said to occur simultaneously. Here we are concerned with the "relative chronology" of actions or events, a fundamental phenomenon with which we are familiar in any language.

The precedence or contemporaneity of various events may be obvious upon a purely semantic (or pragmatic) basis but in certain circumstances the application of special markers is required. In Marquesan these markers constitute a separate class of prepositive verbal particles. Precedence and contemporaneity of an action (event) may be related either to another event or to a point along the time axis which sometimes coincides with the moment of speech. If an action is viewed as subsequent to the moment of speech, its realizability is not certain but only more or less probable. Temporal specification in the future intersects thus with modality, and distinguishing temporal from conditional conjunctions may be difficult if not impossible.

A full-fledged category of tense cannot be defined in terms of relative temporal characteristics only – its pivotal point of reference is the moment of speech and all utterances are related to it so that the events referred to by them are correspondingly marked. It would be naive to think that there is one natural and universally valid pattern of tense(s) with universal validity in all languages. There are languages where events that have taken place before the moment of speech contrast with all other events – obviously upon the basis that the former have already been carried out. However, the past tense cannot be completely separated from

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modality either. Past events may be divided on the one hand into those that really happened and on the other hand into those of which we are not quite sure. The temporal system may further be rendered more complex by introducing the criterion of temporal distance from the moment of speech into the scheme.

Another possibility is that of distinguishing the action itself from its consequences or the state brought about by it. An event might have taken place in the past and its consequences or the resulting state may be relevant for the present. In this instance we are concerned with the perfect tense. In the perfect tense, aspectual features (the action is completed) overlap with the temporal characteristics. Nonpast events, on the other hand, share the property of not being terminated as to the moment of speech and likewise cannot be separated from aspect. Some of them take place simultaneously with what we tentatively call the moment of speech (even if they must have started in the past when viewed from the moment of speech coincident with the last moment of their duration). That is why the linguistic moment of speech is a mere abstraction and ought not to be defined in physical but in psychical terms. When judging historical events, the present may comprise a period of several months, years, decades, or even centuries. In other circumstances its duration is physically much shorter.

As for the future events or actions, these may be said to take place after the moment of speech. Future tense is inseparable from modality. Events referred to by a verb in the future tense can or may (but need not) happen; their realization is more or less probable, intended or desirable but not absolutely sure and so it is far from surprising that the future tense is in many languages derived by means of auxiliary verbs such as will, shall, want, etc. and their equivalents.

Particular utterances may concern actual situations or they are intended to have a general validity. The study of a wide variety of languages seems to indicate that in the framework of the naive philosophy of language it is the present (or present/future) tense form that is usually employed to express general sentences.

Thus in many of the ancient languages as well as in numerous non-European languages tense seems to overlap with aspect and to some extent with mode. This is true of Marquesan as a Polynesian language. Convincing evidence for close links between the three categories is found for example in the transition between the future and imperative markers e'/e (?) or ka'/a and in the aspectual nature of perfective kua/kuo/ua/ua, which is more or less independent of tense and stressing the completion of the action.

Polynesian languages display a restricted set of prepositive verbal particles, which mark aspect and/or tense and/or mode. Marquesan as a member of the East Polynesian branch shares most of its particles with other East Polynesian languages although there are some similarities with the Samoic and Tongic languages as well.

In literature we usually find the following spelling and definitions of the prepositional verbal particles with temporal meaning in the Marquesan language texts, depending upon various written sources, especially Dordillon (1931), Handy (1930), Zewen (1987), Lavondès (1964, 1966), Kaiser and Elbert (1989), and Kimitete (1990): 192
e / ˈe future, condition
e... ana / nei / aˈa duration
ˈua / ˈu perfective and stative (with static verbs)
i past
ˈa narrative (beginning of a new sequence), future, imperative
mei almost
ˈia optative, in order to
oa in order not to

Examples of ˈe:

Na po ˈomua, kakiu, ˈi te tau henua Nuku-Hiva nei, ˈe (1) heˈe te mouka mei titahi motu ˈi titahi ˈe (2) hano ˈi te toua “Jadis, dans les temps anciens, dans l’archipel des Marquises les pics allaient d’île en île se faire la guerre.” Here, ˈe (1) obviously does not mark the verb heˈe as future but rather as indefinite or generalized or repetitive. However, ˈe (2) simply links hano to the preceding verb heˈe (i.e. ...went to make war). In the next example, ˈe seems to have the aspectual meaning of duration without any recognizable temporal meaning: ˈi te motu o Nuku-Hiva, ˈi te Henua ˈEnana, ˈe haˈapei ˈia ko ˈika nui “Sur l’île de Nuku-Hiva, aux Marquises, se préparait une grande fête”.

Popou ˈi aˈe, ˈu peˈau hua vehine: ˈE hua au ˈi uta ˈi te hinako piki! “Le lendemain matin, la jeune fille dit: Je retourne vers la montagne cueillir des fleurs de pandanus” Here the particle ˈe marks the verb (hua) as future, which is confirmed by the reply of her partner: ˈU peˈau te mahaˈi: ˈE, ˈa hiti...! “Le jeune homme répondit: Oui, vas-y...!” The future meaning is present in the following example as well: Popou ˈi oˈio ˈi, ˈe heˈe tatou ˈi te avaika “Demain, de bonne heure, nous irons à la pêche.”, ˈI tenei pō ˈe haˈatū au ˈi to tāua haˈe “Tonight I will build our house”.

The particle ˈe is employed as a marker of future after the negative particle: ˈUmo ˈi ˈe tiˈohi mai “Ne regardez pas!”

ˈU peˈau te ˈavaika: Aˈe ˈoaka iaˈoe, ˈua ˈiˈo ˈi te ika, ˈe mate ˈoe “Dit le pêcheur: Tu ne l’auras pas, elle a été enlevée par le poisson, tu risques la mort”. Here the future tense meaning of ˈe with mate is obvious.

In the following example the meaning of ˈe may perhaps be characterized as nonpast: ˈAˈe au ˈe toˈo ia koe, ˈe vehinehae koe “Je ne te prends pas dans la pirogue, tu es un fantôme”.

The reference to the future may be linked with the mild imperative meaning: ˈUa ˈoko Tikapo, me te vavaˈo mai ia Poumaka ˈe heˈe mai io ia “Tikapo l’entendit, il appela Poumaka et lui dit de venir le trouver”. In the following sentence ˈe marks an exhortation, likewise oriented towards the future: ˈE kanea to tatou vaka mea hiˈika “Faisons-nous une pirogue pour aller à la pêche”.

In the languages that are closer to Marquesan than any other, the prepositive verbal particle e / ˈe may refer to actions that are going to take place (i.e. indicative future without guarantee) after the moment of speech, marking also imperative and, finally, generalized sentences. It is a fairly large semantic scale and fur-
ther semantic specification is usually achieved by adding to it a postpositive particle such as ana (e.g. in Hawaiian, Maori, etc.) nei, na, á (e.g. in Tahitian, Hawaiian, etc.) etc.

Prepositive particle é combined with the postpositive particle ana (or a’á) is used to express a durative action taking place simultaneously with another action: E hoe ana te vaka, ia tihe io te tau mata’ae, ‘ua ta’á ’Apeku’a: Pao, pao... “Pendant que pagayait la pirogue, lorsque l’on arrivait aux différents caps, ’Apeku’a criaït: Finie, finie...”; ’E inu a’á, ‘i pao ‘ia ai ‘e te haka ‘iki me te toki ke’á “While he was drinking, the chief hit him with a stone axe”.

The marker é... ana has no unambiguous temporal meaning. It presents an action as durative, continuous, taking some time and therefore it is suitable to mark actions that are parallel to other actions. In the following example there is a durative verb form in the main clause (’é hana ana) as well. ’E kata ana ‘i to ia hana ’é hana ana io he vai “She was laughing at what he was doing in water”. Examples from other Polynesian languages follow. See Hawaiian: No ke aha kākou e ha ‘alele ai i nā hoalauna? “Why are we leaving the neighbours?”; ’E hele aku ’oe “You (should) go”; ’E hele ana au i ke ali ’i “I am going to the chief”, “I shall be going to the chief”. After the negative base (’á’ole) particle e marks open action that should be completed in the future.

Particle i marks the past tense in a manner neutral from the point of duration or completion of the action itself: I tua ‘ia ai hua temanu, hika, ‘i ta’á ‘ia tihe ‘i te pao ‘ia “In the morning they left. They cut the temanu tree, it fell, it was carved until finished”; I hakamamao ai te vaka ‘i vaho ‘oa... “The canoe went farther to the open sea...”; Aha koe i kite ia Vakauhi “Est-ce que tu as vu Vakauhi” “In relative constructions i is a marker of the past or preceding action: ’O ia te pi’ó ‘i ma’akau ai Uhitapu ’i te ha’amate ia Taheta “Telle était la raison pour laquelle Uhitapu avait projeté de faire mourir Taheta”; Na te Kuhane Meita ‘i i ha’ama’a ma i to ’atou koekoe eti’á ‘éka to ’atou tekao “The Holy Spirit has illuminated their mind in order to make their words right”; I topa ai hua tama a hua vehine io he vai, i toi ‘ia ai e te vai io he ‘oto tai “L’enfant tomba dans l’eau et fut entrainé par le courant dans le trou de mer”.

It occurs very frequently after a negative base, for example: ’A o’é au i tihe “I did not come”.

The particle á has the highest frequency among all preverbal particles and it occurs especially frequently in the narrative style, usually marking another or the next one in a sequence of actions; perhaps it might be paraphrased by the expression “and then”, “afterwards”. ’A occurs very frequently after the word ‘a tahi “then,” “afterwards”: ’A tahi ‘a to o ai ‘i te tuehine me te tuku iho io he vaka “He took his sister and made her to embank”; ’A tahi ‘a ma’akau ’Apeku’a, ‘e hano ‘i te umu huka ’e toua me Haneamotua “Then ’Apeku’a decided to take revenge by war against Haneamotua”; ’A is not a strictly temporal particle despite the fact that in some East Polynesian languages it may gravitate toward future or imperative.

The imperative function has been noted for á in Marquesan, for example: ’A hano io Taheta “Go to find Taheta!”; ’A taha io he vai! “Va à la rivière”.

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In some instances the particle ‘a signalizes an action that is going to take place after the moment of speech, for example: ‘A ta’ai ‘otou ‘i tu’a vaka” “Will you carve my canoe”; ‘A tahi ‘a tihe ai te vaka ‘i te hiku ‘o te tai “La pirogue arriva alors en eau peu profonde”.

The particle ‘ua or ‘u is generally characterized as perfective but it is compatible with states as well. The difference between perfective and stative is easy to define. The former presents a state resulting from an action that has taken place before while in the latter instance there is no such preceding action, for example: ‘U koakoa te mo ‘i “La jeune fille est contente”, ‘U mamae to ‘u vaevae “J’ai mal aux pieds”.


The perfective sense of ‘ua is more obvious in the following instances: ‘Ua piki O’ohatu me ta ia mata’eina ‘a ‘i ‘oto ‘o to ia vaka “O’ohatu et ses sujets montèrent dans sa pirogue” (i.e. They entered the canoe and stayed in it); ‘Ua hua ‘Apeku ‘a me te ne me te hano io Nuniiapukatea “‘Apeku’a revint en pleurant et alla trouver Nuniiapukatea”; ‘O te tukane, ‘ua tuku te motua me te kui io he tahukahi, ‘o te tuehine, ‘ua tuku te motua me te kui te tuehine io he paepae kaiioi “Le père et la mère mirent le fils aîné sur le foyer, ils placèrent leur fille sur le paepae des ka’ioi”; Titahi ‘ā, ‘ua he‘e ‘i tai ‘i te mei nunu me tahipito to ‘iki “One day, he went to bake breadfruit with some children”. The perfective aspect is compatible not only with the past (‘A tahi ‘ua to ‘o Hu‘uti ‘i te teka “Then Hu‘uti has taken the teka”) but also with the future: ‘Epo, ‘ua ‘ite ‘oe “Just wait a little, you will see”.

The perfective meaning of the particle ‘ua / ‘u is, however, not always obvious, cf. the following sentence: ‘Ua kite na mata’eina ‘a ia Akahe ‘e-i-vevau “La population voyait Akahe e-i-vevau”; ‘I tenei, ‘ua tau hua ‘enana ‘o Kae io he motu ‘i te ka‘avai me hua tau vehine vahana ko’e nei. ‘Ua tau io he one “Kae aborda sur l’île, dans la vallée où se trouvaient ces femmes sans hommes. Il aborda sur la plage”.

The meaning of Hawaiian ua seems to be very close to that of MQA ‘ua / ‘u. It marks a completed action or a state. Besides, it is considered to be inceptive (like Maori ka). These two meanings seem to be contradictory but this impression is wrong. Both completion and inception have a common denominator. The particle ua marks the predicate as not continuing in time but limited either finally (perfect) or initially (inceptive). Its frequency in Hawaiian seems to be significantly higher than in Marquesan. Example: ‘Ua lilo mai na leho ia Kea‘au “The shells have been recovered by Kea‘au”; Ma hope o laila, huli mai lā lāua a ho ‘i i O‘ahu nei, mana ‘o iho la ‘o Ma‘akuakeke i ko lāua ola, ua ho ‘i i ka ‘āina “After this they turned and made for Oahu, and Ma‘akuakeke began to think that they were safe”.

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The meaning of state is present in the following example: *Ua nui loa ka 'eha o ka manō i kēia mau hana a Punia i loko o ka 'ōpū* “Great was the pain of the shark because of what Punia was doing in its stomach”.

The particle *ua* is defined as perfective (state resulting from a completed action) by D. T. Tryon for Tahitian (p. 34), e. g.: *Ua parahi ʻoia ʻi piha iho ʻia ʻu* “He sat beside me”, *Ua reva atu Peu rāua ʻo Teriʻi* “Peu left with Teriʻi”.

The particle *mei* has no temporal meaning at all and marks an action that almost happened, a nearly realized action: *ʻO mei mate au ē!* “Oh! Un peu plus, je mourais!”; *E tohea metaki, mei vī ʻi Vakauhi* “Lorsque viendra le vent, Vakauhi presque peut tomber”; *Te? mei mate te ʻenana, ʻa tahi nei koe ʻa vaʻa* “Ah oui! dit Vakauhi, c’est quand l’homme est presque mort que tu réveilles”.

The particle *ia* is usually characterized as optative in Polynesian grammars but in Marquesan it is used more frequently in the temporal meaning (when): *ʻIa tihe atu io te faʻe o hua vehine, ʻa oʻe e koana i te uʻu ʻi ʻoto* “When they came to the house of the woman, they were not allowed to enter”; *ʻIa tata te maʻama, ʻua hua io to ʻatou faʻe* “When the dawn was come they would return again to their own house”; *ʻIa maʻo na ʻatou, ʻa tahi ʻa kai hua maha ʻi ʻi tu ia kai* “When they were satisfied, then the lad had his food”.

A comparison of the set of Marquesan verbal particles with their equivalents in other Polynesian languages would obviously furnish some insight into their meaning. In general the meaning of the particles remains very similar in the East Polynesian branch of the family despite some variations that are easy to explain. Several of them occur even in the Samoic languages and in Tongan. Below a survey of temporal particles in East Polynesian as well as in Samoic languages (including the Outliers) and in Tongan are given in two tables.

### Table 1

**TUAMOTUAN**

- **kā** inceptive
- transference of attention in the present or continuation of the predication in future in a progressive sense
- strong order
- ŵ continuation, sentence or clause initial action or condition in progress (verb usually followed by *nei, ara, rā*
- e habitual or customary
- e future action or condition
- e mild request
- tē ... (*nei*) continuation
- i past action, often with kaore
- kua inception or completion

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RAROTONGAN

e imperfective
kua perfective
i retrospective
tē continuation
kā / ka inceptive (often future references)
mei approximative
kia subjunctive

TAHITIAN

*e future
*ua perfective
i recently completed action
te... nei present continuous
mai almost, nearly

HAWAIIAN

a when, at the time when, until, as far as
e imperative/exhortative
i past (in subordinative clause)
e future (in subordinative clause)
ua perfective
ke... completed action, state, condition
ke... nei present progressive
e... ana (in subordinative clause)
mai prohibitive, in order not to

RAPANUI

ka definite future
e present/future
he generalized/narrative
ko perfect
i past

MAORI

ka / kā inceptive (beginning a new action), often future (or subsequent action)
i always past
kua perfect
e non-past; imperative
e... ana  continuous action
kia  desiderative, purpose
kei  lest
me  prescriptive

Table 2

SURVEY OF THE SUPPOSED MEANINGS OF THE PARTICLES IN VARIOUS LANGUAGES

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KA / KĀ / ʻA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUA:</td>
<td>inceptive, transition to next action (therefore subsequent or even future) in the narration; strong order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR:</td>
<td>inceptive (often future)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW:</td>
<td>when, at the time when, until, as far as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO:</td>
<td>inceptive, often future (or subsequent) action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS:</td>
<td>ka future (beginning of an action in future)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM:</td>
<td>a future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU:</td>
<td>ka future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUK:</td>
<td>ga anticipatory (permission or assent asked, passage of time indicated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONG:</td>
<td>a future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIK:</td>
<td>ka future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOK:</td>
<td>kā (immediate) future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE:</td>
<td>ka future (vague)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN:</td>
<td>ka future/punctual aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TON:</td>
<td>ka (future) conditional, desiderative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQA:</td>
<td>narrative, new action in narration, future imperative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KUA / ʻUA / ʻU / UA

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUA:</td>
<td>completion or inception (M: Resulting state with actions, state with properties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR:</td>
<td>perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAH:</td>
<td>perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW:</td>
<td>perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO:</td>
<td>perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS:</td>
<td>perfect/resultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM:</td>
<td>ʻua perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU:</td>
<td>ku perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUK:</td>
<td>gu perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIK:</td>
<td>present/perfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONG</td>
<td>&quot;u past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIK</td>
<td>ku perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOK</td>
<td>perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN</td>
<td>kua perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TON</td>
<td>kuo perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQA</td>
<td>perfective or stative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUA</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAH</td>
<td>recently completed action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW</td>
<td>past (in subordinative clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>i past (an unproductive relict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIK</td>
<td>ni simple past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQA</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUA</td>
<td>habitual or customary (M: in a kind of general utterance which is logically derived from nonpast, i.e. the most open of all tenses) future action or condition mild request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>imperfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAH</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW</td>
<td>future (in subordinative clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>nonpast, imperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>present/future; he generalized present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>timeless particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TON</td>
<td>'e future (or timeless) particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUK</td>
<td>general aspect (=the most abstract tense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIK</td>
<td>nonpast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONG</td>
<td>indefinite tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIK</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOK</td>
<td>nonpast; the widest and vaguest meaning, indic. permanent truth (sometimes even past)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN</td>
<td>general tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQA</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TUA</th>
<th>action or condition in progress (with nei, ara, rā)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>habitual or present action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW</td>
<td>progressive (in subordinative clauses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>continuous action, progressive, durative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQA</td>
<td>durative (with ana, nei, a’a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TE or TĒ**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TUA</th>
<th>continuation (te... nei)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td>continuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAH</td>
<td>present continuous (te...nei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAW</td>
<td>present progressive (ke...nei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>completed action, state, condition (= deverbative ’nominalization’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MQA:** cf. constructions kei te..., i te..., hei te... continuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TUA</th>
<th>te as nominalization or gerund in complex sentences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>TAH</td>
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**REFERENCES**


THOTH OR RE-HARAKHTI?

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The article discusses the question of identity of the ancient Egyptian deity carved into relief on the sundial found at Gezer.

In one of his papers on ancient Egyptian sun clocks, Ludwig Borchardt\(^1\) describes an artifact found at Gezer in Palestine. It was first described as a pectoral but later recognized as a sundial.\(^2\)

It is a semicircular ivory instrument decorated on both flat sides (see Fig. 1). One side is covered with radial lines that issue from a central point on the straight upper edge. The opposite side is covered with a scene in relief. In the uppermost part of the scene, a fragment of the horizontal belt containing the lower parts of six visible stars is shown to represent the heaven. The scene continues with a slender depiction of a boat and two anthropomorphic figures under the stars. Behind the figures and above these edges of the boat, two cartouches are depicted giving the name of the 19th dynasty ruler, Merenptah. Both figures are superficially depicted but the one on the right side kneeling in a position of adoration very likely represents the king himself. The disc with two uraei on its opposite side is placed above the king. He kneels in front of the second figure situated on the left side of the boat. This figure is sitting on a throne and seems to have a head which is not human. He holds a kind of pole in one hand that is likely to be the wAc sceptre. This figure very likely represents a deity to whom the king makes an offering. Above the deity another disc is also carved but compared with the one shown above the king, this is not so high and...
just with one uraeus only. Borchardt says this figure is Thoth, the god of wisdom.\(^3\)

Unfortunately, I have not been able to see either this artifact or its photo, just the published copy. In spite of this, I should like to offer the following explanation.

It is not easy to give the precise identity of the sitting deity without some hesitation. Both figures are carved without details and except for the royal cartouches identifying the king, no other inscriptions accompany this scene. Thus, we are without help in trying to find something concrete about the identity of the deity.

Looking at the copy of the scene, we can see some kind of short dotted lines running horizontally on the surface. It seems to me, perhaps these lines may be interpreted as tiny cracks on the ivory surface. Similar cracks occur rather frequently on other objects made from ivory.\(^4\) I suppose one of them (under the forepart of the cobra) touches the face of the deity, whose identity remains unknown but, in my opinion, this line originally does not belong to the relief itself. Perhaps, this short line may have been Borchardt's or even Clagett's criterion for the identification of this deity, as Thoth.\(^5\) This line, considered by both authors as belonging to part of the relief itself, may have been seen as the long bill of the ibis, the sacred bird of Thoth. In fact, there are other indications which would make this identity doubtful.

It has been said that the function of this artifact was that of a sundial, that is an instrument for measuring time. Hanging on the wall, a perpendicular gnomon which was once part of this device, would have projected its shadow onto the flat side with the radiating lines.\(^6\) In this connection I would like to point out the solar nature of this instrument. This fact enables us to expect the solar nature and character of a scene as a whole occurring on it as well. I assume that the figure sitting on the throne to whom an offering is made by the king, is a cosmic deity and, more particularly, a solar deity, for the bark itself is the solar bark.

In search of evidence which would support the idea of the solar identity of the deity, one needs to turn attention to the discs, especially to the one that lies above the deity's head. It seems evident that this disc belonging to the deity

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\(^5\) See in note 3.

\(^6\) L. Borchardt, *Zeitmessung*, Pl.15.
functioned as the deity's crown – unlike the disc with two uraei over the figure of the king. Based on the analogy with other iconography we can suggest that the disc represents the sun god – He of Behdet. On the other hand, it is evident that the disc that is set over the deity has got one uraeus only. On the right side, we can clearly recognize the head of a cobra and on the left side, its tail. Among the Egyptian deities, the disc encircled with cobra (sign N-6 in Gardiner's sign list) and worn over the head, was the solar disc: this is one of their identifying symbols *par excellence*. If the figure on the discussed scene were Thoth, as Borchardt says, the disc should have the moon's crescent in the lower part. We can see that this is not the case. Therefore, the disc on this scene speaks rather for the solar identity of the deity than for Thoth. It now remains for us to specify just which solar deity this might be.

The entire body of the deity is carved in a stylized form without any special details. The head itself together with the headdress forms a triangular shape, broader at the bottom than the apex. Such a stylized form is similar to the wig given to animal-headed deities. It consists of long hair falling down over the shoulders. The apex on the right side very likely represents the facial part of the head, I mean, the bill. However, I suggest that this is not the bill of an ibis but that of a falcon. I consider that what Borchardt took to be the long ibis bill is really just a short crack.

If this supposition is correct, the complete figure should be described as that of an anthropomorphic body with the head of falcon and the solar disc combined with the uraeus on its head. Such a description belongs to the iconography of Re-Harakhti, one of a number of divine aspects of the sun. If this interpretation is correct, the kneeling king makes an offering not to the ibis-headed god Thoth, but the falcon-headed sun god Re-Harakhti.

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7 For the example, see Medinet Habu, Vol. VII, Part III, Pl. 571-B.
9 Medinet Habu VII, Part III, Pls. 577-C and 584-B.
10 Compare with MEMNONIA VIII, 1997, Pl. LVIII-A; See also P. Munro, *Die spätägyptischen Totenstelen*, AF 25, Glückstadt 1973, Tafelband, Taf. 1ff, Taf. 4/Abb. 16, Taf. 6/Abb. 17, 18, Taf. 25/Abb. 90, Taf. 46/Abb. 161.
11 For figures in similar scenes, see Medinet Habu VII, Part III, Pls. 571-B and 575-A; I would like to thank Dr. J. Málek of the Griffith Institute for his kind help with the literature for this article and his reference to Re-Harakhti on p. 374 of PM2 VII.
Figure 1. Merenptah's sundial found at Gezer. (From R. A. S. Macalister, The Excavation of Gezer 1902-1905 and 1907-1909, Vol. II, London 1912, p. 331, fig. 456.)
IN SEARCH OF A JEWISH IDENTITY: THE CASE OF THE FALASHAS

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Considerable scholarly as well as popular attention has been concentrated on a tiny segment of the population of Ethiopia, the Judaistic Falashas. Much of this interest is due to sentiments resulting from the Western religious and cultural environment. In the second half of the 19th century the Falashas became the objects of missionary activities, both Protestant and Jewish, the latter trying to introduce them to rabbinical Judaism. Finally recognized as genuine Jews, and having fled their homes in the turmoils of the post-revolutionary Ethiopia, they were transported to Israel where they had to grapple with the complexities of modern Western society.

1. The unique case of exodus, the transfer of the Falashas, often referred to as Ethiopian Jews, from Ethiopia to Israel, mainly in Operation Moses (1984) and Operation Solomon (1991), can be seen as the practical consequence of the official acknowledgment of their Jewish identity. In 1973 Ovadia Jossef, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, declared that the Ethiopian Jews belonged to the tribe of Dan. This statement amounted to the official recognition of their status as Jews and entitled them to the same right of return to the Jewish homeland as all the other members of the Jewish community. At the same time, the Chief Rabbi’s declaration ended a long dispute among the Jewish religious leaders and experts, many of whom put the Jewishness of the Falashas in doubt. They argued that the Ethiopian Jews had been living outside the mainstream Jewish development for so long that they did not develop a proper Jewish identity. Knowing nothing about Mishna and Talmud, they could hardly be taken for genuine Jews.

The Chief Rabbi’s decision, however, does not explain how and from where Judaism was implanted in Ethiopia, how the Jewish tradition survived there, and who the bearers of these traditions were. Neither does it determine the position of the Falashas within the framework of Judaism.

1 In agreement with their doubts many orthodox rabbis in Israel refused to recognize Ethiopian Jews as Jews unless they underwent a token conversion.
The attempts to answer these questions were numerous and new solutions are being presented continuously. Compared with the literature on other ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the literature dealing with the Falashas is disproportionately vast. Besides scholarly works there are reports written by travellers, missionaries and other more or less qualified observers. Much of this material is incomplete and unreliable owing to the lack of evidence on one side and the missionary tendency, both Christian and Jewish, on the other.

Scholarly opinion concerning the ethnogenesis of the Falashas varies considerably. Some share the conviction that the Falashas are descendants of those segments of the Cushitic Agaw who at one stage of their development were exposed to Judaism and never stopped professing their archaic Jewish beliefs (Trimingham 1968: 20; Ullendorf 1968: 116).

Recently the opinion has prevailed that after the conversion of the royal dynasty in Axum, the Jews who had been living there, were expelled and settled in the border areas (Lasta, Semien), converted the local population, mixed with them, and became the Cushitic Jews of Ethiopia (Hammerschmidt & Rauschenbach 1966, in Krempel 1972: 258).

As for channels through which Judaism reached Ethiopia, two possibilities are being considered. Judaization of the indigenous ethnic groups could have been the result of contacts with Egyptian Jewry via Meroe or with the Jewish elements in Yemen. The Yemenite hypothesis seems to be more probable, since the influence of the Western part of South Arabia on the coastal region of East Africa played an important role in the development of East African civilization. This influence may go back as far as the first third of the first millennium B.C. The archeological and linguistic evidence points to the migration of the Semitic-speaking population across Bab el-Mandeb to the African coast of the Red Sea. The earliest of these immigrants to what is now the territory of Eritrea and the mountainous areas of Tigre, the Sabeans, introduced new agricultural methods and irrigation, established commercial ties and strongly influenced the religious ideas of the area. Their most important contribution, however, was the language and the art of writing.

In the centuries around the beginning of Christian era proselytism must have been a common phenomenon in Jewish life. It was greatly enhanced by the dispersion of a large section of the Jewish population into foreign lands. Conversions took place after contacts with ethnic Jews often of Palestinian origin, or non-Palestinian non-ethnic Jews of proselyte origine. Some scholars who have sought to identify areas of conversion to Judaism on the basis of racial criteria have based their work on the assumption that it is possible to distinguish between “more” or “less” genuine Jewish roots among the contemporary Jews, and since the majority

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2 The material supporting this possibility is scanty: a few verses in the Old Testament (Jer. xlviv:1) about Jews who had settled in Egypt and (Zeph. iii:10) mentioning a diaspora in Cush. Further, there are Elephantine papyri informing of the existence of a Jewish community in Upper Egypt.
of today’s Jewish population are members of the Caucasian race, “genuine” Jews should look like Europeans. Non-European Jews who do not meet these requirements have usually been labeled “descendants of converts to Judaism”: the Yemenite, Ethiopian, Indian and Chinese Jews (Wexler 1993: 201).

Jewish elements must have spread in a great variety of forms. The differences between Palestinian and some Jewish diaspora communities were considerable from the point of view of ethnicity, language, and religious practice. They were out of touch with developments in Palestine where rabbinic Judaism was developing at that time (ibid., 185).

It must not be forgotten, however, that Judaism was neither the only nor the most important monotheistic religion in pre-Islamic Arabia. The missionary activity of the monophysite Church among the Arabian tribes contributed to the diffusion of that type of Christianity over the peninsula. Those forms of Judaism and Christianity which at that time existed side-by-side in South-West Arabia were in their religious and historical character more akin to each other than their Westernized counterparts (Ullendorf 1962: 99). As mentioned above, it is more than likely that some of the immigrants from South Arabia could have been Jews, but no reliable proofs are available. Nevertheless, there is some linguistic evidence supporting this assumption. The Jewish immigrants probably came in small groups and settled with other immigrants. This can explain the widespread Hebraic influences and practices in Ethiopia. A special link to the Falashas, however, cannot be established (Krempel 1972: 18).

In the second century B.C. a local dynasty, independent of the South Arabian motherland, established its rule over the Ethiopian highlands. The new political unit, the city state of Axum, extended its power as far as Meroe and even Yemen. The well-known stelae of Axum, tombstones, coins and other items testify to the wealth of the Axumite kings, the main source of which was the sea trade. Under king Ezana (cca 320–342 A.D.) Christianity became the state religion of Axum. The conversion of Abyssinia to Christianity must have been slow outside the principal centers. Different religious habits and practices existed side by side and influenced each other. This may be one source of the remarkable syncretism typical of Abyssinian Christianity (Ullendorf 1962: 101).

The power of Axum was largely restricted by the Persian occupation of Yemen in the 6th century A.D. and further undermined by the expanding Islam. The following geographical and cultural isolation hastened the intermingling of the Semitic and indigenous Cushitic peoples. Those segments of the population which had been most exposed to the influence of the immigrants and not only took over their language, religion and social structures, but also mixed with them biologically, later played the decisive role in Ethiopian history. The most important of them are the Tigre and the Amhara, generally referred to as Abyssinians.3 They are consid-

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3 One group of Semitic immigrants called themselves Habashat whence the Arabic word Habash (ḥabash) from which the names Abyssinia, Abyssinian are derived. Today’s inhabitants find these expressions offensive and prefer calling their country Ethiopia (Ityop'īya).
ered to be the transmitters of the Semitic-Axumite heritage. Calling themselves “Semitic”, they feel they have every right to rule over the “African”, “black” ethnic groups in Ethiopia (Krempel 1972: 14).

The year 960 A.D. marks the turning point in the history of Ethiopia. In this year, the ruling dynasty of Axum was overthrown by a woman, called in Tigre sources Gudewit, in Amhara sources Esatawu. The Arabic sources speak of a queen of the Banū al-Hamwiyah. The information about the event is scarce and contradictory. The queen is reported to have caused total devastation of the country: she burnt churches and monasteries, stole religious treasures, and killed priests and monks. The queen and her followers are always referred to as non-Israelite.

The fact that together with her husband she is called ayhudi (Jewish) is the only direct reference to the existence of the Jews in Ethiopia up to the end of the 13th century. According to Ullendorf (1962:61) it seems that there was a revolt of the Agaw people intent on overthrowing Christianity and re-establishing of the old Hebraic-pagan religion. This has given rise to the tradition that Jewish tribes, perhaps the Falashas, created a Judaized state in Abyssinia. Some argue, however, that it is not quite certain what exactly the word ayhud meant since in the later Ethiopian chronicles it denotes a heretic, dissident, rebel (Krempel 1972:18). The expression Israelite is often used by the Christian Abyssinians with reference to themselves. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the earliest Christian literature usually makes a distinction between Israelite (a Jew who accepts Christianity) and a Jew (a Jew who is hostile to Christianity) (Wexler 1993:22).

After the re-establishment of the so-called Solomonic dynasty in 1268 A.D., a relatively reliable reconstruction of Ethiopian history is made possible by the existence of the Royal Chronicles written in Ge°ez in the monasteries of Debre Damo and Debre Libanos. When the words ayhud and ayhudi are mentioned in these documents, it is almost exclusively in connection with military campaigns against rebellious or secessionist groups within the state or ethnic groups resisting subjugation outside it (Krempel 1972:34). This fact, however, does not necessarily exclude religious connection.

The chronicle of Amda Cion (1314–1344) reports on a military expedition to Begemder against rebels “who had been Christians before but now cursed Christ like the Jews, the crucifiers” (Dillmann 1884:1017). Although the term “Falasha” is not used, some scholars (Hess 1969, I: 112; Leslau 1951: xxxix) came to the conclusion that the rebels could be the Falashas. E.S. Sherr (1988: 77) also mentions the Falashas in this connection.

The first chronicle to mention the name Falasha is that of king Minas (1559–1563). The chronicle of his successor, Sarsa Dengel (1563–1597), states that a certain Radai, a Falasha, refused to pay tribute to the king. The king sent an army against Radai and his followers to Semien. The war lasted long since the rebels

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4 In some other sources, under the impact of similarity, the queen is called Judith.
5 Sherr (1988: 75) mentions the existence of an Agaw kingdom ruled by a Falasha dynasty in the Lake Tana area (9–11 cent.).
used the local ambas 6 as natural forteresses, and could be brought to an end only with the help of Turkish musketeers. The chronicles describe the terror the king’s army caused among the defeated: many threw themselves into precipices to avoid being sold into slavery.

Campaigns against the Falashas continued under Susneyos (1605–1632). The king, greatly influenced by Portuguese missionaries 7 and finally converted to Catholicism, tried to eliminate all Jewish elements preserved in Ethiopian Christianity, such as observance of the Sabbath. The Falashas became objects of severe persecutions. Their villages were looted and king’s officials in the Lake Tana area were ordered either to baptize the Falashas or to kill them.

With the campaign of Susneyos the resistance of the Falashas seems to be definitely broken. The chronicles of the later kings do not mention them at all.

Following the traces of the Jewish traditions in Ethiopia we cannot ignore the testimony of the legends surrounding the beginnings of Abyssinia and its royal house, a remarkable cycle of legends contained in Kebra Nagast, the Glory of the Kings (13th century), which has become part and parcel of Ethiopian culture and life. Its kernel is the story of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, based on the narrative in

I Kings x: 1–13, greatly amplified and embellished. Besides numerous quotations and paraphrases from the Old and New Testament, it contains borrowings from apocryphal literature, from rabbinical literature as well as the Koran (27: 15–45) and many other sources (Ullendorf 1962: 143). 8 This legend shows that the royal dynasty in Ethiopia derived much of its legitimacy from the identification with the Hebraic-Jewish elements in the Abyssinian past and its Semitic roots.

The Queen of Sheba, the Ethiopian queen Makeda, is reported to have learnt about Solomon’s wealth and wisdom and decided to visit him. Having been received with great honours, Makeda accepted Solomon’s religion and love. On her journey home she bore a son (Menelik I). The son later visited his father, was anointed by him and sent back to Ethiopia. The legend further reports that on that

6 I.e., steep table mountains characteristic of Northern Ethiopia.

7 The military intervention of the Portuguese on the side of the Ethiopian Christians against the Muslim invasion (1541) had secured the Portuguese missionaries a privileged position in Ethiopia. The greatest achievements of their presence in the country are connected with their activities as explorers and scholars (Pero Paez, Jerome Lobo). They have produced works of scholarship far ahead of their time. On the other hand, the narrowmindedness of some of them stirred a national upheaval and caused their expulsion (1632). This experience resulted in the withdrawal of the Ethiopians within their inaccessible mountain ranges and led to an almost complete discontinuation of relations with the outside world (Ullendorf 1962: 11).

8 In Arabic sources, the romantic encounter of King Solomon (Sulaymān) with the Queen of Sheba (Bilqis) gave birth to a number of legends forming part of the collections Qisas al-‘anbiyā’ (Tales of Prophets). The Ethiopian version has been examined in several studies: E. LITTMANN: The Legend of the Queen of Sheba in the tradition of Axum. London 1904; P. WHEELER: The Golden Legend of Ethiopia, the Love Story of Mageda, Virgin Queen of Axum and Sheba, and Solomon, the Great King. 1936 (quoted in Sylvia Pankhurst 1955: 104, n. 3, 4).
occasion the Ark of Covenant was stolen from the temple in Jerusalem and brought to Axum, the new Zion. It is still kept in the cathedral of Axum and has always been the central symbol of the Ethiopian Church.9

The Christian legends further tell us that before Christianity was introduced to Ethiopia one part of the population had been Jews, the rest worshipped the snake Arwe.

In agreement with the Solomonic legend, the Falashas are believed to be the descendants of the artisans Makeda had brought to Ethiopia from Israel. Some Falashas believe that this explanation of their origins has been fabricated by the Christians to humiliate them by indicating that they have always been handworkers who are in low repute among the Abyssinians (Krempel 1972: 24). Another legend, that of Moses and the exodus from Egypt, finds a wider acceptance among the Falashas. It says that some of those who left Egypt with Moses quarrelled with their leader and decided to go their own way. At last they arrived in Ethiopia, settled there and mixed with the local population. During the Middle Ages stories about Israelites who did not get to the Promised Land and lived scattered in far-away countries, about so-called Children of Moses, were widely narrated in the Mediterranean area, in the Middle East and in Central and Eastern Europe. Some Jewish travellers of that time must have been influenced by them.

The oldest of these travellers, Eldad ha-Dani of the 9th century, mentions bnei Moshe who lived between the Nile and the rivers of Kush. Owing to the excess of legendary material, as a source of information his report has to be dismissed (Leslau, Ullendorf). Benjamin of Tudela, a Jewish merchant from Navarra in Spain, in the second half of the 12th century visited North Africa and the Middle East. In his travel diary, Benjamin mentions Jews who live in the mountains in the country called Aden. Although most geographical names in the diary are difficult to identify, some scholars accept the diary as an authentic source for the history of the Falashas (Conti Rossini 1912: 362). The Jews of Ethiopia are also mentioned by the kabbalist Abraham Halevi Baruchim in his Epistle on the Secret of Redemption, 1528 (Encyclopaedia Judaica 5, 1971: 1143).

As a whole, the medieval reports contribute very little to the knowledge about the predecessors of the Falashas. They are, however, symptomatic of the interest in the Ethiopian Jews which seem to be more emotional than rational (Krempel 1972: 56). This kind of attitude is typical of a great deal of literature on this topic to this day.

2. The new age of the Western exploration of Ethiopia opens with the name of James Bruce. In his quest to find the sources of the Nile, Bruce travelled much over Ethiopia (1768–1772), performed scientific observations, collected materials and provided a fairly detailed account of the life of the Falashas. Bruce’s writings stimulated curiosity and rekindled interest in this peculiar people and their religion.

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9 For the veneration of the Ark of Covenant, see Leslau 1965: 4.
Most of those who journeyed to Ethiopia after Bruce were engaged in attempts to solve the Falasha problem. The most prominent of them, Antoine d’Abbadie\(^\text{10}\) brought the first Falasha manuscripts to Europe (1840). In his inquiries he used a sort of questionnaire created for this purpose by a young Italian scholar Filosseno Luzzato of Padova (Kessler 1996: 109). The first letter of d’Abbadie on the Falashas appeared in *Journal des débats* in Paris (1845).

Approximately at the same time, Protestant missionary societies turned their attention to Ethiopia. The first to arrive were the representatives of the Church Missionary Society (1829). The main purpose of the mission was to encourage Bible reading in the vernacular and provide religious instruction. They were well received but in 1838 were expelled from Tigre and later also from Shoa. Under Theodros the missionaries were allowed to return but neither the Emperor nor the Church were willing to tolerate their activities among Christians. In this situation it was decided to concentrate on the Falashas, the “Jews of the country”. Converting them to Protestantism was seen as a means to attain the real target, the reformed Christian Church (Flad jun. 1922: 19; in Kremper 1972: 59). It was hoped that through the conversion of the Falashas it was possible to create a group of devoted Protestant Christians who would be able to influence their compatriots.

In 1860 another missionary organization, the “London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews”, started its activities among the Falashas. Henry Aaron Stern, a German Jew converted to Christianity, entrusted with the leadership of the mission, did his job with utmost devotion and zeal. In spite of his arrogant attitude to the “natives”, the work was bringing its fruit. Especially the distribution of the Bibles in Amharic was a success. For the first time, the Falasha priest could understand the passages of the Scriptures they were used to read in Ge’ez. On the other hand, however, the Falasha priests and monks saw their influence diminished by the growing numbers of their congregation prepared to embrace Christianity. In this way, the missionaries dangerously undermined the stability of a settled and closely knit society (Kessler 1996: 118).

According to d’Abbadie, the Falashas had no knowledge of the existence of the Jewish communities in other countries. From the Protestant missionaries they learnt about the dispersion of the Jews around the world and about the Biblical promise of their return to Israel. Now the Falasha leaders used the information against the missionaries accusing them of deceit: making the Falashas Christian, they wanted to take away from them the right to return to the Promised Land. Soon the spirits went high and led to a kind of messianic expectation among the Falashas. In 1862 a certain Aba Sirach proclaimed himself prophet and promised to lead his followers to the land of their forefathers. They left western Ethiopia for Tigre, where many perished of starvation and diseases, the rest returned home (Krempel 1972: 62).

\(^{10}\) Antoine d’Abbadie (1810–1897), together with his brother Arnaud, spent many years in Ethiopia and brought back a great amount of material. Besides cartography, trigonometry and astronomy, he was engaged in studying languages, history and anthropology.
There were rumours of the possible forced conversion of the Falashas which finally reached Europe. The Alliance Israélite Universelle, established to assist Oriental Jews sent Joseph Halévy, a Semitist scholar, to Ethiopia to get the first-hand information of the state of affairs. From his journey (1867) Halévy brought some valuable ethnographic material about the Falashas, corregeligionists in his wording, but found little credence with the Alliance. Nobody seemed to be interested in the black Jews.¹¹

The issue of the Jewishness or non-Jewishness of the Falashas became widely discussed in the West. A great number of articles appeared supporting one or the other view. The general public was prepared to believe the Falashas were genuine Jews. The Jewish religious leaders, however, regarded them as a sort of fossil, a survival of the pre-Christian stage of development.

Halévy's conviction the Falashas were Jews and should be brought back to the fold of the world Jewry was shared by his pupil, Jacques Faitlovitch.¹² Of Russian extraction and naturalized in France, Faitlovitch devoted all his life to this cause. He found no support from the Alliance either, especially after Rabbi Chaim Nahoum, who they had sent to Ethiopia for the final judgement on the Jewishness of the Falashas, denied this assumption.

In 1904–5 Faitlovitch went to Ethiopia and brought back a letter signed by a great number of the Falasha priests and monks, asking the Jews of Europe for help (Kessler 1966: 152). The letter stirred interest and compassion of many Jews in Europe and in most countries so-called pro-Falasha committees were founded. The funds raised by these committees were to be used to finance the Jewish missionary work among the Falashas with the aim to introduce them to rabbinical Judaism. For this purpose, Jewish religious literature and the Bibles in Amharic were distributed and several Falasha young men were sent to Europe to study at rabbinical schools. They were expected to return home and teach. Travelling schools, touring Falasha villages, were established during Faitlovitch's third visit to Ethiopia (1913–14) (Encyclopaedia Judaica 5, 1971: 1137).

Faitlovitch continued his work until his death in Tel Aviv (1955). Steps were taken to enable the immigration of the Falashas to Israel. Several Falasha children were brought there and educated in a religious kibbutz. After about ten years they were sent home but only a few of them were willing to engage in missionary work. A number of schools and sanitation stations around Gonder, supported by the World Jewish Congress, persisted up to the revolution 1974, but the immigration activities were stopped.

The Jewish mission among the Falashas, lasting for decades, had its effects. Jewish festivals, unknown in Ethiopia before, became accepted and celebrated

¹¹ In this connection, it is worth mentioning that e.g. Yemenite Jews were so sceptical that light-skinned people could be Jews that they coined the label “Christian Jews” with reference to visiting European Jews (Wexler 1993: 203).

¹² Jacques Faitlovitch (1881–1955), disciple of Halévy, author of Proverbes Abyssins (1907), Les Falachas d’après les explorateurs (1907) and Quer durch Abessinien (1910).
and Jewish customs were introduced. In some village schools even Hebrew was taught. As a result, some Falashas started to feel themselves Jews, calling the Amhara and others goy. Their self-confidence was strengthened by the new interpretation of the Falasha history in terms of Jewish history.13

"Die Mission führte dazu, daß eine Identitätsbestimmung für viele Falascha als Individuen schwierig geworden ist. Von jungen Lehrern, die ihre Ausbildung überwiegend in Israel erfahren hatten, wurde mir desagt, daß sie sich nicht als Äthiopier fühlen können, aber auch nicht als Juden, da sie sich mit keinem der beiden Länder, Äthiopien oder Israel, völlig identifizierten: in beiden Ländern würden sie abgelehnt" (Krempel 1972: 71).

Ullendorf speaks of an “artificially judaized diaspora”:

"It has been sometimes asserted that for centuries the Falashas have suffered as Jews. In fact, however, not until the Christian and Jewish missionary activities of the nineteenth century have the Falashas learned to regard themselves as Jews. . . The Falashas have never, until the Italian occupation of 1936–41, suffered as Jews but as the occasional victims of tribal warfare – a fate they have shared with many other Ethiopians” (Ullendorf 1967).

3. The word Falasha is Semitic and means ‘emigrant’ or ‘migrant’. The Falashas called themselves Beta Isra’elor Kayla, a Cushitic word of obscure origin. They lived scattered mainly in Begemder, Semien, Damiya and Qara in North-Western Ethiopia in a predominantly Christian environment.

The scriptures, rites and practices of the Falashas show some very close parallels with Ethiopian Christianity. The Bible of the Falashas, called orit, is identical with the Coptic Abyssinian version. The Bible Canon in Ethiopia comprises a number of apocryphal and pseudoepigraphic books, such as Tobit, Judith, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Wisdom of Ben Sira (Ecclesiasticus), the two books of Maccabees, the Book of Baruch and the books of Enoch and Jubilees. In contrast to Judaism, the Falashas have priests, kahen, as a generic noun as against qes denoting a single individual priest, with a possible plural qescoč. Any Falasha from a respected family and of good character, if versed in prayers and the Bible, can be a priest. Having no knowledge of Hebrew, they use Ge’ez as their liturgical language. The Falashas adhere tenaciously to the precepts of the Pentateuch, but the Mishna and Talmud are unknown. They observe solely the feasts mentioned in the Pentateuch, post-exilic feasts are not celebrated.14 They celebrate, however, a special feast called Seged, with the meaning “to bow, to prostrate”. People from many places gather high up on a mountain fasting and praying. Chapters from Ezra and Nehemiah are read.

13 The desperate struggle of the Falashas against the Ethiopian kings in Semien was compared to the heroic defence of Massada by the ancient Jews.

14 The fact that the Ethiopian Jews were ignorant of relatively late Jewish holidays such as Hannukah commemorating an event that took place in the 2nd century B.C. some observers take to mean that Judaism came to Ethiopia before the rise of this holiday (Wexler 1993: 201).
The centre of religious life of the village is masgid, meaning here synagogue. Sabbath is strictly observed. Its beginning is announced by ringing the bells at Friday sunset, calling people to the masgid for prayer before the sabbath meal. In the morning the Decalogue is read in the masgid and large loaves of bread, dabo, brought by the families are blessed and sliced. Part of it is given to the priests, part to the needy and the rest is eaten at the house of worship (Jaych 1995: 77). Pre­scriptions concerning ritual cleanness are kept with great zeal. The Falashas abstain from touching strangers and after each such contact they must be purified. Like Christians, the Falashas observe many fast days. Unlike Judaism, they know monks and nuns who play an important role in the community. Like their Christian neighbours, the Falashas practice circumcision on the eigth day after the boy’s birth, and excision on girls.

The position of the Falasha minority in Ethiopia can be understood only within the framework of the particular form of Ethiopian feudal system, especially in the extremely complicated system of land ownership. This system together with the inheritance rules prevented the outsider groups from owning, using and inheriting land.

Land ownership was restricted to Amhara peasants, although even their land ownership had a collective nature. This kind of ownership was called rist. The great variety of regional circumstances led to great differences in tenure from one province to another (Pankhurst 1968: 136). In the Amhara provinces, such as Begemder and Semien, the participation in a rist community decided about economic security, status and social class. As the non-Amhara population could not, as a rule, participate in rist ownership, they could only lease land from the Amhara. Such contracts could be easily ended by the owners of the land. Owing to these circumstances, the non-Amhara population was pushed out of farming and from the Amhara-inhabited area in general. In this way, the right to own land also influenced the relations between the Christian and non-Christian population (Krempel 1972: 137).

Since the access to land was very limited for the Falashas, they had to earn their living as artisans. As blacksmiths, masons, carpenters, potters and weavers, they played an important role in the Christian community which despised both trade and manual work other than agriculture. Especially blacksmiths were looked down on with contempt and suspicion. They were believed to possess occult powers and to be able to turn themselves into hyenas at will. In the eyes of the Christian elite, the occupational pattern of the Falashas associated them with the black African ethnic groups despised by the Amhara (Kessler 1996: 151). Under these circumstances, the Falashas could easily be victimized. They were regarded as the source of all kinds of misfortune that might hit their Christian neighbours. In the time of economic disasters, the Falashas used to become favoured objects of persecution.15

15 In their petition to the Emperor, the Falashas complain: "We are falsely accused of sorcery, in that we transform ourselves at night into wild beasts, such as hyenas, and that not only do we kill our neighbours and their cattle, but that we also exhume the bodies of their dead and eat them. It is by means of such false accusation that your servants are persecuted like wild animals, and many of us have been murdered in the most barbarous manner" (Kessler 1996: 151).
As against the presentation provided by Krempel (1972: 267), we believe that however deeply integrated in the Ethiopian feudal system the Falashas may have been, to look at them exclusively as the product of this system is too restrictively onesided. The origins of the Falashas, to be sure, may never be satisfactorily explained but their stubborn adherence to ancient Hebraic or pagan-Hebraic beliefs has to be taken into account, too.

4. The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 was brought about by a number of long- and short-term factors. As latent conflicts in the society deepened and inner contradictions became acute, the archaic feudal order collapsed without much resistance. Among the immediate causes of the revolution were rising commodity prices as a result of the world economic crisis but the most decisive was the disastrous drought and subsequent famine killing more than 200 000 people. The failure of the regime to help the famine victims, due to massive corruption of the government officials as well as cover-up of the seriousness of the disaster, provided the opposition groups with a common cause (Sherr 1988: 125).

The major problem facing the revolution was the lack of leadership. With the fall of Haile Selassie’s government the political power at the center was left for a divided civilian left and the military to occupy (Bulcha 1988: 63). When the military council or the Dergue (originally called the Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, the Police and the National Garde) finally became the governing body, it had no strategy or ideology for social and political change. After some hesitation it announced its choice of socialism as a path for future development, a pragmatic move rather than a result of ideological conviction. This course was definitely formulated in 1976 in the Programme of the National and Democratic Revolution which became the fundamental document of the Ethiopian Revolution (Sherr 127).

The revolution started as a comparatively peaceful event and remained relatively bloodless in its initial stages. Even the land reform which led to profound changes in the ownership pattern did not result in significant violence. The later violence and counter-violence were results of the struggle for power and privileges. The contestants were the Military Council, the civilian petty bourgeoisie with the civilian left at the fore-front, and the national movements whose leaders were leftists, as well. Each of them justified the use of violence as a “revolutionary duty”. The consequences for the society at large were profound. Insecurity, persecution, poverty and social uprooting have become more wide-spread in Ethiopia than ever before (Bulcha 1988: 101).

The late seventies saw tremendous population movements caused by political disturbances and famine. At that time, the first groups of Falashas started fleeing Ethiopia. The province of Begemder and Semien where most of them lived saw fierce fighting between rivalling political groups. The counter-revolutionary Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) caused devastation attacking people in need of land and forcing them to flee. The Falashas also suffered persecution from the units of the extreme left-wing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) since, as Jews, they were suspected of Zionist sympathies. The Jewish aid organizations tried to help but soon became suspect of organizing flights and were banned (Kessler & Parfitt 1987: 9).
The so-called Red Terror, proclaimed by the Dergue, as a response to the assassination of its cadres by the EPRP, finally crushed the opposition but failed to bring stability to the country. The standard of living of the population did not improve. Heavy taxes were imposed to cover the immense military expenses of the government. The absorption of the labour force into the militia and the state control of the market lowered food production. State farms using forced labor on a large scale were run at enormous losses (Bulcha 1988: 113). Forced relocation, carried out under the programmes of “resettlement” and “villagization” became one of main refugee-generating factors.

One of the main goals of the Ethiopian revolution was the change of the Amhara identity of political power. Nevertheless, in the hands of the Dergue, the revolution was converted into a covert Amhara nationalism expressed by slogans like “Ethiopia Tikdem” (Ethiopia First) or “Ennat Ager Weym Mot” (Motherland or Death). In other words, Amhara nationalism was presented as Ethiopian nationalism (ibid.: 70). Equality of minority groups was proclaimed but, in time, the eradication of tribal differences and minority cultures became a national priority. Amharic was viewed as the language of the state and it was hoped it would succeed in replacing all local languages. Similarly, Amhara (Christian) culture continued to be taken as the model for assimilation although the Marxist government was anti-religious and had, as its ultimate goal, the destruction of religion in Ethiopia. Jews and some other groups (Roman Catholics, Protestants, Seventh-Day Adventists) came under growing pressure. Even the literacy campaign involved strong atheistic propaganda. Rituals were ridiculed, market days organized on Sabbaths (Kessler & Parfitt 9). Under these circumstances the younger Falashas started leaving the country en masse encouraged by emissaries touring their villages. According to the categorization provided by Bulcha (1988: 80–3), the Falashas fall into the ‘oppressed minorities’ group whose fate is closely related to that of the ‘displaced masses’.

The refugees had to travel hundreds of miles and ford raging mountain streams. The most serious danger, however, came from human beings rather than from natural phenomena. About 14 per cent of refugees suffered armed attacks, robbery and other type of violence (Bulcha 139). The destination of the fleeing masses was camps in the Sudan.

\[16\] “One category of refugees consists of racial and religious minorities pushed out by hostilities against them from the members of the majority in the country of origin. The current flight of Assyrians and Syrians from different countries in the Middle East and the recent departure of about twenty thousand Falashas or “Black Jews” from Ethiopia after two thousand years residence in the mountains of Gonder fall under this category. Persecution and oppression might have been exercised against such minorities for centuries, as with the last two groups, but flight often takes place at a given point in time. Such a juncture often coincides with a national crisis such as defeat in war or economic depression which is felt deeply in the wider society. It is during times like these that minorities become the scapegoats. The “endemic” oppression and discrimination against them become “epidemic” as members of the dominant group search for a vent for their frustration. But above all flight is dependent upon international factors, particularly the availability of asylum elsewhere” (Bulcha 1988: 82).
The Falashas, concentrated mainly in the camp of Umm Raquba were the most vulnerable group. Coming from the cool mountainous areas they were unaccustomed to the heat and diseases of the lowlands. Physical exhaustion and lack of nourishment during the flight increased the occurrence of infectious diseases. The Christian refugees were fearful of the Falashas believing that they ate human flesh. On the other hand, the Falashas were suspicious of the medical arrangement in the camp. For fear of being poisoned, severely dehydrated people refused to eat salt tablets. They found themselves trapped in a situation they could hardly understand. Many died, some decided to return.

The Falasha presence in the Sudan was a closely guarded secret, but in September 1984 reports appeared in the international press about the death toll in the camps. After the Falashas had been recognized as Jews, there was a growing pressure on the Israeli government to act. In the meantime, several thousands were transported to Israel by the Israeli secret service agency. When the agonizing situation of the Falashas in the Sudan became internationally known and, at the same time, the Falashas were continuously leaving Gonder in great numbers, Operation Moses was started. It lasted from the middle of November 1984 until January 5th 1985 and rescued about 7,000 people from the camps in the Sudan. In the first week of January, the story of the airlift hit the headlines and for political reasons the action had to be stopped. Both Ethiopia and the Sudan placed a total ban on the emigration of the remaining Ethiopian Jews. Three months later, thanks to the intervention of George Bush, another five hundred Falashas were transported by U.S. Airforce planes to Israel under the code name Operation Sheba (Kessler 1996: xxvii). Many thousands found themselves trapped in Ethiopia. They abandoned their villages and made their way to Addis Abeba.

By the end of 1989 the Ethiopian government was losing control of large parts of the country (Eritrea, Tigre, Begemder). When the Soviet Union withdrew its support, the government turned to Israel for financial and military help. In return, they allowed a few hundred Jews to leave every month on condition Israel provided travel documents. Transport had to be effected by Ethiopian Airlines via Rome and further on by Israeli airplanes to Israel.

By February 1991 rebel forces had reached Gonder and the Israelis recognized that the fall of Addis Abeba could not be long delayed. There was fear that the rebel occupation of the capital might end in a disaster for around 20,000 Falashas concentrated in the city. A swift action was imperative. In March a military mission was sent to Ethiopia to organize the evacuation. In the meantime the rebel forces continued their advance and on May 23, when they were already at a short distance from Addis Abeba, Operation Solomon was activated. It started at 10 a.m. on May 24 and ended by 11 a.m. the following day. Over 14,000 people were transported on 41 military and civilian flights. Three days later the capital fell and without much bloodshed a new government took over (Kessler xxviii).

Israel was the first nation to offer non-military assistance to the new post-Mengistu Ethiopia. Good relations between both countries made the activities of the Jewish relief organizations possible. The Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) and the North America Conference on Ethiopian
Jewry (NACOEJ) dispatched their representatives to Ethiopia so that they could attend to those who had been left behind. Among those assisted to travel to Israel were about 2,500 from the distant Agaw speaking Qara region who had been isolated from the rest.

The relief organizations had to deal with an unexpected problem: about 30,000 Christian Ethiopians claimed they were relatives of Beta Isra'el and wanted to be reunited with them. They had been converted by Christian missionaries or were descendants of converts. It was decided they could be accepted if, under supervision of the Falasha priests, they could prove beyond doubt that they were first-degree relatives of the Jewish immigrants. About 1,000 were accepted and granted Israeli citizenship. Most of them reverted to Judaism (ibid: xxxi).

5. In Israel the Falashas had to cope with the difficulties of adjustment to a new and totally strange society. Thrown out of their social environment, often separated from their families, unable to understand the language, they suffered from severe deprivation. Some also experienced, for the first time, the humiliation of discrimination due to skin coloring (ibid: xxix).17

The government immigration policy of pre-state Israel was characterized by the belief in standardization and social equality fostered by the prevailing socialist ideology. The standards were established by the Ashkenazic immigrants. New immigrants were expected to abandon many elements of their traditional cultural heritage and adopt the Ashkenazic norm (Begley Soroff 1995: 77). The process would begin in the absorption centers, merkaz klita, where the immigrants would temporarily reside. The creation of the absorption centers in the sixties was the result of careful planning based upon the assumption that with education, modernization and the passage of time all ethnic groups would be integrated on the basis of equality. The philosophy of “fusion of exiles”, mizug ha-galuyot, had been a forceful factor in Israeli society for a long time. The absorption centers were instruments of assimilation, a unidirectional process of change towards homogeneity, as the cultures and the institutions of the non-migrant group are accepted and begin to prevail over those of immigrants (Bulcha 1988: 84).

Before January 1980 there were some 400 Ethiopians living in Israel, mostly from Tigre. The motive that brought them there were varied: economic, religious, personal. They were not considered Jews either nationally or religiously. The doubts about their Jewish identity led them to develop their Judaism in Israel within the Sephardic (Yemenite) community in their public religious expression. The assimilation ideology and the cultural pressure of the dominant social group made them abandon many elements of their cultural tradition and made them reluctant to present themselves as an organized ethnic group (Begley Soroff 1995: 174). It is only in the last decade that cultural pluralism has been perceived as a positive factor in society.

17 Some mayors in Israel were reluctant to take the Falashas. They called them “stone-age primitives".
The mass transfer of Ethiopian Jews has no parallel in the history of immigration to Israel. It could be possibly compared to the Operation Magic Carpet which brought Yemenite Jews to Israel in 1948–49.

The newcomers from Ethiopia were concentrated in absorption centers which in many cases became their permanent homes. Had they been settled in rural areas, it would have been easier for them to find jobs. It can be construed with safety that economic opportunities are pivotal in early adjustment. They facilitate the rate and scope of integration (Bulcha 1988: 90). Their African origin, skin colour, language and cultural background set the Ethiopian Jews apart as a group. As most of their leaders could not read modern Hebrew, they were not recognized by the authorities. The Ethiopian immigrants were even asked to change their names to more Hebrew sounding ones. Anxiety was caused by the demands of the orthodox rabbinate which in many cases refused to recognize them as Jews unless they underwent a token conversion ceremony which they considered shameful and insulting. In September 1985 several hundred Ethiopians held a demonstration opposite the office of the Chief Rabbinate protesting against symbolic conversions (Begley Soroff 199).

Ethiopian Jews became dependent on Ashkenazic religious authorities. Women’s practice of observing family purity ritual was not allowed to continue. In Ethiopia in case of period the woman stays in the mergem gojo, a special hut, for seven days. She also stays there for forty days after she gave birth to a boy and eighty days in the case of a girl (Jaych 1995: 38). On the other hand, the Ethiopian women refused to use the ritual bath mikwe, since they connected this custom with baptism, symbolizing conversion to Christianity.

Ethiopian Jews still keep their traditions concerning the celebration of Sabbath. It is preceded by bathing and washing clothes. Sabbath ends with nightfall on Saturday evening. Havdala is not performed, a traditional coffee ceremony is held instead.

The Ethiopian Jews were acculturated to their Amhara-Tigre environment. The social preferences of the members of a group are largely determined by their region of origin in Ethiopia. They feel a deep sense of identification with the people of their own agar (Begley Soroff 1995: 187).18

Extended family is still an important social unit for the Ethiopian Jews. Children are trained to be well-behaved (in general, Ethiopian Jews find their Israeli neighbours noisy and aggressive).

The Ethiopian Jews face a unique problem in maintaining and transmitting their ethnic identity. As they were not exposed to a secular education or advanced religious training, the basic means of transmitting their cultural and religious knowledge and values has been through the oral tradition using Bible stories, folktales and proverbs. They also use a form of poetry called sam-enna warq (wax and

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18 "One’s agar signifies more than a place of residence or provenience. It means “home” and all those whose families live there are regarded with special affection, while those outside are regarded with reserve and suspicion, if not hostility" (Levine 1965: 49).
gold) (ibid.: 209). Wax and gold is the formula which the Amhara use to symbolize a certain form of verse. This form consists of two semantic layers: “wax” is the apparent figurative meaning of the words, hidden behind this apparent meaning lies “gold”, the actual significance of the words.19

The ambiguity of sam-enna warq colors the entire fabric of traditional Amhara life. When an Amhara talks, his words usually have double meaning, when he listens he is ever on the lookout for latent meaning and hidden motives (Levine 1965: 8). Wax and gold can be a medium of humor, a means of insulting others without risking punishment and even enables criticism of the authorities. In Israel, the art of exploiting the numerous ambiguities of wax and gold discourse provides Ethiopians with a means of transmitting a sense of identification with Ethiopian culture (Beglay Soroff 210). This manner of communication, however, is in direct contrast with the spirit of modern Western culture which requires unambiguous ways of expression and precision in the use of language. Constant resorting to analogy and equivocation causes annoyance and generates tensions.

Ethiopian Jews are well aware of the complexity of their situation. Begley Soroff (210) quotes a Falasha proverb saying: “You cannot put your legs in two trees” meaning “one risks losing his cultural footing in the attempt of integrating into a new society”. Having arrived over a short period in great numbers, unlike veteran Ethiopians, the new Ethiopians managed to establish a strong group identity. They closely adhere to the meaningful standards of religious behaviour they had transplanted from Ethiopia. Characteristics which set them apart in this respect are Seged, attitude towards mikweh, and the importance of the ges. They also continue to celebrate the coffee ceremony at the end of Sabbath.

“We are a unique people” and “there is no difference between us and other Jews” are contradictory statements made by most new Ethiopians (Begley Soroff 177). For them, these statements are just two sides of the same identity.

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19 If the poet’s aim, for example, is to praise a hero, like Emperor Menelik, he creates a wax model, like “the lion” in terms of whose action the gold, Menelik, is depicted: “The lion Menelik crushed the wolf Italy.”


BOOK REVIEWS


John Lynch, professor of Pacific languages of the University of South Pacific Emalus Campus (Vanuatu) has participated as author in several publications dealing with Oceanic languages, especially those of Vanuatu.

The book under review intends to fill a perceptible gap. Until recently there have been virtually no books on the languages of the Pacific as a whole although such books are useful not only to linguists but also to lay readers, teachers, students and to all who are involved in the pragmatic aspects of language policy and education as well. Lynch has decided that his book should serve the readers of all these kinds simply because it is the first of its sort. The lay users will no doubt appreciate that the author has included a chapter on linguistic description and historical linguistics for their benefit. Basic information on the interrelation between Language and culture is also included (pp. 1-19). This is followed by a similar chapter dealing exclusively with the typical features of the Pacific languages (Part One, pp. 23-72). A language is namely set not only into the culture of its speakers but also into a specific natural environment as well as into circumstances that have developed during the course of its history.

The linguistic world of the Pacific is quite different from ours. In an area like this it becomes obvious that language is not a purely linguistic category and it can be distinguished from dialect only if extralinguistic factors are taken into account. Mutual intelligibility is far from sufficient. However, it is not only an issue of social identity (p. 26) but also of cultural identity. Lynch does not deny the importance of language for ethnic consciousness but notes that there are also communities whose attitude toward their language might be labelled as lukewarm. And yet, what is perhaps more interesting to note is that some communities are very keenly aware of the emblematic function of their language and especially in Melanesia the differences between neighbouring languages may be sometimes deliberately exaggerated (p. 58 and pp. 71-72 about language game as an instrument of diversification). This may be regarded as an element of spontaneous purism or even of spontaneous standardization. In Polynesia where the individual archipelagoes are sometimes quite efficiently separated from each other, the representative function of language seems to be underdeveloped and the necessity of having a special name for their own language may be lacking or relatively late or artificial (cf. pp. 40-41). Analogous phenomena are known from other parts of the world. For example the Slavs used to call themselves Slovans, Slovens, probably derived from the root with the meaning word, speak (slovo, etc.). Slovans or Slovens are thus those who can speak. On the other hand, their close neighbours were labelled Nemets (singular), Nemtsi (plural) – literally those who are mute, that is unable to speak (our) language.

Lynch – at least indirectly – touches upon the problem of stability of the rate of change of languages when comparing high linguistic diversity in Melanesia and rela-
tively high linguistic homogeneity of Polynesia despite the fact that genetically related languages are used in both regions. The linguistic heterogeneity of Melanesia is explained at least partly by a higher rate of change of relatively small linguistic communities than in Polynesia. Another critical factor may be that of interference with the Papuan languages (p. 57).

A separate chapter deals with the history of the languages of the Pacific. The genealogical tree of the Austronesian family is essentially dichotomous and right-branching and one cannot help asking if this is a fact of the linguistic family itself or – to some extent – just a reflection of our cognitive process (see p. 47). Here the author is confronted with the relations of language development on the one hand and extralinguistic factors such as migrations and culture on the other.

Unlike Austronesian languages, the history of the Papuan and Australian languages is quite brief and although the classification of the Papuan languages is obviously very much tentative, without it we would get lost in this fragmented linguistic universe (pp. 60-67). Unfortunately, the examination of possible external links of the various phyla and families of the Papuan (and Australian) realms is in its first hypothetical stage (p. 69).

Part Two (pp. 75-202) expounds a typological and synchronous survey of various levels of the linguistic structure of all three groupings of languages – Oceanic, Papuan and Australian. In a chapter on phonetics and phonology first the typical vocalic and consonantal subsystems are given and subsequently the deviations from them are discussed. In Melanesia as well as in Micronesia, the consonantal diversity is considerably higher than in Polynesia and Fiji. Papuan sound systems typically comprise the same five vowels familiar from Polynesia and neither are their consonantal inventories very rich. On the other hand, most Australian sound systems include only three vowels while apical and laminal consonants do occur in Australia. Attention has been paid to phonotactics as well (with open syllables and heavy restrictions on consonantal clusters occurring quite frequently) and also to such phonetic processes as reduction in Rotuman and widespread reduplication (marking very much the same meaning which results from the nature of this analogous coding), vocalic quantity and stress. One has to appreciate that Lynch mentions the phonetic and phonological problems with which European, especially English and French missionaries and anthropologists were confronted, which often led to their neglect of vocalic quantity and the existence of the glottal stop as a full-fledged phoneme (pp. 94-99). This is a serious shortcoming because it decreases a precariously low phonetic redundance in quite a few of the languages spoken in the Pacific area.

A similar approach has been employed by the author in his chapter on morphology and syntax (pp. 100-202). The contrast of inclusivity and exclusivity with the first person occurs in most Oceanic languages. Lynch notes that some Melanesian languages have no third-person pronoun at all and use demonstratives instead (p. 101). In fact, the so-called third person pronouns are no true personal pronouns at all. They are usually derived from demonstratives. It is the first and second person pronouns that are linked to switching roles in conversation while the referents of the third person pronouns remain the same. Another widespread phenomenon is the occurrence of possessive affixes with nouns. The consequences of a generally modest inflexion for the definition and distinction of word classes are discussed at some length. Numeral classifiers and possessive markers in (in the case of alienable possession) are known to exist in several languages and their sets are especially rich in some Micronesian languages, especially in Ponapean where they represent a kind of semantic classifiers (pp. 126-128).

Lynch employs a rather inclusive definition of aspect (p. 134) when he subsumes under it not only continuous and completive but also irrealis; the latter belongs rather in
the category of mood, not aspect. Tense necessarily overlaps with the mood in the sense that what lies in future only may happen and, on the other side, neither are we sure that everything that is said to have taken place in the past has really happened. For the reason just mentioned, particles marking the imperative in one language may serve as markers of the future in another related language. While the transitive and intransitive verbs are generally distinguished in Oceanic languages, the contrast of active and passive constructions is reported from a much smaller number of languages. If, however, a language admits only a passive construction without agent (as Roviana, see p. 144), in our opinion we are not confronted with a true passive but merely with an intransitive construction. However, if we have to do with a language where the passive constructions occur much more frequently than their active counterparts (cf. Maori), justified doubts arise as to whether we are still confronted with the passive in the true generally accepted sense of the word. Maybe this state of affairs reflects a transition toward ergativity which is a far from unknown phenomenon in Oceanic languages.

The grammar of the Papuan languages differs considerably from that of the Austronesian languages in Oceania. Few Papuan languages distinguish inclusive and exclusive pronouns (p. 167). The category of person is often marked by verbal affixes (conjugation) and noun classes are no exception either. Besides, agreement phenomena are known to occur, typologically reminiscent of the Bantu languages (e.g. Abu, pp. 169-170). On the other hand, possessive constructions are simpler than in Oceanic languages (p. 171). The word order is radically different from that in most Oceanic languages and the latter tend to the SOV type, if not so strictly as, for example Japanese (p. 177).

Australian languages are characterized as typologically more homogeneous than either the Austronesian or Papuan languages spoken in Oceania (pp. 185-202). Prototypical features include three numbers in personal pronouns (including dual), case affixation (including ergative), noun class or gender category, word order, occurrence of split ergativity and antipassive. Only in Arnhem Land and the Kimberleys there are several languages that are not ergative but accusative.

Part Three supplies the readers with extralinguistic information on the languages of the Pacific (pp. 203-271). The reasons for interference are seen for example in the marriage regulations, namely, in the practice of exogamy, in exchange trade, and migration – and, besides, in colonization by European powers and the USA. That is why in many languages of the Pacific loanwords are quite common, but even phonological and grammatical changes have been observed to occur. An extreme case of contact and interference is the putative existence of mixed languages. We are accustomed to the idea that a massive influx of foreign elements cannot change the genetic affiliation of a language. On the other hand, we have to admit that in an insufficiently known linguistic environment such as for example western Melanesia we might easily be confronted with a language that cannot be labelled in an unambiguous way as either Papuan or Austronesian. Pidgins and Creoles, however, despite being the result of linguistic contact, are far from "mixed" in the abovementioned sense. Quite the contrary, the creolization is a process during which the original genetic characteristics of the pidgin is confirmed (through reflexification). Koine, on the other hand, arises from the elements of various dialects of one and the same language, that is, dialect mixing.

In Chapter 11 (pp. 237-271), Lynch refutes the myth of so-called primitive languages that are reputed to have only a very restricted vocabulary or lack abstractions, etc. The readers will appreciate information on the language of respect especially in Polynesia and Micronesia (pp. 257-258) as well as on a variety of "special languages" based on word taboo (pp. 258-260), and language situation and policy in present-day Oceania.
Another important problem in the whole area is the phenomenon of language extinction and their subsequent revitalization especially in New Zealand and Hawaii (pp. 268-271). The success of the latter is obviously doubtful and may be, in the long run, confined to the symbolic or representative function of language. This is because the repressive linguistic policy of the governments towards the original population has lasted too long and the renaissance has come too late. Granting full linguistic rights to a dying or virtually dead minority is a widespread trick that has proved useful not only in Oceania but in the not so recent past also in Great Britain, France and Hungary.

The value of the book is enhanced by a bibliography of recommended literature (pp. 279-294), phonetic symbols (pp. 291-294), sample phoneme systems (pp. 295-298), glossary of technical terms (pp. 299-312) as well as by notes to the particular chapters (pp. 313-320), references (pp. 321-344) and an index (pp. 345-359).

Viktor Krupa


N. F. Alieva ranks today among the most prominent scholar of Indonesian languages in general and of Bahasa Indonesia in particular. Her studies and monographs are published not only in Russian but also, for example, in English and Indonesian. The present publication combines her Indonesian with typology, another field of interest of hers.

The author defines the subject of her latest book first of all as Indonesian in relation to Malay and Malaysian. Because of complicated historical circumstances this is no mere terminological problem and as the term “Indonesian language” is ambiguous, Alieva defines it for her purposes as Bahasa Indonesia (p. 6).

As for typology, she feels obliged especially to the Russian scholars I. I. Meshchani- nov, V. N. Toporov and G. A. Klimov and – outside Russia – to A. Capell from Australia. From the latter she has borrowed the idea of the dominant typological feature which, in the case of Bahasa Indonesia, is possessivity. Another key issue of typology in her publication is quantification (cf. p. 37). However, Alieva does not make use only of Greenberg’s indexical method of measurement of synthetism but also pays attention to qualitative aspects of typological change such as the influx of derivative affixes from Sanskrit and Arabic (p. 43).

Upon the most abstract level Bahasa Indonesia is characterized by Alieva as a typologically non-homogeneous language which has displayed both analytic and synthetic tendencies throughout its history (p. 47). She follows the formation of auxiliary words from autosemantic verbs upon the example of phase markers. The process of formalization has not been completed yet, which is confirmed by a relatively high degree of synonymy. For example, the idea of termination is expressed by habis, selesai, tamat “to finish” (p. 75).

The comparative approach is not lacking in Alieva’s research. She has observed that despite incontestable variety in the inventory and content of grammatical categories, some of the semantic fields are formalized and grammaticalized more readily than others (p. 86).

Her approach to analytism versus synthetism is not restricted to grammar but comprises lexicon as well (p. 89ff). Synthetism may find manifestation in the gradual loss of internal form, semantic transparency and also in phonetic reduction of words.

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The inventory of productive synthetic means of Bahasa Indonesia includes affixation (derivative affixes are difficult to delimit from grammatical markers), reduplication (very different from the former) and pronominal enclitics (p. 107). Alieva states that there is a considerable typological gap between nouns and verbs in Bahasa Indonesia. While nominal morphology is very poor, the verb is much more complicated but it also has significant analytical features. In this sense Alieva is right when maintaining that Bahasa Indonesia is a verb-oriented language – despite the fact that there is no verbal category of tense at all. In Alieva’s opinion tense is a category of predicate in Bahasa Indonesia and, besides its marking is only optional (p. 150). This, however, is not enough for a category to be considered grammatical.

A separate chapter deals with syntactic typology (p. 170ff.). This, however, cannot be reduced to the relations among subject, object and verb but includes case (in Fillmore’s terminology), word order, functional sentence perspective, topic versus subject etc., voice, ergativity, possessivity and even text grammar. Alieva views Indonesian sentence as notable for the external simplicity of the basic models which respect “universal laws of logic and psychology” (p. 175). Another dominant feature of Indonesian sentence structure is possessivity. The model of possessive construction is one of the most productive devices used to express the syntactic roles (p. 213) and the principle of possessivity has expanded even to word formation. Even the construction agent – verb is grammatically treated as if the agent were a possessor of the action. Elements of the possessivity principle are present – either overtly or covertly in many languages, including Indo-European.

N. F. Alieva’s book develops the mainly European typological tradition (including its Russian theoretically oriented representatives) without ignoring the achievements of linguistics overseas, especially in Australia and America. Thus she has managed to avoid the notorious one-sidedness of American colleagues who sometimes indulge in the luxury of discovering what has been discovered before.

For the benefit of the readers the author has included a List of abridgments (pp. 286–289), Text Sources (pp. 289–290), Literature (pp. 291–318) and an extensive Summary in English (pp. 319–324).

Viktor Krupa


Studies collected in the publication under review were originally presented at an international symposium hosted by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Munich University, in July 1996. Eleven case studies cover different border areas in limited time periods but they deal, as mentioned also in the subtitle of the publication, with issues related to the Chinese border, the vision of that border among Chinese officials and literati and the specific frontier policy during the time span from the 10th to 19th century. The central problem, which underlines the individual contributions, is – as stated by the editors in the Preface – “the role of borders ... in China’s perception of other peoples” (p. VI).

The first paper “Geography and Politics: The Song-Liao Border Dispute of 1074/75” (pp. 1-28) by Christian Lamaroux examines the problems related to the interpretation of border on both sides of this dispute, the different attitudes to border and foreign people among Chinese elites (the conciliatory attitude of Wang Anshi versus the “hardline” at-
titude of Lü Dazhong) and the political implications of the vision of border as a line or as an area. The dispute also illustrates the role of central government and the local society with its administration in dealing with frontier disputes and conflicts. This border dispute was an important incentive for the development of Song geography, as the famous geographer Shen Gua (1031-1075) played a decisive role in the negotiating process. The opinions of experts provided the most important arguments for the marking of the disputed part of the Song-Liao border in the Hedong circuit in Daizhou prefecture.

The contribution “Ming Foreign Policy: The Case of Hami” (pp. 79-98) written by Morris Rossabi deepens our understanding of the Ming Dynasty’s policy towards Central Asia, which was also the focus of M. Rossabi’s research in numerous other studies. The author centers on the period of the emperor Yung-le (1403-1424) during which the Imperial Court dispatched missions to many neighbouring countries and among others also to Hami. Although the overall involvement of the Ming Dynasty in the expansion of its frontier was relatively limited, the case of Hami proves that the Ming were prepared to secure its military and economic interests with considerable amount of resources. The Ming Dynasty sought continuance of the Yuan’s domination over politics in Hami (as was the case for instance also in Tibet) and the Yung-le period was crucial in this undertaking. Making use of the traditional repertoire of instruments (installing a ruler, appointment with a title, granting of a seal, threat of punitive expeditions, tribute missions, border trade) Yung-le managed to impose its authority in this Central Asian city state. His strategic interest was to ensure good relations with Hami’s leader and thus gaining their support against potentially hostile Central Asian peoples. The Chinese engagement in Hami weakened after his death and the successive rise of Oyirad Mongols. As in the tribute relations with other regions, the Ming Court was concerned about the large number of embassies from Hami which led to further frictions with Hami. The rise of Turfan in the 1460’s under the leadership of Sultan ‘Ali started the final deterioration of Ming influence in Hami which ended in 1510. The continuous involvement with Hami in the 15th century produced a group of Chinese experts (e.g. Chen Cheng, Ma Wensheng) who helped to shape the realistic approach of the Ming Dynasty towards Central Asia.

The paper “Visions of the Border in Chinese Frontiers Poetry” (pp. 99-117) by Gudula Linck is focused on a distinct genre in Chinese literature – so-called frontier poetry (bian saishi) written by members of the educated elite (generals, statesmen) who came into contact with alien people, mainly on the northern and north-western frontier of China from the Han Dynasty onwards. G. Linck analyses the material under four perspectives – borderland as human interaction, border as nature and landscape, frontier as the place of battle and frontier as a political phenomenon. Although the general attitude towards the other is characterized by the prevailing feeling of Chinese superiority and the descriptions of non-Chinese bear traditional stereotypes which can also be found in Standard Histories and other sources, the personal knowledge of the environment and the first-hand experience with the military and cultural conflict with the other make this poetry an interesting and so far neglected source for our understanding of the relations between China and the steppe.

The contribution “Chinese Emperors and Tibetan Monks” by Sabine Dabringhaus (pp. 119-134) is divided into two parts. The first contains a brief survey of Sino-Tibetan relations from the 7th century, when the Tibetan Empire and the Tang Dynasty China established vivid contacts, till the 18th century, when the status of Tibet in the Qing Inner Asian Empire was finally settled. The second part is focused on the instrumentalization of Tibetan Buddhism by Qing elite in pursuing its political aims not only in Tibet.
but also in Mongolia. Various means of on the one hand Imperial support for Tibetan Buddhism and Buddhist clergy (foundation of Gelugpa monasteries in Tibet, Mongolia and Beijing; financing of translation of Buddhist works) and on the other of Imperial control (registration of monks in monasteries; interference in clerical autonomy) are mentioned. Chinese documents with regulations regarding Tibetan Buddhism are quoted. These represent the ideal model and do not necessary mirror the reality (e.g. the regulation regarding the lottery system for appointing the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama introduced in 1792; the order for the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to appear regularly at the Qing court – after the visit of the 5th Dalai Lama in Beijing in 1652 the next Dalai Lama who visited Beijing was the 13th in 1908). When analysing the political mechanism – its successes and failures – which motivated the Qing involvement with Tibetan Buddhism, official Chinese documents should be evaluated very cautiously. The process of Imperial political control over Tibet and Tibetan religion is important for understanding the current Chinese Tibet policy.

The paper “Some Topoi in Southern Border Historiography During the Ming (And Their Modern Relevance)” by Geoff Wade (pp. 135-158) deals with the various topoi related to Chinese and non-Chinese which can be found in Chinese historiography. G. Wadde illustrates these stereotypes (the dichotomy of morality, fairness, justness, virtue versus the opposite represented by the other) which legitimized the self-perceived superiority of Chinese in their relations with the outside world on the material from Ming shilu related to southern border of the Ming Dynasty. The issue of validation of Chinese invasions, expeditions and voyages during the Ming in the context of these topoi is very illustrative. The use of the language by the description of these Ming offensive undertakings and its 20th century pendants in Chinese history-writing are fine examples of a complex problem related to the status of minority nationalities in the PR of China and the construction of their ethnic history by the Han-Chinese dominated state. The sound arguments presented by G. Wade help to crack the prevailing notion of traditional China as a non-agressive and pacificistic empire.

The study “Die Paracel- und Spratly-Inseln in Sung-, Yüan-, und frühen Ming-Tex-ten: Ein maritimes Grenzgebiet” by Roderich Ptak (pp. 159-181) also has also important implication for the contemporary dispute about territorial claims over these islands by a number of East and South-east Asian states. The evidence of geographical works from the 9th to 16th century, which were consulted by the author, show that as a rule Song, Yuan and early Ming texts do not contain references to Paracel and Spratly Islands and because of their remote peripheral location (and because they were uninhabited) they were regarded by Chinese authors as unimportant and not considered as part of the Chinese empire, but this gradually changed during the 16th and 17th century.

Other case studies included in the publication under review and not dealt in detail here include: “The Yangzi in the Negotiations between the Southern Tang and its Northern Neighbours (Mid-Tenth Century)” by Johannes L. Kurz (pp. 29-48); “A Borderline Case: Korean Travelers’ Views of the Chinese Border (Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century)” by Marion Eggert (pp. 49-78); “Macao, Miguel de Arriaga, and the Chinese: A Note on the Failed British Occupation of Macao in 1808” by António Graça de Abreu (pp. 183-198); “Ohne Pfosten und Posten: Die Grenze zur Alishan-Region im Taiwan Qing-Zeit” by Thomas O. Höllman (pp. 199-210); and “Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch’ing” by Ng Chin-keong (pp. 211-257).

The eleven case studies presented in the publication under review offer an interesting insight into the manifolded and complex relationship between China and her various
neighbours and also have important implication for the current Chinese perception of
the borders and neighbours of the PR of China.

Martin Slobodnik

SHU-HUI WU: Die Eroberung von Qinghai unter Berücksichtigung von Tibet und Khams

The publication under review is a monograph devoted to the Qing conquest of the
Qoshod Mongols in the territory of today’s Qinghai Province in 1723-1724. This topic
was so far neglected by researchers and the present study in detail depicts and analyses
this military, political and economical undertaking. The main source used by the author
are the memorials (zouzhe) of Nian Gengyao (?1726), the Governor-general of Shaanxi
and Sichuan, who together with the general Yue Zhongqi (1686-1754) played a crucial
role in this campaign and according to the author, was in 1720’s “the most important
person in the frontier policy of the Qing Dynasty”. The memorials, written in Manchu
and Chinese, are an important source for the study of these events, as they include the
first-hand accounts of various phases and aspects of this conquest. The collection  of
Nian Gengyao’s memorials published in Taipei in 1971 also includes the correspon­
dence of the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723-1736) to him and the remarks (zhupi) of the
emperor. This rich material enables the author not only to reconstruct a comprehensive
picture of the military campaign (which, in other official sources, such as Qing Shilu,
was treated only briefly and the records are influenced by the later conflict between
the Yongzheng emperor and Nian Gengyao) but also reflects the close relationship betw­
een the emperor and Nian Gengyao and the emperor’s absolute trust in the handling the
conquest of Qinghai by Nian Gengyao. The author also took in account other official
Manchu, Chinese and Tibetan sources.

The conquest of Qinghai was a part of the so-called three emperors’ campaign
(1715-1758) which was concluded by the wiping out of the Dzungars. The author briefly
describes the complex situation in Inner Asia, where in the beginning of the 17th cen­
tury the main powers were the Qing Dynasty, the various local leaders of the Qoshod
Mongols in Qinghai and the Dzungars in the eastern part of Central Asia. Tibetans
played a rather passive role in this struggle, although the Dzungar invasion of Central
Tibet in 1717 was the starting point of the conflict between the Qoshod Mongols and the
Qing who formed an alliance during the campaign to Lhasa in 1720. Their relations
soon deteriorated as a result of, on the one hand unfulfilled promises of the Qing, and
on the other of the purposeful Qing policy aimed at conquering Qinghai and so
strengthening China’s influence in Tibet and Central Asia. This policy led to the rebel­
lion of Lobzang Danjin, the most powerful local Mongol chieftain in Qinghai, in 1723
which the newly crowned emperor Yongzheng handled with the assistance of his loyal
general Nian Gengyao. The monograph analyses the strategic and economic back­
ground of this military campaign and the author offers readers a vivid picture of the
complexity of this issue. The memorials of Nian Gengyao mirror his deep understand­
ing of all the aspects of the situation in Qinghai of the period.

As the territory of Qinghai and Kham (i. e. western Sichuan) was inhabited by vari­
ous ethnic, tribal and religious groups (Qoshod Mongols, Khalkha Mongols, Moslims,
various Tibetan tribes), in the course of the conflict between the Qing and Qoshods
these groups with their individual interests had to take sides in this war. It is interesting

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to note, that in spite of the harmonious relationship between the Fifth and successive Dalai Lamas and the Qing Emperors and the imperial support for Tibetan Buddhism (especially as a political instrument in the pursuit of Qing political aims among Mongols), the Tibetans – both the secular and religious elites – inhabiting Qinghai sided with the rebels. This mistaken decision resulted in the destruction of a number of monasteries in Qinghai and lead to horrible killings of Tibetans by the Imperial army. The rebellion of Lobzang Danjin ended with the Qing victory and the flight of Lobzang Danjin to the Dzungars, who in the course of the conflict remained neutral and later in 1726 even signed a peace-treaty with the Qing. The Qing Dynasty introduced a number of political, administrative, military and economical reforms – initiated mainly by Nian Gengyao – which further strengthen the Qing influence in Qinghai and definitely incorporated this province into China. The author concludes her monograph with the aftermath of this campaign - the tragic fate of the loyal imperial servant Nian Gengyao, who fell into disgrace with the Yongzheng emperor (the reasons are not clearly stated in the preserved sources) and was sentenced to suicide.

The publication under review is a valuable account of the Chinese conquest of the Qinghai. The monograph gives a complex picture of the complicated political situation in Inner Asia at the beginning of the 18th century and contributes to the understanding of the Qing expansion into this region. It is of high interest not only for Sinologists, but also for Tibetologists and Mongolists and illustrates the richness of information preserved in Manchu sources.

Martin Slobodnik


After the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990’s, which has been accompanied by numerous ethnic conflict on its former territory, and the long expected death of Deng Xiaoping, more and more researchers have started to focus their interest on the ethnic situation in the contemporary People’s Republic of China, which was often perceived as a nation-state inhabited by a homogeneous population of the “Chinese”, and the short list of monographs devoted to this question which were published during the 1970s and 1980s began to grow. The publication under review examines the ethnic composition of China from a historical perspective. The author does not focus his interest on the history of individual ethnic groups which inhabited the territory of today’s China (with some exceptions motivated by the relevance of the problem to the current situation, for example history of Tibet since the 18th century on pp. 188-192) but concentrates on the long and complicated development which resulted in the creation of a unified multiethnic empire and then later, in the 20th century, modern state.

In six chapters and the epilogue the author presents the history of China from the 1500 B. C. to the end of the 20th century while concentrating on the central issue of his publication: he examines the integration processes which led to the unification of empire, seeing it not only as an institutional and political undertaking, but also stressing the ethnic and cultural issues which produced the necessary degree of homogeneity. The issues of the so-called Sinification are also mentioned, as well as the gradual territorial expansion of the Chinese empire which reached its peak in the 18th century. On the other hand, the reasons which resulted in decline of individual Chinese dynasties and the
birth of non-Chinese dynasties on the periphery (and on two occasions, the Yuan and Qing dynasties, also in the heart of traditional China) are stated. The author devotes considerable attention to the period of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), a cosmopolitan era of Chinese history, when foreign influences decisively marked Chinese religion, philosophy and art. This period of openness towards the outside world lead to numerous discussions on Chinese identity among the Confucian literati, who played a crucial role in the construction of a politically and culturally unified empire.

Against the background of imperial China (with good reasons the author corrects the assertion that China is a country with 5,000 years of continuous history, a statement frequently repeated by both journalists and politicians, p. 230) H. Schmidt-Glintzer depicts the process of nation building in republican China. Maybe he could have devoted more space to the often neglected question of the fictitious character of a unified Han nationality (p. 208) and the complex issues related to the ambiguity of the term Chinese (an inclusive, officially sanctioned term encompassing the members of various ethnic groups living in the territory of contemporary China versus an exclusive notion which is reserved only for so-called “Han-Chinese”, p. 13, the very usage of the term “Han-Chinese” by Sinologists illustrates exactly the ambiguity of the term Chinese). Also in the 20th century the strive for unity finally proved stronger than the secessionist tendencies but the much discussed scenario of the disintegration of China in the 1990s (motivated not only by ethnic self-determination but also by economic reasons) remains a risk factor of the future development. Although one can agree with the author that ethnic separatism will never be a danger for a strong China (p. 10), the history of China presented in the publication under review proves, that the periods of disintegration constitute a not negligible part of its history.

The publication is accompanied by numerous maps, bibliography and a register. A glossary of Chinese characters would be helpful for any reader acquainted with the Chinese language. Despite minor inaccuracies (e.g., on the page 191 the author states that PRC granted independence to Tibet in the so-called 17-point agreement signed in May 1951 which does not correspond to reality, the central government granted Tibet political, economic and cultural autonomy within the borders of a communist state) it gives a comprehensive picture of the historical development which preceded the current ethnic composition of PRC. It gives the necessary historical background to anybody interested in the various ethnic tensions in current PRC and illustrates the different character of the interethnic relations in PRC as compared with the former Soviet Union.

Martin Slobodnik
GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

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Footnotes should be written on a separate sheet.

Illustrations, Figures, Diagrams, Tables must be numbered in Arabic figures and marked in pencil at the back with the author’s name. Relevant notes should be typed on a separate sheet. Illustrations must be drawn neatly on white paper and lettering must be legible after reduction in size for printing. Photographs must be submitted unmounted on white glossy paper. A note in the margin should indicate the approximate place for the illustrations to be inserted.
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